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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS
Edward T. Swaine *

Do assignments of legislative power to international institutions like the
World Trade Organization and the UN Security Council infringe the U.S.
Constitution? Recent scholarship takes two radically different views. One
perspective contends that such delegations are constitutionally problematic,
chiefly in terms of the nondelegation doctrine and federalism. But a second
perspective suggests that these doctrines lack legal or normative salience.
Delegations of legislative authority, for some, are functionally indistinguishable from any other kind of legislation; federalism, others argue, offers no
advantages over managed decentralization. On either ground, the incongruity between the increasing use of international delegations and U.S. constitutional principles is resolved by dismissing constitutional considerations
altogether.
This Article favors neither perspective, and advances a new one. Some
delegations of legislative authority do raise colorable constitutional issues.
But the reasons why delegation analysis remains conceptually relevant—including the difficulty that any one nation has in controlling international
institutions—indicate that such delegations actually serve other constitutional values, particularly the value federalism places on diffusing authority
and creating checks on the power of the national government. That is, notwithstanding the adverse effects international institutions may have on the
existing agents of U.S. federalism—the states—such delegations actually
serve some of the same ends.
After explaining this claim, and addressing other welfarist and democratic concerns, the Article closes by identifying types of international delegations that remain particularly problematic. The objective is to avoid any
overbroad indictment of international delegations, without at the same time
denying the continuing salience of constitutional values.

* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, and Associate Professor
of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I received valuable comments from
participants in workshops hosted by the Wharton School, the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, and the American Society of International Law’s Interest Group on
International Law in Domestic Courts. I thank the Legal Studies Department for a
generous research grant.
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The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the
lawmaking function belongs to Congress and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity.
—Justice Kennedy, in Loving v. United States (1996)1
The answer to Lord Ellenborough’s famous rhetorical question,
“Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the
whole world?” may well be yes, where the world has conferred
such binding authority through treaty.
—Justice Breyer, in Torres v. Mullin (2003)2
INTRODUCTION
The practice of delegating to international institutions—vesting
them with the authority to develop binding rules3—sometimes looks like
1. 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
2. 124 S. Ct. 562, 565 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (quoting
Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K.B. 1808) (Ellenborough, C.J.)).
3. Terminology is critical in defining this Article’s scope. First, the delegating acts in
question are domestic statutes or international agreements that vest continuing lawmaking
authority in an international institution, not those that compromise national authority
simply by virtue of the original agreement. See Curtis A. Bradley, International
Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557,
1558 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International Delegations] (making similar
distinction); see also Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 Tex.
Int’l L.J. 527, 537 (2003) [hereinafter Young, Trouble] (noting that the WTO and NAFTA
“constitute institutions rather than simply establish binding commitments”).
Second, the authority so vested must be capable of some kind of legal effect on the
international or domestic plane: something more than mere pronouncements or
hortatory acts, but not necessarily having direct effect in domestic law. Contrast George A.
Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional Integration, 46
Am. J. Comp. L. 463, 463 (Supp. 1998) (differentiating “agreements that create new
institutions and ostensibly vest those institutions with the power to make ‘law’ that will be
binding and directly effective within the states that are party to them” from conventional
international agreements).
Third, I follow political scientists in defining “international institutions” quite
broadly—including not only international organizations, but also international legal
regimes that lack such a concrete identity. See Robert O. Keohane, International
Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?, Foreign Pol’y, Spring 1998, at 82, 82
(describing international institutions as “rules that govern elements of world politics and
the organizations that help implement those rules”); see also Stephen D. Krasner,
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in
International Regimes 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1982) (defining international regimes as
“sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”).
This incorporates numerous arrangements that allocate corporate authority to a
conference of the parties (COP), or a meeting of the parties (MOP), rather than to any
traditional intergovernmental organization. See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein,
Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A
Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 623, 623 (2000)
(describing prevalence of such arrangements in environmental treaties); id. at 626
(differentiating COPs and MOPs from traditional intergovernmental organizations). More
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the next New Deal. Despite its continuing mistrust of international engagements,4 the United States continues to vest new authority in established organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO), and to create new institutions, like the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), that exercise considerable power over U.S. affairs.
The march seems inexorable. Notwithstanding painfully slow progress in
the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, and a tenuous commitment to the
sacrifices required by free trade, the United States is trying to extend
NAFTA-like institutions across the rest of the Americas.5 And after undertaking a military campaign in Iraq marked for its unilateral character,
the United States ceded substantial authority over reconstruction efforts
controversially, it includes aspects of customary international law. See infra notes 111–134
and accompanying text.
Fourth, and finally, I focus on delegations of legislative, rather than judicial or
executive, power. This makes a difference in domestic constitutional terms, and also
reflects a category generally recognized within the law of international organizations. See
infra notes 29–44 and accompanying text. In surveying international delegations, however,
I do take note of several that are predominately executive or judicial in character. See
infra notes 145–156 and accompanying text.
4. One observer summarized:
From the law of the seas to the Kyoto Protocol, from the biodiversity convention,
from the extraterritorial application of the trade embargo against Cuba or Iran,
from the brusk calls for reform of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund and the International Criminal Court: American unilateralism
appears as an omnipresent syndrome pervading world politics.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power 155 (2002) (quoting Harald Muller).
For assessments of U.S. unilateralism and its causes, see Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign
Policy: Ambivalent Engagement (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002); U.S.
Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral
Institutions (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003). For a history of the U.S. position in the
twentieth century, see Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and
International Organization, 1919–1999 (1999).
5. See Elizabeth Becker, For Bush, A Janus-Like View of Trade, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
2003, at C1. The draft Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement contains
robust, NAFTA-like dispute resolution provisions, see FTAA—Free Trade Area of the
Americas, Third Draft Agreement, Nov. 21, 2003, ch. XXIII, FTAA Doc. FTAA.TNC/w/
133/Rev.3, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp (on file with
the Columbia Law Review), even if its scope may have become less ambitious than was once
the case, see Paul Blustein, Trade Talks End in Vague Accord, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 2003, at
E1—and though it should also be noted that other recent trade agreements are more
modest in this regard, see, e.g., United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement,
June 1, 2004, art. 20, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/DR-CAFTA/DR-CAFTA_Final_Texts/asset_upload_file85_3940.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). Beyond the Americas, the Doha Round appears to have been
jump-started by recent agricultural commitments. WTO General Council, Doha Work
Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579
(Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul
04_e.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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to new entities governed by existing international agencies,6 made concessions to Iraqi sovereignty in order to secure passage of a UN Security
Council resolution,7 and tried to secure military assistance from NATO.8
Just as with the New Deal, which in effecting an analogous reassignment of domestic political authority weathered serious constitutional objections to the delegation of legislative power,9 opinions about the new
international arrangements—their significance and their merits—are
sharply divided. Sometimes they are described as entrusting U.S. regulatory authority to a sinister cabal of foreign potentates,10 inviting caricature.11 Nevertheless, serious concerns may be perceived. International
delegations, critics suggest, inappropriately compromise the authority of
national and local governments, invite rent seeking, reduce global wel6. The International Reconstruction Trust Fund Facility for Iraq, for example, was
developed by the UN Development Group and the World Bank, United Nations-World
Bank International Reconstruction Trust Fund Facility for Iraq, at http://www.uniraq.org/
donors/irffi.asp#Documents_and_Guidelines (last visited Aug. 29, 2004) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review), and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq,
established pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution, includes representatives of
offices within the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Arab Fund for
Economic and Social Development, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD). International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq, Terms of
Reference (Oct. 24, 2003), at http://www.iamb.info/tor.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); see S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1483 (2003) (outlining multilateral approach to rebuilding Iraq); Steven R. Weisman, U.S.
to Cede Part of Control over Aid to Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2003, at A1 (discussing U.S.
plans to transfer control of Iraqi aid to agency controlled by UN and World Bank).
7. Robin Wright & Dana Milbank, U.S. Bends to France, Russia on U.N. Iraq
Resolution, Wash. Post, June 8, 2004, at A4; see S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1546 (2004).
8. Jackie Calmes, Chirac Reaffirms No Wider Role for NATO in Iraq, Wall St. J., June
10, 2004, at A2. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 402–412.
9. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 255–61, 295–303 (1998)
(describing transformation of administrative state in 1930s against nondelegation
challenges); David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility 37–40, 158–64 (1993)
(describing similar developments, but denying that constitutional transformation).
10. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, The Great Betrayal 264–65 (1998) (voicing
sovereignty concerns about NAFTA); id. at 313 (“Run by nameless, faceless, foreign
bureaucrats, the WTO is the embryonic trade ministry of a world government.”); Cliff
Kincaid, Global Bondage: The U.N. Plan to Rule the World 97 (1995) (criticizing UN as a
nascent world government, representing “a transfer of powers delegated to the people by
the Constitution to more distant levels of government, this time on an international
level”); Marc A. Thiessen, When Worlds Collide: Out with the New, Foreign Pol’y,
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 64, 64 (characterizing “a plethora of new regional and global
supranational institutions” as effecting “[a] transformation . . . of a magnitude unseen
since the Protestant Reformation and the creation of the modern nation-state almost 500
years ago”).
11. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.
213, 215 (2002) [hereinafter Alvarez, Treaty Makers] (“For believers in threatening U.N.
black helicopters, the erosion of sovereignty implies lack of control or undemocratic
delegations of power to faceless international bureaucrats.”).
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fare, diminish accountability in governance, and undermine democracy.12 In a recent, widely noted essay,13 Jed Rubenfeld commented that:
The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international governance organizations—their centralization, their opacity, their remoteness from popular or representative politics, their elitism,
their unaccountability—are well known. . . . World government
in the absence of world democracy is necessarily technocratic,
bureaucratic, diplomatic—everything but democratic.
....
. . . What sets [America’s] teeth on edge [are] . . . binding
agreements administered, interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies . . . . America’s commitment to democratic self-government gives the United States good reason to be skeptical
about—indeed, to resist—international legal regimes structured
. . . around antinationalist and antidemocratic principles.14
These objections have found a constitutional footing. Recent legal scholarship has identified inconsistencies between international delegations
and the constitutional bar on delegating legislative authority.15 Other
12. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 167, 170–84 (1999) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Exit and Voice] (describing capture of
international institutions by small interest groups); Eric Stein, International Integration
and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 489, 490 (2001) (noting claim in
academic discourse that “internationalization ‘almost invariably means a loss of
democracy’” (quoting Ralf Dahrendorf, The Third Way and Liberty: An Authoritarian
Streak in Europe’s New Center, Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 13, 16)); Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int’l
L. & Bus. 681, 698–99 (1996–1997) (describing international lawmaking’s relative lack of
accountability and vulnerability to interest group politics); Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice
View of International Organizations, in The Political Economy of International
Organizations: A Public Choice Approach 27, 27–40 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett
eds., 1991) (citing problems of rent seeking and lack of effective oversight); cf. Kal
Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int’l
Econ. L. 841, 841 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter Raustiala, Rethinking] (citing examples of
“voluminous” literature on international institutions, sovereignty, and democratic
accountability).
13. Compare, e.g., George F. Will, Paris Versus Philadelphia, Newsweek, Oct. 13,
2003, at 80, 80 (describing Rubenfeld’s essay as “mind-opening”), with Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Dangerous Myth, Prospect, Jan. 22, 2004, at 11, 11 (criticizing Rubenfeld’s
essay as resting on flawed constitutional analysis and a view of international law
“unrecognisable to an international lawyer”).
14. Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, Wilson Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 34, 36.
15. See, e.g., Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, passim (describing
delegation concerns, and advocating non-self-execution of treaty obligations as remedy);
Lori Fisler Damrosch, “Sovereignty” and International Organizations, 3 U.C. Davis J. Int’l
L. & Pol’y 159, 159–61, 165–66 (1997) [hereinafter Damrosch, Sovereignty] (describing
tensions between delegations to international organizations and the nondelegation
doctrine); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 71, 77–78 (2000) (advocating
resuscitation of nondelegation doctrine for foreign affairs); John C. Yoo, The New
Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the
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scholarship takes the view that constitutional federalism is at stake, insofar as exercises of delegated authority sometimes challenge attributes of
state sovereignty.16 Enforcing the nondelegation doctrine, then, would

Appointments Clause, 15 Const. Comment. 87, 111, 114–16 (1998) [hereinafter Yoo, New
Sovereignty] (describing nondelegation issues adjacent to Appointment Clause objections
to international delegations); Young, Trouble, supra note 3, at 533–38 (noting challenges
posed by supranational lawmaking to constitutional scheme); see also David A. Koplow,
When Is an Amendment Not an Amendment?: Modification of Arms Control Agreements
Without the Senate, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 981, 1042–43 (1992) (concluding that, as a result of
deferential standard of judicial review, delegated authority in arms control agreements
“would probably be upheld as constitutional—but only barely”).
Many others, it should be stressed, see nothing unduly problematic about
international delegations. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution 247–73 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Henkin, Foreign Affairs] (finding few
constitutional issues to be posed by international delegations); David Golove, The New
Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55
Stan. L. Rev. 1697, 1699–1701 (2003) (expressing skepticism regarding normative and
doctrinal case against international delegations); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution,
Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority
to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 331, 358–65, 382–85,
392–96 (1998) (concluding that international delegations would be problematic under
existing Supreme Court dictum, but should be upheld under general separation of powers
principles); Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52
Hastings L.J. 1, 11–15, 40–46 (2000) (contending that international delegations are
transformational, “generat[ing] a de facto ‘international branch’ of federal government”);
Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 239,
251–57 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic] (suggesting that criticisms
of international delegations are exaggerated and reflect general discomfort with role of
courts); Note, Discretion and Legitimacy in International Regulation, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1099, 1107–08 (1994) (“dismiss[ing] quickly” on doctrinal and policy grounds the
possibility of “interpret[ing] the nondelegation doctrine to bar Congress from delegating
authority to make international law”).
16. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters 68–69 (1998) (describing
impact of global governance on federalism); Enid F. Beaumont, Domestic Consequences
of Internationalization, in Globalization and Decentralization 374, 374–86 (Jong S. Jun &
Deil S. Wright eds., 1996) (describing effect of globalization and international trade
agreements on federalism); Bermann, supra note 3, at 466–67 (noting that “NAFTA
effectively mandates coordinated and even uniform rules on certain matters previously left
to independent state regulation and seeks to ensure that all state laws and regulations in
areas such as health, safety and environmental protection conform to the standards
established through the NAFTA framework”); Bradley, International Delegations, supra
note 3, at 1559 (“[D]elegations of authority to international institutions . . . have the
potential to erode U.S. federalism by enhancing the power of the entire federal
government vis-à-vis the states.”); Ku, supra note 15, at 72–73 (drawing on federalism
doctrine to evaluate propriety of international delegations); Young, Trouble, supra note 3,
at 532–41 (describing tensions between international assignments of authority and
federalism); Julie Long, Note, Ratcheting Up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause Analysis of
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 231, 232–33 (1995) (“U.S.
accession to NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements challenges traditional state
powers in the name of free international trade in a way that never before has been
accomplished.”).
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seemingly vindicate two constitutional norms at one fell swoop, in addition to remedying bedrock political concerns—such as the promotion of
democratic governance—that have less immediate constitutional
salience.
One problem with this solution is that the constitutional doctrines of
nondelegation and federalism are themselves of limited salience. Each exemplifies what Lawrence Sager memorably dubbed “underenforced constitutional norms”: not abandoned, exactly, but hardly enforced to their
“full conceptual limits.”17 The nondelegation doctrine is rarely decisive,18 even less so in foreign affairs,19 and it has been called “moribund”
for so long that one might assume (mistakenly) that it has already shuf-

Other commentators, of course, suggest that concerns about state sovereignty are
misplaced. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Real Federalism: Why It Matters, How It Could
Happen 2 (1999) [hereinafter Greve, Real Federalism] (commenting that “[a]gainst the
backdrop of an intense debate over the (perceived or real) loss of American sovereignty to
. . . international organizations, . . . the dignities and powers of the states seems secondary,
if not wholly anachronistic,” but distinguishing legitimate concerns about “real
federalism”); A.J. Tangeman, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State
Government in a Global Economy: Will the NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process
Preserve State Sovereignty?, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 243, 243–46 (1996) (describing concerns
regarding state sovereignty and federalism, but concluding that federal-state consultation
process under NAFTA provides model for reconciliation).
17. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1221 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair
Measure]. Subsequent scholarship has explained how such norms may be influential in
statutory construction. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J.
545, 547–48 (1990) (explaining how plenary power doctrine has resulted in courts
neglecting constitutional claims and deciding cases instead on the basis of
“subconstitutional” concerns); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1581–85 (2000)
[hereinafter Young, Constitutional Avoidance] (describing how avoidance doctrine can
result in overenforcement of constitutional provisions).
18. The leading—which is to say, only—cases applying the doctrine to strike down
congressional statutes are Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). That said, the doctrine
continues to be invoked, and seriously considered, to this day. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001) (discussing lower court’s suggestion that
narrower construction of statute at issue could cure unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power); see also infra text accompanying notes 204–218 (discussing Supreme
Court’s nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence).
19. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (asserting
that in order to avoid embarrassment and promote national objectives, “congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved”); see Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 124–25 (concluding that
nondelegation doctrine has “never had much” life in foreign affairs, but noting increasing
attempts by Congress to limit delegations and possibility that delegation remained
constitutionally circumscribed when delegated power “impinges on individual rights”).
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fled off.20 And while federalism crops up in an impressive array of constitutional decisions, the principle that states have an inviolable sovereignty
over certain subject matters has also fallen out of fashion,21 and was never
robust in foreign affairs.22 There is a gap, in short, between the theoretical import of the nondelegation and federalism doctrines and their actual practice.
As if that were not enough, some would address this apparent incongruity not by reviving those doctrines, but rather by denying that either
one had any conceptual integrity in the first place. Delegating authority,
it is argued, is legally and functionally identical to ordinary legislating,
and should hardly be singled out for constitutional scrutiny.23 Federalism, too, is said to offer no advantage (and considerable disadvantage) as
against elective, nationally managed decentralization.24 Taken together,
these criticisms suggest that the Constitution has nothing relevant to say
about international delegations: Not only are the nondelegation and federalism doctrines rarely enforced by the judiciary, but they utterly fail to
advance any discernible constitutional value.
20. E.g., Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing doctrine as “virtually abandoned” and “moribund”);
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C. 1986) (explaining that, “while the
delegation doctrine may be moribund, it has not yet been officially interred by the
Court”), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). For metaphoric variety, see
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 330 (2002) (“The
nondelegation doctrine, however, is the Energizer Bunny of constitutional law: No matter
how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on going and going.”);
Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, Regulation, July/Aug. 1980, at 25, 28
(“[E]ven with all its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the
unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice.”). Both Professor
Lawson and, in time, Justice Scalia, nonetheless conceded that the doctrine was essentially
dormant. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Supreme Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress”
regarding the permissibility of delegations, and that it last did so “over half a century ago”);
Lawson, supra, at 334 (“[T]he forces that ground down the nondelegation doctrine are
still at work, and they are not likely to go away.”).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 363–369.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 371–373.
23. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1757–59 (2002) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Interring].
24. See Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 Ga.
St. U. L. Rev. 1009, 1013, 1026–28 (1997) (arguing that interest in federalism is artificially
generated by virtues more properly attributed to decentralization, which may in fact be
impaired by a federal structure); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 910–26 (1994) (distinguishing
federalism from decentralization and arguing that decentralization, not federalism, serves
needs of safeguarding citizen participation, fostering competition, and facilitating
experimentation); see also Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1,
19–51 (2002) (elaborating theoretical and practical tensions between decentralization and
federalism); Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37, 39–40 (2001) (explaining why distinguishing between
federalism and decentralization is necessary for coherent discourse).
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So which view ought to prevail—that international delegations offend the Constitution, or that the underlying doctrines invoked are misconceived and functionally irrelevant? Neither, in my reckoning. While
the judiciary may be ill equipped to strike down international delegations
on constitutional grounds, the conceptual relevance of nondelegation
and federalism to international delegations is not so easily dismissed. International delegations are demonstrably different from domestic delegations of legislative authority—primarily because the United States is just
one of many principals directing its international agents. And for this
reason, among others, the role of international delegations in reassigning
authority from the states is more problematic than when that authority is
assumed (and retained) by the national government.
It does not follow, however, that international delegations are an affront to the Constitution. Such measures are constitutional in two important and reinforcing senses. International delegations are troubling precisely because they are constitutional in character: That is, legislative
authority conferred on international institutions is difficult to reclaim.25
By the same token, however, this kind of commitment indirectly promotes a more specific constitutional value: the diffusion of political authority prized by federalism. While delegating national power to international institutions redistributes national legislative authority (including
that which might otherwise fall to the states), it provides a bulwark against
the concentration of political power in the national government that is
consistent with the ambitions of federalism.
Viewed this way, international delegations are constitutional in an
important—and neglected—regard: They advance a constitutional value
that deserves to be measured against any harm to constitutional values
that they may risk. This does not, of course, amount to a concrete finding that international delegations should always withstand constitutional
scrutiny, even in terms of the nondelegation and federalism doctrines. It
does, however, warrant resisting a preemptive, undifferentiated constitutional objection to such activities, particularly any that would condemn
them outright. It is also a small step toward a more sophisticated analysis,
one particularly relevant to Congress and the President, for distinguishing types of delegations that are most problematic.
This argument consists of four parts. Part I begins by describing
some existing U.S. arrangements with international institutions that look
like legislative delegations. Part II considers the continuing salience of
25. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism:
Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 Tex. L. Rev.
1985, 1996–99 (2003) (emphasizing significance of permanence as a constitutional
quality). To be clear, this notion of constitutionalism does not require privileging
economic liberalism or, for that matter, incorporating noneconomic values in WTO
principles. Contrast Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy:
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 Governance 73, 76–83 (2003) (critically
assessing rival understandings of WTO constitutionalism).
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nondelegation concerns, defending the notion that international delegations should be considered as presenting an issue distinct from ordinary
legislation—without concluding that they are unconstitutional. Part III
then considers the continued salience of federalism, which superficially
looks like a reason to dislike international delegations (and which plays
that role in national discourse about international engagements), but
which in fact provides a strong warrant in their favor. Part IV assesses
how we might reconcile some of the competing impulses of federalism
and nondelegation, including by identifying two species of international
delegation that are particularly problematic—the aggregation of power
in multipurpose international institutions, which is potentially troubling
in federalism terms, and “reverse” delegations reverting to national institutions, which may be particularly pernicious examples of delegation
offenses.
I. THE NATURE

OF

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

The significance and variety of international delegations are impressive, and it is necessary to survey those delegations in order to ground the
analysis. But this overview is limited in several important respects. Because the objective is to explore the relationship between these delegations and U.S. constitutional doctrine, I discuss only those international
institutions in which the United States participates or has seriously considered participating, rather than the entire universe of international instruments.26 Even within that class, commentators have identified a number of respects in which U.S. transfers of power to international
institutions raise delegation concerns. I focus here on the broadest, and
arguably the most problematic, category—assignments of what might be
deemed “legislative” power—though I briefly identify and contrast other
kinds of international delegations at the end of this Part.27
26. This necessarily excludes international delegations of the first significance, such as
the European Union. The U.S. focus also misses how other nations struggle to reconcile
international delegations with domestic nondelegation principles and the constitutional
role of subnational governments. See, e.g., Richard Deeg, Contemporary Challenges to
German Federalism: From the European Union to the Global Economy, 33 Law & Pol’y
Int’l Bus. 51 (2001); Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A
Comparative Analysis of United States and German Law, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 213 (1994); see
also infra note 173 (noting practice in the Netherlands and Denmark).
27. Two other limits are temporal in character. First, I do not assess whether
contemporary delegations are revolutionary in character, and I likewise assume that prior
practice has not conclusively resolved their constitutionality. While some commentators
consider international delegations to have changed in character during the twentieth
century, see, e.g., Ku, supra note 15, at 79–88 (describing nature of “new” international law
and its domestic encroachments); Thomas, supra note 15, passim (indicating case for
constitutional transformation), others argue that international delegations were
anticipated prior to the Constitution and regarded as appropriate immediately afterwards.
See Golove, supra note 15, at 1744–46 (concluding that two early treaties demonstrate that
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Concerns about legislative delegations derive from Article I of the
U.S. Constitution, which assigns “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted”
to the Congress.28 The constitutional understanding of “legislative Powers” does not, of course, bear any necessary relation to the types of authority exercised by international institutions. Even if international lawyers might agree with the Supreme Court that legislating involves “the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct,”29 that abstraction has
little correspondence to the way authority is described in international
agreements, let alone how that authority should be regarded for constitutional purposes.
The ILO illustrates the potential for, and weaknesses of, the analogy
to domestic legislation. ILO officials have sometimes described the organization as a world legislature,30 but its primary function is to promulgate conventions that nations may later choose whether to adopt.31 Activities of this character, which are common among international
organizations, seem more like introducing bills than enacting legislaPresident Washington and the first Senate “understood the treaty power to provide them
with broad authority and that . . . domestic nondelegation doctrines and the Appointments
Clause were inapplicable in the treaty context”); cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683,
690–91 (1892) (attaching great weight to practice of Congress in conferring trade and
commerce powers on the President). Second, I concentrate on existing, rather than
potential, international delegations. Many of the same issues arise, however, in evaluating
proposed U.S. engagements. See, e.g., Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at
1578 n.99 (discussing Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4,
2003, 42 I.L.M. 26). I consider possible implications for future delegations in Part IV.
28. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; see id. art. I, § 8 (detailing powers).
29. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944); see, e.g., Edward Yemin,
Legislative Powers in the United Nations and Specialized Agencies 6 (1969) (“[L]egislative
acts have three essential characteristics: they are unilateral in form, they create or modify
some element of a legal norm, and the legal norm in question is general in nature, that is,
directed to indeterminate addressees and capable of repeated application in time.”).
Assessments of the prevalence of international legislation vary markedly, perhaps due to
the lack of any shared understanding of the term. Cf. infra notes 42–44 and accompanying
text (noting salience, to some, of nonunanimity). Compare, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, The
Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 901, 901 (2002) (noting that “[i]t has
long been accepted that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) cannot legislate
international law,” but noting exceptions), with Gunter Handl, Environmental Security
and Global Change: The Challenge of International Law, in Environmental Protection
and International Law 59, 62 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991) (describing “the prospect of
a virtually continuous legislative enterprise” created by existing international institutions).
30. See, e.g., Florence Ellinwood Allen, The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation 77
(1952) (quoting ILO Director-General’s proclamation that “[t]oday the role of the
organization as to an international parliament has become generally accepted”).
31. The ILO also issues recommendations, which are by their nature nonbinding.
Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Instrument of Amendment,
adopted Oct. 9, 1946, art. 19, 62 Stat. 3485, 3518–32, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 68–80 [hereinafter
ILO Constitution] (describing procedure governing conventions and recommendations).
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tion32—nor, for that matter, do they suggest that such organizations are
acting as “the new treaty makers.”33
At the same time, the analogy to domestic legislation does not capture all of the ILO’s lawmaking potential. For example, the ILO Constitution may be amended.34 Moreover, even if everyone can agree that
promulgating conventions is not, by itself, legislating,35 the ILO compels
all of its members—not just those voting for a convention’s adoption—to
submit it to the national authorities responsible for ratification.36 This is
an obligation to submit, not an obligation to ratify,37 but the difference
between the two obligations is not as substantial as may be imagined.38
The ILO has also asserted that members have a constitutional obligation
to respect certain conventions regardless of whether they have ratified

32. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 277 (Philippe Sands & Pierre Klein eds.,
5th ed. 2001) (noting that an international organizations does not “‘legislate[ ]’ for its
member states”; rather, its member states “take part in the process of adopting a convention
within the framework of an organisation . . .—retaining a complete freedom of choice on
the question of whether to become a party to that instrument later on”); Julia Sommer,
Environmental Law-making by International Organisations, 56 Zeitschrift für
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht [ZaörV] 628, 638 (1996) (explaining
that promulgation of multilateral conventions is “not real law-making by an international
organisation but rather the preparation of inter-state lawmaking within an international
organisation”).
33. Alvarez, Treaty Makers, supra note 11, at 213.
34. ILO Constitution, supra note 31, art. 36, 62 Stat. at 3550, 15 U.N.T.S. at 100
(providing that amendments adopted by a two-thirds majority of the ILO General
Conference take effect when ratified or accepted by two-thirds of the members, “including
five of the ten Members . . . represented on the Governing Body as Members of chief
industrial importance”); see infra note 45 (discussing UN procedure for amending
Charter).
35. This has been the focus of lengthy debate. See, e.g., Hector Bartolomei de la Cruz
et al., The International Labor Organization: The International Standards System and
Basic Human Rights 21–24 (1996) (describing “long and interesting debate”); Virginia A.
Leary, International Labour Conventions and National Law 11–12 (1982) (reporting
debate). But the question would seem to have been authoritatively resolved. See
Competence of the International Labour Organization to Regulate, Incidentally, the
Personal Work of the Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 17 (July 23) (“The [ILO]
has no legislative power. Each member is free to adopt or reject any proposals of the
Organization either for a national law or for an international convention.”).
36. ILO Constitution, supra note 31, art. 19(5), 62 Stat. at 3520, 15 U.N.T.S. at 70.
37. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, supra note 32, at 278.
38. Id. at 277–79 (noting differences between ILO and conventional treaty practices);
cf. Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling
the Playing Field for Developing-Country Workers, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 611, 656–57 (2001) (“As
a practical matter . . . even ratified conventions can be optional. While the ILO has an
intricate, formal enforcement process ultimately leading to the International Court of
Justice, the implementation of ratified ILO conventions in fact occurs because of an
elaborate system of publicity and shaming.”).
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them.39 While the legal authority for such a declaration is unclear,40 the
result resembles what the United States opposed on nondelegation
grounds in the original draft charter.41
As this example suggests, international legislation may take forms unfamiliar to domestic constitutional analysis, and it is tempting to winnow
out some of the variations. The clearest basis might involve state consent.
Traditionally, nations enjoyed the right to maintain an international insti-

39. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, June
18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1998) (declaring that “all Members,” even those that have
not ratified the relevant Conventions, “have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and
in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions,” such as those guaranteeing
nondiscrimination and freedom of association). See generally Brian A. Langille, The ILO
and the New Economy: Recent Developments, 15 Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 229,
229–30 (1999) (stating that member states “have constitutional obligations simply by virtue
of ILO membership”).
40. See Clyde Summers, NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and International Labor
Standards, 3 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 173, 184 (1999) (“It is uncertain whether this
Declaration can make specific conventions binding on [nations] by virtue of their ILO
membership, so as to become a part of their internal law . . . .”). A U.S. participant stressed
that the Declaration did not establish any legal obligation “beyond the present text of the
ILO Constitution.” Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles:
Submission, Discussion and Adoption (Discussion in Plenary), International Labour
Conference, 86th Sess. (1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/ilc/ilc86/com-decd.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (statement of E.
Potter); accord Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles: Committee
Report, International Labour Conference, 86th Sess. (1998), available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (citing assertions by member state representatives that Declaration
does not impose any legal obligations on member states). One might, consistent with this
view, regard the Declaration as more interpretive in character. But interpretation is
nominally assigned to the International Court of Justice, see ILO Constitution, supra note
31, art. 37(1), 62 Stat. at 3550, 15 U.N.T.S. at 92—or to another tribunal that has not yet
been created, id. art. 37(2), 62 Stat. at 3550–52, 15 U.N.T.S. at 100—and the authority of
any other body is dubious, see de la Cruz et al., supra note 35, at 35–36. But cf. W. Paul
Gormley, Human Rights and Environment: The Need for International Cooperation 46
(1976) (“ILO Common Law . . . is binding on ILO members, without the requirement of
ratification. Legal obligations are assumed by the acceptance (or the continuation) of ILO
membership.”); Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an
International Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 Am. J.L. & Med.
479, 529 (1999) (“[A]ll international instruments, whether declaratory or binding in form,
imply an obligation on state parties to cooperate in good faith in the realization of the
rights and obligations involved.”).
41. See Pitman B. Potter, Inhibitions on the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States, 28 Am. J. Int’l L. 456, 456 (1934) (reporting submission of U.S. delegates that “[t]o
permit a foreign body to conclude a treaty binding upon the United States would be
equivalent to delegating the [Senate’s] power of making treaties in the measure of the
provisions of the treaty in question”).
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tution’s status quo, such as by requiring unanimous assent for proposing
changes, by imposing consensus rules that respected the rights of objecting states, or, where the adoption by a majority was permitted, by reserving to each state the right to refuse ratification.42 This quasi-contractual approach has been relaxed in some institutions—where, for
example, amendments may be adopted and made fully effective by a majority (including after initial attempts to secure a consensus), states refusing to ratify changes may be suspended or find that the original, unamended treaty expires, and amendments may automatically come into
force for each state absent its timely dissent—and some consider only
such departures from unanimity to be international legislation.43
Such a rigid definition is underinclusive, in my view, because it too
readily assumes that the existence of a veto ameliorates any delegation
problems.44 Nonetheless, departures from unanimity are certainly the
most compelling examples of international legislative delegations, and
this Part will focus on them. For ease of exposition, these examples are
separated into several general categories: (1) delegations of treatyamending authority; (2) delegations of more standard legislative authority; (3) assimilations; and (4) customary international law.
A. Delegations of Treaty-Amending Authority
A number of institutions permit treaty amendment without the assent of the United States.45 Some provide that member nations may
change basic treaty terms—in essence, the constitutional architecture of
42. See Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law
§§ 781–790 (4th ed. 2003) (describing traditional commitment to unanimity in
international organizations, the advent of majority voting, and the resurgence of
mechanisms more closely resembling unanimity rules); see also id. §§ 771–780 (describing
decisionmaking by consensus, including variants that allowed ultimate recourse to majority
voting).
43. See Krzysztof Skubiszewski, International Legislation, in 2 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 1255, 1255–58 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995) (noting scholarly views
on defining international legislation and categorizing types of legislative procedures); cf.
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, supra note 32, at 263–75 (describing decline of
unanimity and development of alternative schemes); Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 12,
at 847–48 (exploring significance of veto for conceptions of sovereignty).
44. See infra notes 176–183 and accompanying text. As noted immediately below, any
more rigid approach is also contingent, insofar as institutions in which some nations have a
privileged role (like the Security Council, with its veto for Permanent Members) would
nonetheless be considered legislative in character for other, less powerful nations. See
infra note 45.
45. Others permit treaty amendment without the assent of every party, but not
without the assent of privileged members like the United States—creating a delegation
issue that is more acute for other member nations. The UN is a case in point.
Amendments to the Charter come into force only after approval by two-thirds of the
General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the members, “including all the
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an international arrangement.46 The WTO is an important, if unrealized,
illustration. In addition to permitting change through new rounds of
multilateral negotiations, the WTO may by a supermajority of its members decide to amend its basic agreement or other provisions.47 That
option has in fact never been exploited;48 any changes affecting a member’s rights and obligations, moreover, generally require its acquies-

permanent members of the Security Council.” U.N. Charter art. 108 (emphasis added);
see also id. art. 109, para. 2 (providing identical requirements for approval of amendments
recommended by a General Conference of members). Unsurprisingly, the Charter has
rarely been amended. See generally Carolyn L. Willson, Changing the Charter: The
United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 115 (1996)
(summarizing history of amendments). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 52–64
(noting prospect of de facto amendment via interpretation).
The ILO, on the other hand, demonstrates that a privileged position is not necessarily
permanent, and that privileges may be less than decisive. Amendments to the ILO
Constitution may be adopted by a two-thirds majority, but only if that majority includes five
of the ten “Members of chief industrial importance.” ILO Constitution, supra note 31, art.
36, 62 Stat. at 3550, 15 U.N.T.S. at 100. The United States is one such member, see
Composition of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office (as elected on 10th
June 2002 and modified to 30 November 2003), GB.05 (2002–2005) (Rev.3), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/refs/pdf/gbmember.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review), but its status is subject to change by the Governing Body.
ILO Constitution, supra note 31, art. 7(3), 62 Stat. at 3502, 15 U.N.T.S. at 52. Moreover, it
would have to secure the support of at least four other members of chief industrial
importance in order to defeat a two-thirds majority.
46. Schermers & Blokker, supra note 42, § 1173 (“Many constitutions require
ratification by a qualified majority of the members before a decision for amendment can
enter into force. The decision will then bind all members.”); id. §§ 1173–1175 (citing
examples and exploring implications); see also id. §§ 1178–1186 (citing examples in which
international organizations may amend or supplement their constitutions by decision or
interpretation).
47. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. X, § 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at
Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 1, at 137, 142 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1149 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Some provisions may be amended only with the consent
of all members. Id. art. X, § 2.
48. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 109, 172 (2002)
(concluding that “the WTO ‘legislators’ must agree unanimously to new rules,” since “[i]n
practice, amendments to the WTO (and the GATT before it) are just not made, whether
through consensus or voting”). This point was emphasized during U.S. consideration of
the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative
Action, attached to H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 656 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4045–46. There have been attempts, however, most notably a proposed
amendment to the Dispute Settlement Understanding submitted to the Third Session of
the Ministerial Conference in 1999, but that proposal was not acted upon. Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposals on Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Thematic Compilation,
IP/C/W/363/Add.1, ¶ 20(1), at 5 (July 23, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W363A1.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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cence.49 But other institutions, like the IMF50 and the International
Criminal Court (ICC),51 permit amendment of their governing instruments without such safeguards. The result, in theory, is that the United
States has assented to some institutions (and considered assenting to
others) that could alter its obligations without its consent.

49. Certain amendments affecting the rights and obligations of members take effect
“for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members
and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it.” WTO Agreement art. X,
§ 3. This is less than a right to veto. The WTO Ministerial Conference may by a threefourths vote decide that a duly adopted amendment is of sufficient import that any
member must accept it within a specified period or feel “free to withdraw from the WTO
or to remain a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference.” Id. In addition,
amendments to the trade provisions not involving members’ rights and obligations take
effect for all members upon the acceptance by two-thirds. Id. art. X, § 4. To be sure,
amendments not adopted by consensus fall by default within the category of those altering
rights and obligations—that is, requiring acceptance by individual members in order to be
effective against them—but a contrary conclusion may be reached by a three-fourths vote.
Id. art. X, § 1. In sum, changes to the trade provisions may be imposed by a
supermajority’s will, even should a particular member take the view that the changes affect
its rights and obligations. Amendments to the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) follow somewhat similar principles; amendments to certain provisions are binding
on all members once a two-thirds majority is secured, and even for amendments requiring
acceptance by members, the Ministerial Conference may present nonconsenting members
with the choice of withdrawing or remaining only by its leave. Id. art. X, § 5.
50. Proposals to amend the Articles of Agreement must first be approved by the
Board of Governors, which decides by a majority of (weighted) votes. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. XXVIII, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39, amended by 20 U.S.T. 2775; 29 U.S.T. 2203; T.I.A.S. No. 11898, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The amendment may then be approved by “three-fifths of the members, having
eighty-five percent of the total voting power.” Id. art. XXVIII(a); see, e.g., John W. Head,
Suspension of Debtor Countries’ Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment of the Third
Amendment to the IMF Charter, 33 Va. J. Int’l L. 591, 630–42 (1993) (discussing adoption
of an amendment permitting the suspension of voting rights of a member country that
persistently fails to abide by the Agreement). The IMF also has the power to alter quotas
for members, which in turn affects voting rights. See Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, supra, art. III(2) (assigning authority over altering quotas
and subscriptions to Board of Governors); id. art. XV(2) (describing method by which
Fund is to determine valuation of the special drawing right); id. art. XII (detailing
operation of Board of Governors, and voting procedures).
51. The Rome Statute provides that parties may by a two-thirds vote define the
elements of international crimes. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, art. 9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 98 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part II,
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000)
(defining terms relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). It also
provides for the amendment of other terms by a supermajority, Rome Statute, supra, arts.
121(3), 123(3), but specifies that parties objecting to certain amendments may limit their
legal effect, id. art. 121(5), and further permits parties to withdraw from the treaty more
easily in the teeth of objectionable amendments, id. art. 121(6).
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Equivalent changes may be more subtly accomplished through an
institution’s interpretation of its own charter.52 The WTO, for example,
has the authority to adopt binding interpretations of its governing agreement by a supermajority vote53 (though this authority, like the power to
amend the WTO agreements, is more apparent than real54). In the context of particular disputes, moreover, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) also has the ability to issue binding interpretations55—with
the potential to circumvent limits on the WTO’s more formal legislative
52. When the UN was founded, a committee reported that General Assembly
competence to interpret the Charter was “inherent in the functioning of any body which
operates under an instrument defining its functions and powers.” Lori F. Damrosch et al.,
International Law: Cases and Materials 147 (4th ed. 2001) (quoting report). See generally
C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 24–61
(1996) (describing role played by international organizations in interpreting their
constitutions); Schermers & Blokker, supra note 42, §§ 1155–1156 (same).
The comprehensive, and potentially recursive, character of interpretive authority is
best illustrated by the UN Security Council, which has effectively interpreted the Charter so
as to diminish the efficacy of Permanent Members’ vetoes. Article 27(3) indicates that any
substantive measure requires their “concurring votes,” but Council practice treats it as
sufficient if no negative vote is cast—that is, interpreting “concurring votes” to include
abstentions. Willson, supra note 45, at 118. The Council also established a subsidiary
entity, composed of Council members, in order to oversee Gulf War claims against Iraq—
and specified that the veto would not apply therein. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
2987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991) (incorporating by reference Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991),
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 2981st mtg., at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991)). “The overall
effect was to delegate a decision—otherwise subject to the veto—to a subsidiary organ
(with the same membership as the Council) where the veto does not apply.” David D.
Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 Am. J. Int’l
L. 552, 585 (1993).
53. WTO Agreement art. IX(2) (assigning to Ministerial Conference and General
Council “the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations” of referenced agreements upon
a three-fourths majority vote of the members, save where doing so “would undermine the
[formal] amendment provisions”).
54. Stein, supra note 12, at 500 n.62 (noting that interpretation provision “has
remained a dead letter”).
55. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 2(1), 3(2), WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 31, at 25,537,
25,539–41 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. Under the DSU, the DSB, comprised of
representatives from all WTO members, WTO Agreement art. IV(3), establishes panels to
entertain disputes, see DSU arts. 2(1), 6–8, 11, and adopts decisions by those panels and by
the Appellate Body. Id. arts. 16, 17(14). Notwithstanding the DSB’s ultimate control, the
arbitral panels and the Appellate Body retain the real interpretive authority: Their
decisions become binding only when adopted by the DSB, but the DSB is deemed to have
adopted them unless it musters a consensus to reject them. Id. arts. 16(4), 17(14). Since
at least one WTO member usually benefits from the underlying decision, this requirement
of unanimity effectively eliminates the DSB’s supervisory capacity. See Oren Perez,
Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique
of Transnational Law, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 25, 38 & n.47 (2003).
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capacity56—and has already rendered several decisions adverse to the
United States.57
The WTO instruments themselves suggest that this interpretive authority is unexceptionable,58 and it is difficult to distinguish categorically
from garden-variety interpretation by the judiciary or by an executive
agency59—save perhaps in terms of the latitude available to those interpreting, or the commitment to distinctive institutional tenets.60 But to
many, the power of international institutions to interpret their founding
instruments is a significant source of authority for generating new rules.61
56. Cf. R.E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World
Trade Organization, 1 World Trade Rev. 211, 212–17, 222 (2002) (noting concern, but
cautioning against its exaggeration).
57. See, e.g., United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia) (Report of the Appellate
Body), WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 149 (2002); United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Report of the Appellate Body),
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996); infra notes 414–416 and
accompanying text (discussing steel and FSC cases). The U.S. track record, however, is not
distinctly poor. John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law
Legislation?, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 113, 114 & n.4, 123 & n.17 (2003).
58. See DSU art. 3(2) (“Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”). The Appellate
Body has also announced its intention to resolve doubts against the assertion of obligations
limiting state sovereignty (in dubio mitius). EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (Report of the Appellate Body), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/
R, ¶ 165 (Jan. 16, 1998). U.S. law, it should also be noted, limits the domestic enforcement
of WTO panel decisions. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§ 102(b)(2)(A), (B)(i), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(b)(2)(A), (B)(i) (2000)) (providing that state laws may be declared inconsistent
with Uruguay Round Agreements only in suits brought by United States, and that in such
actions a WTO panel decision “shall not be regarded as binding or otherwise accorded
deference”).
59. See Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 1259, 1269 (1947) (describing statutory interpretation as “inescapably a
kind of legislation”). Distinguishing between legislating, on the one hand, and
interpreting (or executing), on the other, is obviously a central difficulty afflicting the
nondelegation doctrine.
60. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 57, at 114 (noting WTO emphasis on free trade).
61. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International
Organizations, in The Legitimacy of International Organizations 104, 113, 137–38 (JeanMarc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001) (describing how institutions’ interpretations
of vague charters can sometimes drastically change meaning of instruments
notwithstanding significant opposition within membership, including so as to effect the
“domestic jurisdiction” reserved under UN Charter for sovereign regulation); Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes & Sarah Heathcote, The Role of the New International
Adjudicator, 95 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 129, 133–34 (2001) (describing interpretation by
dispute settlement bodies as “necessary judicial legislation” caused by failure of member
states to create, clarify, and enforce international law). With respect to the WTO in
particular, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 845, 848–49 (1999) (“[T]he distinction between
judges as bureaucrats/arbitrators, on the one hand, and as lawmakers/legislators, on the
other hand, is crumbling at the WTO.”); Greenwald, supra note 57, at 113 (characterizing
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Inspired in part by criticisms voiced elsewhere in the government,62 Congress has evidenced concern about the WTO in particular, with one senator claiming that its panels “have ceased interpreting our trade agreements and have begun legislating.”63 This objection’s force is
strengthened, ironically, by the difficulty of formally overriding such
interpretations.64
While formally amending and interpreting are the most prominent
means for accomplishing basic architectural changes, a third, newly controversial route involves reservations to multilateral treaties. Nations are
generally permitted under international law to ratify multilateral treaties
subject to reservations, at least so long as the reservation is not barred by
the treaty in question or inconsistent with its object and purpose.65 The
Vienna Convention allows other nations to object,66 but it also allows

WTO dispute settlement proceedings as largely “an exercise in trade law legislation”); Joel
P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 333, 336 (1999)
(“[D]ispute resolution is not simply a mechanism for neutral application of legislated rules
but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance.”). For a recent argument that
such concerns are overstated, see Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:
Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 247 (2004).
62. GAO, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate: World Trade Organization: Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy
Rulings 27 (GAO Doc. No. GAO-03-824, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/
getrpt?GAO-03-824 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting view of U.S. agencies
that WTO decisions have applied standard of review precluding “permissible
interpretations of WTO members’ domestic agencies,” and in some cases “found
obligations and imposed restrictions . . . that are not supported by the texts of the WTO
trade remedy agreements”); U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Executive Branch Strategy
Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body: Report to the
Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce 7–10 (2002), available at http://
www.ita.doc.gov//FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(criticizing certain findings for their “lack of grounding in the negotiated agreement texts
and . . . their failure to recognize that agreement terms may be susceptible of multiple,
reasonable interpretations among which Members may properly choose”). The GAO
noted, however, that many experts disagreed with the executive branch’s assessment.
GAO, supra, at 27, 31.
63. 149 Cong. Rec. S4173 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
64. See supra notes 48–49, 54 and accompanying text (describing infrequent
exploitation of amendment alternatives in the WTO); see also Donald McRae, What is the
Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 3, 13 (2004) (“Only in the rarest of
circumstances will enough Members be in agreement that the consequences of an
Appellate Body interpretation are so harmful that the decision must be reversed through
amendment or authoritative interpretation.”).
65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336–37 [hereinafter VCLT]. The United States is not a party to
the Vienna Convention but generally accepts it as indicating the customary international
law of treaties. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 424 & n.120 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Treaties].
66. VCLT, supra note 65, arts. 20–23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337–38.
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international organizations themselves to decide the permissibility of reservations to their constituent treaties unless the treaties provide otherwise.67 The United States is also a party to other treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which a treaty
organ has asserted (there, over the protest of the United States and other
nations) the right to evaluate the acceptability of reservations.68 This authority is especially significant in light of contemporaneous assertions
that the organ may treat invalid ratifications as severable, so that the reserving nation becomes a party to the treaty on different terms than it
originally ratified.69
Finally, some treaties, often relating to the environment, permit
more pedestrian amendments to be accomplished without the agreement
of all parties. Such treaties typically allow a qualified majority to adopt
amendments to the body of the treaty, while ensuring that those amendments are in force only for parties ratifying them.70 The ratification safeguard does not apply, however, to certain technical annexes; the resulting
tacit acceptance procedure, in which amended annexes bind any party
failing to object within a specified period,71 displays more of a notional
67. Id. art. 20(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 8.
68. ICCPR Human Rights Comm., General Comment 24(52) on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or Optional Protocols
Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, 52d Sess., 1382d
mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). For the U.S. reaction, see
Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, 3 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 265,
265–69 (1996); for generally consistent support from other nations, see Observations by
France on General Comment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR, 4 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 6,
6–8 (1997); Observations by the United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 Int’l Hum.
Rts. Rep. 261, 261–65 (1996).
69. For rival views concerning the acceptability of this practice, compare Ryan
Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 Am. J. Int’l
L. 531 (2002) (noting severability practices and defending their consistency with state
consent), with Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 65, at 436–38 (criticizing
severability).
70. For examples, see Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 3, at 636–39; Patrick Széll,
Decision Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 26 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 210
(1996).
71. E.g., Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC Convention), Sept. 11,
1998, arts. 21(3), 22(3)–(4), 38 I.L.M. 1, 14–15 (signed, but not yet ratified, by the United
States); Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), concluded Mar. 22, 1989, art. 18, 1673 U.N.T.S.
57, 144–45 (signed, but not yet ratified, by the United States); Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3,
1973, art. XV(2)(f), 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1111, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 255; Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972,
art. XV(2), 26 U.S.T. 2403, 2413, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138, 144–45; International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. V(3), 62 Stat. 1716, 1717–18, 1718–19, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, 80, 82. This model is not confined to environmental agreements. E.g.,
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1,
1991, art. VII, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-8, 30 I.L.M. 721, 728–29; International Convention
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respect for sovereign consent.72 Other agreements stray still further from
any consensus rule. The Montreal Protocol’s provisions for “adjusting”
technical annexes permit a supermajority to adopt changes that are subject neither to ratification nor to objection by an individual party.73 Similarly, the Additional Protocol between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides that a majority of the IAEA
Board of Governors may (after consultation with experts) amend the activities, equipment, and material covered, and that any such amendments
take effect four months after adoption—without need for U.S.
ratification.74
These relaxed procedures for tacit acceptance are premised on the
ground that the amendments are administrative and technical, rather
than political, in character.75 They are made palatable, moreover, to the
for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, art. VIII(b)(vii)(2), 32 U.S.T. 47, 52, 1184
U.N.T.S. 277, 281.
72. See Note, supra note 15, at 1103 & n.19 (noting infrequency with which states opt
out under these and similar arrangements).
73. Article 2.9(c) provides that, after attempts to reach consensus have failed,
adjustment to the limits to chemicals specified in the Annexes may “as a last resort” be
adopted by a two-thirds majority, including a majority each of developing country and
developed country constituencies. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 19, 1987, art. 2.9(c), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, at 19–20, 1522 U.N.T.S.
28, 33 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; id. art. 2.9(d), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, at 20,
1522 U.N.T.S. at 33 (providing that such decisions “shall be binding on all Parties”); see
Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy 90 (1998) (citing appraisal that method of
adjustment was a “‘great novelty in international environmental law’” (quoting Johan G.
Lammers, Second Report of the Internal Committee on Legal Aspects of Long-Distance
Air Pollution, Address at the International Law Association, Warsaw Conference (1988)));
Johan Lammers, The Mechanism of Decision-making Under the Vienna Convention and
the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, in State, Sovereignty, and
International Governance 407, 412 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Lammers, Mechanism of Decision-Making] (describing adjustment method as “an
extraordinary mechanism of decision-making”). The parties distinguished, however,
between adjustments to known, previously addressed chemicals—which the parties
expected to be eliminated—and controls on new chemicals, which were to be added only
for those parties ratifying the amendments. Benedick, supra, at 88–91; Széll, supra note
70, at 213.
74. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United
States of America, June 12, 1998, U.S.-IAEA, art. 16(b), S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-7, at 21, 31
(2002) [hereinafter U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol]; see Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, art. VI(e), 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1100,
276 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 (providing for majority voting on nonbudgetary questions, upon a twothirds quorum). Article 9 of the Protocol also allows the IAEA access to locations it
specifies, following consultations with the United States, subject to arrangements approved
by the same qualified majority of the Board. U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, supra, art. 9,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-7, at 28.
75. Congressional Research Service, 106th Cong., Treaties and Other International
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, S. Prt. No. 106-71, at 182 (Comm. Print
2001) [hereinafter CRS] (attributing acceptance of unorthodox amendment procedures
to technical character and complexity of some arms control and environmental
agreements). For an account of how the increasingly technical character of arms control
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extent that parties may enter reservations to amendments.76 Nonetheless, such amendments may change the parties’ substantive obligations to
a degree that rivals or exceeds any nontechnical developments.77 Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol regime, for example, transformed the
parties’ obligation to reduce production and consumption of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).78 And the ease of rendering technical

treaties fostered the development of “non-amendment amendments,” see Koplow, supra
note 15, at 990–1004, 1009.
76. This has proven to be a particularly serious issue for CITES, in which the ease of
amending appendices has been offset by the ease of reservations—typically entered by the
nations most instrumental to the regime’s success. See Philippe J. Sands & Albert P.
Bedecarré, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: The Role of Public
Interest Non-Governmental Organizations in Ensuring the Effective Enforcement of the
Ivory Trade Ban, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 799, 804–05 (1990) (noting detrimental effects
of reservation clauses on certain endangered species); see also Resolution on Effects of
Reservations (Conf. 4.25) (1983) (adopted at Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties, Apr. 19–30, 1983, Gaborone, Botswana), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/
resols/4/4_25.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that reservations
practice “has led to different interpretations of the Convention by the parties”). It is
unclear whether broader developments in the law and practice regarding reservations,
including the authority of constituent organizations to disapprove reservations, will have
any material impact. See Chris Wold, Implementation of Reservations Law in
International Environmental Treaties: The Cases of Cuba and Iceland, 14 Colo. J. Int’l
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 53, 115–18 (2003) (urging greater attention by member states to
contemporary developments).
Some treaties offer the lesser option of seeking a temporary waiver or exemption,
which—like provisions governing reservations—vary as to their conditions. For example,
the Montreal Protocol bans reservations, see Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 18, but
as amended includes substances (like methyl bromide) that are subject to “critical use”
exceptions. Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, art. 2(H)(5), S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-9, at 21–22, available at http://
www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Juliet Eilperin, U.S. to Seek Further Waiver for Ozone-Harming Pesticide, Wash.
Post, July 13, 2004, at A3; see also Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,
arts. 2(5), 2(7), 17(2), 32 U.S.T. 543, 548–49, 562, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, 178–79, 189
(providing for the nonconsensual, automatically effective addition of controlled
substances, but allowing that “exceptional circumstances” may exempt a party from
complying if it agrees to minimal control measures).
77. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 3, at 638 (citing examples of significant technical
amendments to CITES and to the London Convention).
78. While the original obligation was to reduce CFCs to one half of 1986 levels by
1999, subsequent meetings of the Parties provided instead that they should be phased out
completely by 1996. U.N. Environment Programme, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annexes I,
II, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992); id. Decisions IV/2, IV/3; U.N. Environment
Programme, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex I, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3,
(1990); id. Decision II/1; see also Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 3, at 638 (asserting that
“[s]imilar far-reaching changes have subsequently been required for the use of other
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amendments to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which contrasts with the
veto preserved under the prior safeguards agreement between the United
States and IAEA,79 is noteworthy in light of the greater intrusiveness of
the Additional Protocol80 and the recent controversies surrounding international weapons inspections.81
B. Delegations of Authority to Legislate
A second category of institutional authorities more closely resembles
ordinary legislation. The UN Security Council, for example, has the
authority to order member nations to adopt embargoes and other
sanctions,82 and since the end of the Cold War has been more at liberty

ozone-depleting substances listed” in Protocol Annexes); Lammers, Mechanism of
Decision-Making, supra note 73, at 413 (claiming that “the adjustment procedure . . . has
been one of the decisive factors of the successful development of the Montreal Protocol”);
id. at 413–19 (citing examples of adjustments); Ozone Secretariat, U.N. Environment
Programme, Adjustments to Montreal Protocol (2003), at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/
Treaties_and_Ratification/montreal_protocol/adjustments_MontrealProt.asp (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (compiling adjustments).
79. Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, Nov. 18,
1977, U.S.-IAEA, art. 23(b), 32 U.S.T. 3059, 3069 (“All amendments shall require the
agreement of the United States and the Agency.”); id. art. 39(d), 32 U.S.T. at 3074
(providing that certain “Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by
agreement between the Agency and the United States” without formally amending the
Agreement).
80. Barry Kellman & Stephen Dycus, International Security, 33 Int’l Law. 591, 600
(1999) (describing Additional Protocol as a “substantially different document than its
predecessor” in terms of facilities covered, “far more expansive” authority to conduct
verification activities, and expanded responsibilities for U.S. government).
81. See, e.g., id. at 599 (citing changes in IAEA procedures since discovery of Iraqi
and North Korean nuclear programs).
82. U.N. Charter art. 41 (authorizing the Security Council to adopt “measures not
involving the use of armed force . . . to give effect to its decisions,” and to call upon UN
members to apply such measures, including the “complete or partial interruption of
economic relations” and means of communication, and “the severance of diplomatic
relations”); id. arts. 48–49 (obliging members to carry out such decisions). Congress has
specifically acknowledged U.S. obligations to comply. United Nations Participation Act, 22
U.S.C. § 287c (2000). Article 25 of the UN Charter requires compliance with Security
Council decisions of comparable gravity even outside the purview of Chapter VII. See
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J.
16, 51–53 (June 21) (outlining member state obligation to comply with Security Council
Resolution declaring illegal South African presence in Namibia); Rosalyn Higgins, The
Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Binding under Article 25 of the
Charter?, 21 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 270 (1972) (debating whether Article 25 applies only to
Security Council decisions taken under Chapter VII).
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to do so.83 The most striking recent example was Security Council Resolution 1373, which compelled all nations—not just Security Council
members, nor even solely UN members—to take specific actions against
the financing of terrorist activities.84 One expert described the
resolution as the first use of Chapter VII authority “to order all states
to take or to refrain from specified actions in a context not limited to
disciplining a particular country,”85 and further speculated that “it seems
likely to constitute a precedent for further legislative activities” by the
Security Council and other international institutions.86 Resolution 1422,
which provided immunity for a renewable twelve-month period to
personnel involved in UN operations hailing from nations not party
to the ICC,87 and Resolution 1540, which adopted a broad nonproliferation agenda,88 arguably bear out that prediction. Critics of such
measures argue that they exceed the Council’s authority89 and circum-

83. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87
Am. J. Int’l L. 83, 85 (1993) (“Now . . . the Cold War has ended and, suddenly, the Council,
by national or international governmental standards, seems remarkably effective.”). The
Council thus joins other, less ideologically driven security arrangements possessing such
authority. See N.D. White, The Law of International Organisations 87–89 (1996).
84. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
85. Szasz, supra note 29, at 901; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 873, 874 (2003) [hereinafter Alvarez, Hegemonic International
Law] (describing Resolution 1373 as “that rare phenomenon in international law: legally
binding regulation, backed by the possibility of real enforcement action, imposed on all
states by a global international organ engaged in a continuous legislative enterprise by
virtue of delegated power and subject to no geographic or temporal limitation”).
86. Szasz, supra note 29, at 905.
87. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1442 (2002)
(requesting cooperation from the ICC in refraining from investigating or prosecuting
referenced cases, expressing the intention to renew requests for successive periods “for as
long as may be necessary,” and deciding that member states “shall take no action
inconsistent [with the requested immunity] and with their international obligations”).
Resolution 1422 was in fact renewed only once, see S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess.,
4772d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003), before encountering serious opposition. See
infra text accompanying note 421.
88. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540
(2004).
89. See, e.g., Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the
Constitution of the United Nations, 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 593, 593–601 (2003) (criticizing
Security Council Resolution 1373 as predicated on indefinite threat to international peace
and security); Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002),
14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 85, 86–87 (2002) (criticizing Security Council Resolution 1422 as lacking
a sufficiently specific and direct predicate finding of a threat to international peace and
security); Human Rights Watch, The ICC and the Security Council: Resolution 1422
(2004), at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/1422legal.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (same).
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vent both multilateral treatymaking90 and the General Assembly91 in the
process.
The Security Council is not so singular as it may appear. The OECD,
for example, has issued some twenty decisions establishing new, binding
norms for its members on subjects such as multinational enterprises, bribery, and transboundary waste shipments.92 And the WTO’s Ministerial
Conference has the authority, upon petition by a member and approval
by a majority of the membership, to adopt decisions on matters within
the purview of its trade agreements.93 This may be the most plausible
basis for the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of
International Property Rights) Agreement and Public Health, a significant modification of the existing understanding of the TRIPS Agree90. E.g., Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law, supra note 85, at 874–75; see Ilias
Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 315, 326 (2003)
(describing Security Council Resolution 1373 as “minitreaty”). This point was made with
particular force in the open debate on Resolution 1540 by member states not belonging to
the Security Council—and by member states not party to one or the other of the relevant
nonproliferation treaties. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950
(2004) (Resumption 1) (Provisional) (representative of Korea); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4950th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (Provisional) (representative of Pakistan)
[hereinafter 4950th Meeting]. Opting for the Security Council has practical significance.
In the case at hand, Resolution 1373 largely mirrored the provisions of the 1999
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, yet lacked the
Convention’s definition of terms like terrorism—“thus granting the Committee very
substantial discretion in interpreting the extent of states’ obligations under the
resolution.” Happold, supra note 89, at 594. More generally, states have a choice as to
whether to become parties to a treaty, but do not have such latitude with respect to
Security Council legislation. Id. at 594–95. Moreover, nations ratifying a treaty often have
the opportunity to lodge reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs)
differentiating their obligations, while that option is not again available with respect to the
Security Council. See, e.g., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, at http://
untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter_xviii/treaty11.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2004)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing reservations, understandings, objections,
and notifications).
91. See 4950th Meeting, supra note 90, at 23 (noting concern of representative of
India regarding “the increasing tendency of the Council . . . to assume new and wider
powers of legislation on behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding
on all States,” and that “the exercise of legislative functions by the Council, combined with
recourse to Chapter VII mandates, could disrupt the balance of power between the
General Assembly and the Security Council, as enshrined in the Charter”); accord id. at 31
(representative of Indonesia); id. at 32 (representative of Iran).
92. Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5(a), 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1734, 888 U.N.T.S. 179, 185 (compiling decisions).
Such decisions must be by consensus absent unanimous agreement that an alternative rule
is to be employed. Id. art. 6, 12 U.S.T. at 1734, 888 U.N.T.S. at 185. Some contend that
other OECD instruments, such as recommendations, are binding in a somewhat lesser
sense. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
627, 728 & n.398 (2001) [hereinafter Swaine, Global Antitrust] (citing authorities).
93. See WTO Agreement arts. IV(1), IX(1).
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ment,94 which prompted one commentator to query whether “a legislative body has begun to formulate world trade law.”95 As if to reply, the
WTO General Council—the highest-level decisionmaking body located in
Geneva, which acts on behalf of the Ministerial Conference between its
biennial meetings—issued an interim waiver that purported to restate
member obligations, again, until such point as a formal amendment to
TRIPS can be completed.96 Each power resembles one that the U.S. Congress might exercise under the Commerce Clause.97
94. In part because the precise legal basis for the Doha Declaration is uncertain, its
legal import is also unclear. Given the decision to refrain from amending the WTO under
Article X, and to refrain from adopting an interpretation under Article IX(2), it seems
likely that the Declaration did not change the legal obligations of WTO members. Steve
Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 207, 210 (2002).
But it may nonetheless be cited in dispute settlement as evidence of a subsequent
agreement among the parties concerning the application of treaty provisions, or as
evidence of subsequent practice bearing on treaty interpretation. Id. at 211; James Thuo
Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 291, 299 (2002); see
VCLT, supra note 65, art. 31(3)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (providing that any subsequent
agreement between treaty parties “regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions” is relevant to its interpretation); id. art. 31(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 340 (providing that “subsequent practice . . . establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation”).
95. Charnovitz, supra note 94, at 211 (considering that Doha Declarations may be
“part of the constitutive process of decision-making by the WTO as an organization,”
entailing exercise of Ministerial Conference’s “constitutional authority to set WTO policy,
or perhaps to enact secondary law”).
96. WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Aug. 30, 2003, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). The meaning was then further amplified by a separate
statement by the Council chair. See WTO General Council, Minutes of Meeting, Aug. 25,
26, 30, 2003, ¶ 29, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13, 2003) (statement of Carlos Pérez del Castillo,
Chair, WTO General Council), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
WT/GC/M82.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
97. Some delegations also implicate more specific Article I powers. For example, the
UN Security Council’s authority to obligate the United States to employ its “air, sea, or
land forces,” U.N. Charter art. 42; see id. art. 25 (obliging members to “accept and carry
out” Security Council decisions), could be seen as an impermissible constraint on
Congress’s authority to declare war. The question depends in part on one’s interpretation
of the constitutional allocation of war powers. See Bradley, International Delegations,
supra note 3, at 1568–70 (noting controversy and its relevance to delegation and
separation of powers issues); see, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Presidential Power to Wage War
Against Iraq, 6 Green Bag 183, 184 (2003) (doubting whether “the Charter gives the
Security Council the power to order member states to use force” and whether “this power,
assigned by the Constitution to the Congress and the President, can be delegated to an
international organization”). But in any case, Congress has attempted to rein in any
delegation by denying the President authority to make armed forces available without
prior authorization, see United Nations Participation Act § 6, 22 U.S.C. § 287d (2000)
(expressly limiting authorizing language of the Act to say that it does not constitute
general delegation to President to make armed forces available to Security Council), and
reinforcing the bias against any treaty-dictated military activities in the War Powers
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C. International Assimilations
A third category of delegations involves the indirect “assimilation” of
international acts.98 Assimilative statutes do not, in and of themselves,
assign legislative authority to any international actor. Instead, they direct
the President or other executive branch officials to abide by, or otherwise
take into account, lawmaking by international institutions.
The U.S. Code is replete with international assimilations, many of
them simply informational or otherwise incidental.99 But some have
proven controversial. For example, in signing the recently enacted Clean
Diamond Trade Act, President Bush highlighted a “serious question” as
to whether predicating the Act’s effective date on permission from the
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2) (2000). Bradley, International Delegations, supra note
3, at 1569–70 & n.57.
The UN General Assembly also enjoys the authority to apportion financial
responsibility for UN expenses, U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2, and if a member state goes
too far into arrears it risks losing its vote, id. art. 19; see Sean D. Murphy, Payment of U.S.
Arrears to the United Nations, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 348, 348 & n.3 (2000) (giving examples of
failure to enforce Article 19 disenfranchisement against prior debtors United States and
Soviet Union). Some suggest that “[t]he United States . . . has an international legal
obligation to pay such assessments and Congress is constitutionally obligated to
appropriate money to pay them.” Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 259. If so, the
General Assembly’s authority arguably encroaches on Congress’s taxing and spending
power, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”), and violates the Origination Clause, id. art. I, § 7, cl.
1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”). Such
objections may, to be sure, have political traction. See, e.g., 146 Cong. Rec. H4787,
H4796–97 (daily ed. June 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Chenoweth-Hage) (arguing that
WTO decision finding illegal U.S. tax provisions amounted to “unconstitutional delegation
of taxing authority to an unelected international body of international bureaucrats”). In
general, though, implicating specific sources of legislative authority adds little to the
objection that the Constitution vests legislative authority in Congress that must remain its
own. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767–78 (1996) (finding no basis for
limiting delegation where “power is no less plenary than other Article I powers”); Skinner
v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 220–21 (1989) (explaining that delegations of
Taxing Clause authority should be judged by same standards as delegations of other
legislative powers).
98. The term “assimilation” is used by Congress and the Supreme Court in the
domestic context. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 288, 293–94 (1958)
(upholding Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, providing for the punishment of “‘any act or
omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory,
Possession, or District in which such place is situated,’” against nondelegation challenge
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000))). Professor Ku has helpfully drawn attention to the
potential issue for international delegations, though his discussion is limited to a
hypothetical in which the UN Human Rights Committee undertook to define terms
relevant to U.S. statutes. Ku, supra note 15, at 105–07.
99. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1541, 50 U.S.C. § 1701,
amended by ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, §§ 2(a), 3–5, 115 Stat. 199,
200 (requiring President to notify relevant congressional committee when a listed nation
adopts sanctions on Iran or Libya, when and how sanctions are applied, and how those
sanctions fare under any WTO or GATT review).
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WTO or the UN Security Council “unconstitutionally delegated legislative
power to international bodies,” which he sought to avoid by construing
his certification (and its duration) as wholly discretionary.100 Similarly,
the Bush Administration has reportedly suggested that proposed legislation to implement treaties on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) would
violate an “international nondelegation doctrine,” “rais[ing] . . . constitutional concerns,” by making EPA rulemaking as to new chemical listings
dependent on international regulatory processes.101
These controversies suggest a new temper toward international delegations, particularly since domestic and foreign assimilations have traditionally received less scrutiny. Numerous cases have upheld the constitutionality of the Lacey Act, for example, which criminalizes trade in
wildlife in violation of federal, state, foreign, or tribal law,102 even though
the Act appears to imbue such laws—including those adopted after its
passage—with the status of federal law. The basis of these decisions is the
notion that the state, foreign, or tribal law is “simply a factual predicate
for the application of federal law”103—as one court put it, “a fact entering
100. Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act, 39 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 491 (Apr. 25, 2003); see also infra text accompanying notes 514–515 (evaluating
purported solution). Section 15 of the Act provides that the Act shall take effect once the
President certifies that an applicable waiver granted from the WTO or an applicable
Security Council resolution is in effect. Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19,
§ 15, 117 Stat. 631, 637 (2003) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3901). For a similar provision,
see Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 101(b) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3511(b) (2000)) (providing that when “the President determines
that a sufficient number of foreign countries are accepting the obligations of the Uruguay
Round Agreements . . . the President may accept the Uruguay Round Agreements and
implement article VIII of the WTO Agreement”).
101. Memorandum from Glenn Wiser, Senior Attorney, Center for International
Environment Law, Analysis of Department of Justice Letter Regarding the Constitutionality
of Mandatory Notice and Comment Provisions Proposed in Implementing Legislation for
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) § 3(C), at 5, 6 (Apr. 5,
2004), available at http://www.ciel.org/POPs/Memorandum_Stockholm_5Apr04.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (responding to Bush Administration objections that
requirement for public participation and comment would unconstitutionally delegate
lawmaking powers to international bodies); see Letter from William Moschella, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Tom Harkin,
U.S. Senator 4 (Mar. 25, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (distinguishing
alternative bill that, inter alia, “is not linked to decisions in the international process [and
thus] does not raise the same constitutional concerns”). The Senate bill in question would
require the EPA to publish notices and solicit information at several stages of the
international treaty-based review of new chemical listings, require it to give substantial
weight in any rulemaking to international recommendations and decisions, and permit
petitioning of the EPA to commence rulemaking one year after an international listing.
POPs, LRTAP POPs, and PIC Implementation Act of 2003, S. 1486, 108th Cong. § 502
(2004); POPs, LRTAP POPs, and PIC Implementation Act of 2003, S. Rep. No. 108-256, at
4–6 (2004).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2000).
103. Ku, supra note 15, at 106. Thus, although the Lacey Act entails reference to laws
promulgated after its enactment, it does not involve conditions subsequent to the conduct
in question. As one court of appeals decision emphasized, changes in foreign law—and
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into the description of the contraband article, just as if importations of
wine or automobiles were restricted to bottles bearing an official foreign
designation of appellation controllée or cars bearing indicia of a foreign
safety inspection”104—rather than an assignment of authority to state, foreign, or tribal legislators.105
However thin this premise,106 it seems defensible only if Congress is
disengaged from the referenced law and the circumstances of its enactment.107 But most statutes involving the assimilation of international acts
are not so freestanding; instead, they are preceded by a primary delegation to an international institution, the byproducts of which the assimilative statute then implements. Indeed, many of the more controversial
changes in a foreign government’s views as to the validity of its law—are irrelevant if they
occur after the constituent act. United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1241 (11th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1406 (2004); see id. at 1242 (noting prospect that
defendants might influence foreign governments to invalidate laws serving as the basis for
U.S. convictions). Changes in foreign law remain salient, of course, as to subsequent acts.
But the United States and its courts are entirely passive, and need not even monitor postact developments, in contrast to the continuing U.S. involvement in international
institutions. Cf. id. (stressing that “[t]he district courts and the government of the United
States . . . have the right to rely upon the [foreign] government’s original verifications of
its laws”).
104. United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217, 1219 n.1 (3d Cir. 1979).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1393–94 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
claim that criminalizing “trade in fish and wildlife ‘in violation of any foreign law’ . . .
unconstitutionally delegates congressional power to foreign governments,” on grounds
that “‘the [United States] government is not applying the foreign law per se, but rather it is
looking to the foreign law to determine if the Act’s provisions are triggered; if so, then it
will apply the Act, and not the foreign law’” (quoting United States v. 594,464 Pounds of
Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1989))); id. (citing other circuits); see also United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 (1958) (holding that statutory incorporation of
“future state legislative action in connection with the exercise of federal legislative power”
to apply state criminal law in federal enclaves did not delegate congressional legislative
power); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 124, 177 n.134 (1996) (“[T]here is no separation of powers
problem with legislation that defines a federal rule of law by reference to state or foreign
law.”). See generally Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444–45 (1998)
(differentiating as nonlegislative tariff and import statutes that provided for suspension or
repeal of particular provisions based on certain conditions, leaving to the President only
determination of whether those conditions had transpired); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (“Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to
determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective,
because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time
to the decision of an Executive . . . .”).
106. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that a statute imposing civil penalties on all
activities contravening a resolution passed by an international assembly would not be
understood as a delegation of legislative authority.
107. Absent that condition, Congress could circumvent more conventional
applications of the nondelegation doctrine by establishing an executive branch office with
relatively uncircumscribed authority, then enacting a statute purporting to treat as federal
law anything the executive officer did. In the Lacey Act, notably, Congress is the passive
recipient of the foreign law, not its enabler. 16 U.S.C. § 3372.
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international delegations are paired with such assimilative statutes,108 including a number of delegations that operate by less consensual or transparent means.109 Assimilations of this kind arguably raise few problems
that are distinct from the primary delegation. At the same time, such
couplings undermine the notion that delegations lack domestic legal pertinence and, if nothing else, help demarcate delegations of interest.110
D. Customary International Law
A fourth form of international delegation involves customary international law—the rules that nations appear to accept as legally binding
upon them.111 This is a distinctive type of delegation, unique to the international setting, and the circumstances require careful specification.
For example, while some have suggested that enforcing such law in U.S.
courts necessarily entails a legally problematic delegation,112 that account
108. See, e.g., Tariff Act § 516(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (2000) (implementing
Chapter 19 of NAFTA by providing that when Chapter 19 arbitration panel refers
challenged matter on antidumping or countervailing duties back to International Trade
Commission (ITC), ITC shall “take action not inconsistent with the decision”); Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act § 305, 22 U.S.C. § 6725 (2000) (implementing
Chemical Weapons Convention by requiring State Department to seek issuance of search
warrant in response to demand from Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) to engage in challenge inspection of public or private facility).
109. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(4) (2000)
(providing that FDA Administrator must publish for comment any reasons for departing
from maximum pesticide residue level established by Codex Alimentarius Commission);
Pelly Amendment to Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a)(1), (2)) (providing for agency certification to the President upon a
determination that foreign nationals are impairing the effectiveness of any “international
fishery conservation program” or “international program for endangered or threatened
species”); id. § 1978(a)(4) (providing that upon receiving certification, the President may
prohibit imports “of any products from the offending country for any duration as the
President determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by
the [WTO] . . . or the [specified] multilateral trade agreements”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7671e(a)(3) (2000) (providing that in the event the Montreal Protocol “is modified to
. . . control or reduce . . . any substance more rapidly [than otherwise provided by law],”
the EPA shall establish a more stringent phase-out schedule); id. § 7671m(b) (providing
that subchapter is to be construed consistent with U.S. obligations under Montreal
Protocol, and that in event of conflict, the more stringent provision is to govern).
110. See infra notes 184–203 and accompanying text (addressing purported lack of
legal relevance).
111. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (directing courts to “apply . . .
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); Restatement of
the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987)
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
112. See, e.g., Rabkin, supra note 16, at 62 (describing customary international law as
“in itself, a wholesale delegation of lawmaking power (or treatymaking power) of just the
sort that . . . the Constitution would otherwise seem to forbid”). To be clear, Professor
Rabkin does not agree that customary international law should be construed to have that
effect. See id. at 56–62. For representative views in the debate, compare, e.g., Curtis A.
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is incomplete: Even if the courts have given customary international law
a preemptive and legislative character, a nondelegation offense requires,
at a minimum, that Congress was involved in assigning its authority.113
It is perhaps easiest to discern such assignments on the international
plane. First, the United States has helped form international institutions
that themselves create customary international law or generate the opinio
juris and state practice undergirding it.114 Whether the resolutions and
recommendations of international organizations instead ought to be reBradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary
international law should not, without authorization from the federal political branches,
have the status of federal law), with Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824 (1998) (arguing that customary international law
is properly regarded as federal common law).
113. And, I assume, requires more than an attenuated claim that Congress has failed
to curtail a judicial practice—at least to the extent of its authority to do so. Cf. Jordan J.
Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 9 (2d ed. 2003) (suggesting that
“customary international law can limit the exercise of an otherwise appropriate
congressional power”). One might argue that Congress indirectly contributes to
customary international law each and every time it opines on a matter of international
concern. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 39,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 159 L. Ed. 2d 718 (2004) (No. 03-339) (conceding that
“[a]lthough the political branches cannot control the development of customary
international law,” they may influence it through “diplomatic and military measures,
formal pronouncements, negotiation of international agreements, and the announcement
of reservations or conditions to the ratification of such agreements, or to general standards
of international law that may be asserted by other nations”); Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 cmt. b (including unilateral
governmental measures and official statements of policy as evidencing relevant state
practices). But identifying this kind of derivative effect as a delegation would strip the
term of any coherent meaning.
Even absent any meaningful congressional delegation of authority, the critics of
customary international law would nonetheless argue that it poses problems of
constitutional concern. See, e.g., Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at
1580–81 (arguing that attributing federal law status to custom “would give unelected
federal judges broad lawmaking authority not stemming from any political branch
authorization, in areas in which they may have limited institutional competence”); Young,
Trouble, supra note 3, at 533–34 (asserting that irrespective of whether it would be
prohibited under the Constitution, “there is no serious question that giving direct effect to
customary norms works a profound departure from the ordinary procedure by which law is
made in this country”).
114. See, e.g., Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Int’l Law Ass’n,
Final Report: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary
International Law §§ 28–33 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Customary
Law.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing function of General Assembly
resolutions in relation to customary international law). It is important to note that, even if
resolutions and their like do not contribute to custom, they yet have legal effect, such as by
affording safe harbor to those complying with them. Bowett’s Law of International
Institutions, supra note 32, at 279–92 (describing potential legal effect of
recommendations, resolutions, declarations, and unratified conventions); Schermers &
Blokker, supra note 42, at §§ 1216–1280 (same); Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations
and the Traditional Sources of International Law, 20 German Y.B. Int’l L. 103, 118 (1977).
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garded only as “soft law” is beyond the scope of this Article,115 but it suffices to note that international tribunals have sometimes given them a
more exalted status,116 putting Congress on notice as to the consequences of conferring authority. Second, Congress has assented to international institutions that purport only to apply, rather than to make, customary international law. The most prominent example is the
International Court of Justice (ICJ),117 to which the United States partially acquiesces,118 even though the ICC—which the United States is no
longer likely to join—would have rivaled it.119
NAFTA illustrates the permeability of any distinction between making and applying customary international law. Chapter 11 provides for
the creation of arbitral panels to assess whether any of the three state
parties have infringed the rights of foreign investors.120 The panels’ duties include the construction of ambiguous treaty terms121 that are pur115. For examples of the literature on this question, see Swaine, Global Antitrust,
supra note 92, at 728 n.400.
116. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254–55 (July 8) (“General Assembly resolutions, even if they are
not binding . . . can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99–103, 106–09 (June
27) (requiring little affirmative evidence of state practice in light of General Assembly
instruments evidencing opinio juris on principle of nonintervention).
117. See ICJ Statute, supra note 111, art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187
(directing ICJ to “apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law”); Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1570–73. To be
clear, Professor Bradley’s particular concern in the cited material involves the court’s
interpretation of treaty law, but his concerns regarding the domestic effect of the court’s
decisions may apply equally to its application of customary international law.
118. In the wake of the ICJ’s decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 108–109, the United States withdrew its
consent to compulsory jurisdiction. See Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State
of the United States of America, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United
Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985). There are other bases for the court to
exercise jurisdiction over the United States, but each requires a separate means of
consent—either to jurisdiction in a particular case, or to treaty terms conferring
jurisdiction over a class of cases. See generally ICJ Statute, supra note 111, art. 36, 59 Stat.
at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186–87. Judgments rendered by the court in cases not involving the
United States are not binding upon it. See infra text accompanying note 132 (discussing
role of precedent in international tribunals).
119. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1578–79. Before the
United States formally provided notice that it was withdrawing its signature, it was obliged
to respect the Rome Treaty’s object and purposes, arguably raising delegation issues for
unsigning. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061 (2003)
[hereinafter Swaine, Unsigning] (discussing controversy).
120. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, ch. 11, § B, 32 I.L.M. 289,
642–47 [hereinafter NAFTA].
121. This includes interpreting whether national measures are “tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation,” “for a public purpose,” “nondiscriminatory,” and “in
accordance with due process.” NAFTA, supra note 120, art. 1110(1), 32 I.L.M. at 641.
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portedly constrained by preexisting customary international law,122 but
that law, in fact, remains unclear.123 The panels also assess whether national measures accord with minimum standards required by international law—including, but not limited to, “fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.”124 Concerned about the discretion this
vests in arbitrators,125 the state parties adopted Notes of Interpretation
seeking to construe “international law” solely as “customary international
law,” seemingly reinforcing the panels’ estrangement from treaties and
other constitutionally orthodox processes for lawmaking.126 These Notes
do not, in any event, resolve many issues of construction,127 and them122. The alternative, pressed by some NAFTA claimants, is that the treaty creates a lex
specialis that sets a lower bar for expropriation claims. The United States, Mexico, and
Canada have argued to the contrary, and their view has been endorsed by two tribunals.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, ¶ 286, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (NAFTA Trib. 2000);
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, ¶ 104 (NAFTA Trib. 2000), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc7.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
123. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 51–59 (2003); see also Joel C. Beauvais,
Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 245, 257–58 (2002) (describing vagueness of expropriation standards
under international law); id. at 266–77 (reviewing initial Chapter 11 cases).
124. NAFTA, supra note 120, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639; see id. art. 1110(1), 32 I.L.M.
at 641 (incorporating, for purposes of expropriation standard, standard of Article
1105(1)).
125. The particular impetus for this concern was a decision taking an expansive view
of the potential of Article 1105. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of
Phase 2, ¶¶ 111, 118 (NAFTA Trib. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/documents/Award_Merits-e.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (interpreting
“fair and equitable treatment” in Article 1105(1) as adding to the minimum standard of
treatment in customary international law, so as to “require that covered investors and
investments receive the benefits of the fairness elements under ordinary standards applied
in the NAFTA countries”); see Beauvais, supra note 123, at 272 & n.127 (describing
reaction to arbitrators’ decision); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 37, 47–48 (2003) [hereinafter
Brower, Structure] (describing adoption of Notes of Interpretation as part of reaction to
defeats suffered by Canada and Mexico).
126. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTAInterpr-en.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Section B of the Notes provides:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to
investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
127. Charles H. Brower, II, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA’s Investment
Chapter, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 9, 10–11 (2002) (suggesting that Notes are consistent
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selves occupy a peculiar middle ground between interpretation and law
creation—thus running the (slight) risk that they will be disregarded by
the tribunals.128
Assuming, then, that Congress is sufficiently implicated in these enterprises, the question remains whether they really involve the delegation
of legislative authority. Those international institutions generating evidence of customary international law, like the General Assembly, typically
leave the inference of legal authority to others; those institutions directly
charged with making such inferences, like the NAFTA tribunals, seem to
be judging rather than legislating. If assigning responsibility to federal
courts to interpret and apply domestic law does not violate the nondelegation doctrine,129 how does customary international law?
To many, the distinction lies in the relatively indeterminate character of customary international law: Those assigned to construe it have so
many sources from which to draw, and so few constraints, that the task of
discovery and application is hard to distinguish from lawmaking.130 The
with view that bilateral investment treaties established opinio juris, or that treaty violations
were evidence of unfair and inequitable treatment); Brower, Structure, supra note 125, at
78–80 (same).
128. The Free Trade Commission is authorized to issue interpretations of NAFTA that
bind Chapter 11 tribunals, see NAFTA, supra note 120, art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 645, but
amendments are supposed to be adopted by the ordinary legal processes particular to each
party, id. art. 2202, 32 I.L.M. at 702. Some suggest that the Notes are less of an
interpretation than a treaty modification, and are thus ultra vires. Guillermo Aguilar
Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11,
28 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 397–98 (2003); Brower, Structure, supra note 125, at 49–50; see also
id. at 79–82 (describing illegitimacy of Commission’s adoption of Notes). If so, one
arbitral award arguably implies, panels are free to ignore the Notes. See Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶ 47, 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1356 (NAFTA Trib.
2002) (indicating that “were the Tribunal required to make a determination whether the
Commission’s action is an interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter,”
but adding that it was not required to do so, and would assume that the Notes were merely
an interpretation). But see Brower, Structure, supra note 125, at 48–49 (noting invocation
of Notes by parties, and even retroactive application by one tribunal).
129. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and its Discontents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710, 741
n.132 (1994) (book review) (noting that “the Supreme Court has never applied the
nondelegation doctrine to judicial lawmaking”).
130. For elaborations of this claim, see David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical
Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39
German Y.B. Int’l L. 198 (1996); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith &
Posner, Theory of Customary International Law]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary
International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 639 (2000); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 449 (2000). While a similar charge of indeterminacy is
often made against international law in general, most critics take the view that customary
international law is far more suspect than are international agreements. See, e.g., Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44
Va. J. Int’l L. 113, 129 (2003) (“One reason why codification of customary international law
occurs is that such law is often vague and contestable.”); John O. McGinnis, The
Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The
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problem stems from the fact that statutory assignments to apply customary international law are, ultimately, delegations to a diffuse and amorphous international institution—the collective will and legal opinion of
nation states.131 This underlying delegation also undermines any attempt
by international or domestic courts to assert authority. While the decision of an international court construing customary international law
binds the parties in the instant dispute, it does not establish binding precedent for future cases—reflecting, in part, the ad hoc, preinstitutional
tradition of international proceedings.132 National courts, while enjoying
greater permanence and independence, are little better situated: As with
international tribunals, the real question concerns the practice and
opinio juris of states, not the prior gloss given by courts.133 The result is
Example of the WTO, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 229, 233 (2003) [hereinafter McGinnis, Appropriate
Hierarchy] (“Multilateral agreements are likely to produce more legitimate and beneficent
norms than customary international law. The process of discovering customary
international law is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty and tends to result in principles
with vague and uncertain contours.”).
131. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which was
responsible for reviving the relevance of customary international law in U.S. courts,
explained in 2003:
The determination of what offenses violate customary international law . . . is no
simple task. Customary international law is discerned from myriad decisions
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas. Furthermore,
the relevant evidence of customary international law is widely dispersed and
generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges. These difficulties are compounded by
the fact that customary international law—as the term itself implies—is created by
the general customs and practices of nations and therefore does not stem from
any single, definitive, readily—identifiable source. All of these characteristics give
the body of customary international law a “soft, indeterminate character” that is
subject to creative interpretation.
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 29 (1995)); cf.
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. Rev.
665, 720–23 (1986) (finding that, to the extent that customary international law is derived
from sources outside the United States, such as foreign governments, “it has no basis in
popular sovereignty at all” and so “cannot be reconciled with American political
philosophy”).
132. Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 103 cmt. b (1987) (recalling the “traditional view that there is no stare decisis in
international law”); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan.
L. Rev. 429, 482 (2003) (observing that “even within a single international court there is
often no system of binding precedent and no doctrine of stare decisis,” and concluding
that “[t]he refusal to treat precedents as binding is a long-entrenched practice in
international adjudication that stems from the origins of the international judicial system
in the ad hoc arbitral courts of the nineteenth century”); e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 111,
art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”). In practice,
international courts do not entirely disregard their own past decisions. See Martinez,
supra, at 483–84.
133. ICJ Statute, supra note 111, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187
(identifying “judicial decisions . . . as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law”); cf. Restatement of the Law (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
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that attempts to reckon the customary international law applicable in any
given case appear less constrained by prior judgments and more akin to
lawmaking, perhaps even by comparison to the common law.134
Delegation principles help illuminate the controversy over the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS), which provides district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for torts “committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”135 Lower courts construed
this language as creating a cause of action (as opposed to merely conferring jurisdiction) to enforce customary international law as it has evolved
§ 102(2) (describing nature of customary international law); id. § 103(2) (describing
sources of international law). According to the Restatement, international law
determinations by domestic courts simply follow the same hierarchical principles
appropriate to any other issues of law: Lower courts follow higher courts, and all U.S.
courts follow the Supreme Court. Id. §§ 103 cmt. b, 112(2) & cmt. a. This appraisal is
difficult to reconcile, however, with the evidentiary weight to be accorded the views of
foreign courts and the executive branch, see id. § 112 cmts. b, c, as well as the “particular
attention” accorded the views of international tribunals, see id. § 112(1).
Whether or not custom’s external nature is fully respected in practice, the failure to
do so may give rise to its violation, as adherence to local precedent creates a potential gap
with international developments. Cf. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 1977
Q.B. 529, 553–54 (Eng. C.A.) (Lord Denning) (explaining why doctrine of incorporation,
reflecting developments in international law, should be preferred to doctrine of
transformation, which instead privileges stare decisis). The risk of such a gap is greatest, it
may be predicted, in the most dynamic areas—those in which the most customary
international law is being made. See Francesco Francioni, International Law as a Common
Language for National Courts, 36 Tex. Int’l L.J. 587, 588 (2001) (contending that, in cases
of evolving customary international law, decisions of national courts cannot “simply reflect
precedents in national law relevant to the dispute,” lest they “perpetuat[e] . . .
misconceived ideas of customary law or . . . unwarranted unilateral interpretation of the
law” inconsistent with the international determination of the relevant norms).
134. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 123, at 55 & n.117 (distinguishing
decisionmaking by arbitral panels from common law development, “insofar as the tribunals
are not bound by stare decisis and are not subject to centralized appellate review . . . [and
t]here is, as a result, no guarantee that delegation. . . . to adjudicative development will
result in anything approaching uniform standards”); McGinnis, Appropriate Hierarchy,
supra note 130, at 247–49 (suggesting that, by comparison to common law, customary
international law is inefficient, lacks accountable decisionmaking, and suffers from relative
lack of tradition and deliberative rationality); see also Swaine, Global Antitrust, supra note
92, at 715 n.355 (suggesting that the position of federal courts in applying customary
international law may be likened to their role in applying state common law in diversity
cases, but without any analog to state supreme courts on which they might depend). But
cf. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 137 n.* (arguing that, relative to common
law, “judges have been substantially less free to follow their own bent in determining
customary international law, in view of the authority of the Executive branch in the matter
and the need to attend to the practices and opinions of many nation-states over many
years”). Tellingly, one federal judge recently extolled the relative stability and restraint of
federal common law as compared to customary international law. Doe v. Unocal, No. 0056603, 2002 WL 31063976, at *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(arguing in favor of employing federal common law for determining third-party liability),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 00-56603, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2003).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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(rather than as that law existed in 1789, when the ATS was enacted).136
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain engineered a
compromise, holding that while the first Congress did not intend to create a new cause of action,137 it anticipated both that courts would entertain torts then recognized under the common law and that they would
come to recognize others.138 Under this reading, Congress has assigned
to the federal courts modest authority to reckon customary international
law,139 rather than employing its own legislative power—including its
more specific authority to “define and punish . . . Offences against the
Law of Nations”140—to establish federal law.141 In doing so, it indirectly
136. The seminal case is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see Flores
v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Filartiga Court not
only held that [Section 1350] provides a jurisdictional basis for suit, but also recognized
the existence of a private right of action for aliens only seeking to remedy violations of
customary international law or of a treaty of the United States.”).
137. 159 L. Ed. 2d 718, 748–49 (2004); see also id. at 751 (representing that “[a]ll
Members of the Court agree that § 1350 is only jurisdictional”).
138. Id. at 752–53. The Court described the paradigms it specifically addressed—
piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringement of the rights of ambassadors—as the
“principal offenses against the law of nations” that would have been evident to the first
Congress, rather than an exhaustive list. Id. at 748–49. The Court found, moreover, that
the first Congress intended to assign responsibility for “identify[ing] some international
norms as enforceable” and that subsequent Congresses had not truncated that authority.
Id. at 752–53.
139. Id. at 749 (holding that courts “should require any claim based on the presentday law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms”). The Court’s opinion emphasized modern, pragmatic reasons for limiting the
courts’ assignment under the ATS, including a changed conception of the common law
(and the role of federal courts in generating it), a general preference for legislative
creation of private rights of action, respect for the primacy of the political branches in
foreign affairs, and the lack of any “congressional mandate to seek out and define new and
debatable violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 751. At the same time, it signaled that its
approach was consistent with the limits previously established by many lower court
decisions—including Filartiga, the case on which the more expansive modern approach is
based. Id. at 752–53.
140. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Beth Stephens, in an important defense of the place
of international law in U.S. law, holds out the Offenses Clause as the basis for the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), but puts far more emphasis on its function in “punishing”
offenses—and essentially admits that the power to “define” such offenses was delegated.
Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power To “Define And Punish
. . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447, 523 (2000) (“Under
the Clause, Congress has the power to ‘define and punish’ violations of the law of nations.
It did so in the ATCA by creating a civil cause of action for such violations, leaving the
definition of the offenses to the courts.”); see also Brief for the United States as
Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 32–36, Sosa (No. 03-339) (describing assertion of
private rights of action under the ATCA as usurping Congress’s define-and-punish
authority).
141. By so privileging the place of international law in U.S. courts, one might argue,
Congress has also delegated some of the relevant authority to the executive branch, given
its greater significance in contributing to the underlying establishment of customary
international law norms. See Ku, supra note 15, at 81 (describing President as holding
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enabled lawmaking by the international institutions and foreign nations
ultimately responsible for contributing to state practice and opinio
juris.142
E. Other Delegation Issues
In discussing delegations of legislative authority, I ignore other procedural objections stemming from Article I,143 as well as any potential
distinctions between the use of congressional-executive agreements and
the Article II treaty power.144 But two other, ostensibly more distinct,
“primary constitutional authority” over making of customary international law); Young,
Trouble, supra note 3, at 534 (noting that because the Executive “tend[s] to be in charge
of the international practice from which customary norms are derived,” authority over
lawmaking “shifts . . . from the legislature to the executive”).
142. Cf. Sosa, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing “notion that a
law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject,” could be invoked
to constrain U.S. sovereignty, and citing congressionally enacted legislation as the proper
“method for making the laws that are over us”).
143. For example, if an international institution exercises legislative authority, it is
unlikely to comply with bicameralism and presentment requirements, see U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2 (describing procedure for adopting legislation), and individuals involved in that
exercise are unlikely to satisfy provisions governing the selection of senators and
representatives, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (defining eligibility for election as Representative); id.
art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (defining eligibility for election as Senator). See generally Bradley,
International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1562 (describing procedural limits on
delegation). Such offenses are thus highly congruent with legislative delegation problems.
Put differently, delegations deemed to confer lawmaking authority would almost invariably
offend the Constitution in these other respects. See supra note 97 (citing additional
substantive objections under Article I).
144. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the main, this simplification is defensible.
Regardless of the initial lawmaking’s form, some legislative principal has ceded authority,
and the virtual interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements
means that the interposition of international lawmaking displaces both Congress’s
legislative authority and the Senate’s treaty power—and it makes little sense to consider
constitutional offenses particular to Article II if that route need not be employed at all.
See Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 303 & cmt. e (1987) (asserting that “any agreement concluded as a CongressionalExecutive agreement could also be concluded by treaty,” and that “[t]he prevailing view is
that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance”).
In practice, though, treaties are likely to be preferred in certain contexts. See CRS,
supra note 75, at 26, 233–35 (describing criteria developed by the State Department, and
consultations between Congress and the executive branch, regarding the occasions for
employing treaties); id. at 178–81 (noting that, on occasion, the Senate has asserted
responsibility for amendments to treaties and appeared to reject as inadequate
involvement by the Congress as a whole). It may also be appropriate, therefore, to
consider claimed infringements on the Senate’s advice-and-consent function, at least if that
function is more robust than its legislative alternative. See, e.g., Howard R. Sklamberg,
The Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Treatymaking,
18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445 (1997) (comparing “Senatorial Dominance” model of treaty power
with its alternatives). But see CRS, supra note 75, at 15–16, 79–80, 98–111 (noting
examples of comparably broad assertions of congressional authority for involvement in
negotiations).
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kinds of delegation merit brief mention. One set of issues is raised by the
participation of foreign or international officials in the law’s execution,
arguably in violation of the Appointments Clause.145 The specter of executive delegation has been cast, for example, over NAFTA’s Chapter 19146
and Chapter 11 arbitrations147 and the Technical Secretariat of the OrFinally, to the extent that international institutions exercise authority available to the
President, they cannot be so readily said to entail a delegation of legislative authority. For
example, a student note defends relying on the President to exercise a veto on behalf of
the United States in international institutions by positing that “[i]n constitutional terms,
treaties authorizing [such] procedures are essentially treaties authorizing subsequent
executive agreements,” melded with the President’s independent authority to adopt
executive agreements “interpreting a treaty.” See Note, supra note 15, at 1101. It is
debatable whether such treaties do in fact “explicitly authorize subsequent executive
agreements,” and whether the President is genuinely exercising “interpretive authority.”
Id. For its part, the Senate often defers, but sometimes asks that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee be kept informed of proposed amendments, and it is unresolved
whether such supervision is adequate to discharge the Senate’s treaty duties—which
suggests that at least a modicum of legislative authority may remain at issue. CRS, supra
note 75, at 181–83.
145. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1563 & n.28. That clause
governs “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States” and thus properly deemed an “‘Officer of the United States.’” Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). According to the Supreme Court,
only the President and appointed officers—or, exceptionally, inferior officers authorized
by Congress to be appointed by courts, or heads of departments—are to “administer the
laws enacted by Congress,” thus prohibiting legislative attempts to assign such tasks to
others. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997). It is unclear whether the
Appointments Clause framework properly applies to instances where the individuals are
not employees of the federal government, or whether the necessary quantum of federal
authority is being exercised by individuals principally engaged in enforcing international
rather than federal law. For a careful discussion in the context of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, see Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 120–29; see also Ku, supra note
15, at 107–10 (describing conflict between unfettered inspections mandated by Chemical
Weapons Convention and accountability required by Appointments Clause). Other, more
specific executive authority may also be implicated, such as the Commander-in-Chief
authority that would arguably be compromised were U.S. forces to fall under UN or NATO
command. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1570 n.58 (collecting
authorities).
146. NAFTA, supra note 120, arts. 1904–1905, Annexes 1901.2, 1903.2, 1904.13, 32
I.L.M. at 683–85, 687–88 (describing mechanisms for review of final antidumping and
countervailing measure determinations, composition and authority of panels, and review
of panel decisions); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (2000) (detailing U.S. implementation);
id. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (sharply limiting challenges to particular panel decisions). As
Professor Bradley explains, while the panel decisions bind U.S. agencies, the panels will in
all likelihood include members—potentially a majority—who will not be Article III judges
nor subject to the Article II appointment process. Bradley, International Delegations,
supra note 3, at 1575; see id. at 1575 n.87 (citing authorities); Ku, supra note 15, at 111–12
(“[R]emoval [to a NAFTA panel] eliminates any possibility of further review by an Article
III court.”).
147. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1576; supra text
accompanying notes 120–128. These panels, which may award damages but not injunctive
relief, are composed of private parties, so they would clearly fail any constitutional
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ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.148 As these examples suggest, the constitutionality of such arrangements is often at least
partly dependent on the standing of international legislative delegations,
insofar as they determine the law the foreign or international officials are
involved in discharging.149
A second set of issues concerns asserted diversions of “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States”150 to foreign and international officials.151
Such claims must confront the longstanding practice of employing international arbitral tribunals,152 which appear to have been controversial
more because of their sometimes legislative character than due to any
distinct Article III issue.153 Indeed, the difficulty in discriminating bestandard if nondelegable executive authority were involved. See Bradley, International
Delegations, supra note 3, at 1576.
148. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, art. VIII, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 103-21, at 42–57, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, 332–41 (describing inspections of property
by Organization and Secretariat); Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at
1578; Kinkopf, supra note 15, at 392–95; Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 114–16.
149. Any distinctive objections to the assignment of executive authority are more
likely to be raised than are concerns about legislative delegations—which, after all,
indirectly confer authority on the executive branch in its diplomatic capacity—and thus
raise fewer concerns about underenforcement. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note
101 (describing delegation controversy involving POPs treaties, in which executive branch
has emphasized invasion of executive prerogatives); cf. The Constitutional Separation of
Powers Between the President and Congress, supra note 105, at 18–25 (defending antiaggrandizement approach to separation of powers issues); John F. Manning, Textualism as
a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 710–25 (1997) [hereinafter Manning,
Textualism] (distinguishing legislative self-delegations, through use of legislative history,
from executory delegations to agencies and courts, on the ground that institutional
incentives make self-delegation more likely and more dangerous).
150. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
151. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1564–66. The relevant
jurisprudence is abstruse. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (commenting on “frequently
arcane distinctions and confusing precedents” in Article III jurisprudence).
152. See Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 116 (1922)
(noting that there is no “encroachment upon the judicial power when treaties vest judicial
powers in bodies other than [U.S.] courts,” since such bodies do not exercise “the judicial
power of the United States” and, in addition, may have more of a ministerial than judicial
character); see also Golove, supra note 15, at 1744–46 (describing preconstitutional
understanding of delegations to international tribunals, and legitimacy under present
constitutional analysis). This distinct treatment is endorsed even by some of the most
zealous critics of international delegations. See, e.g., The American Land Sovereignty
Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 883 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor, Cornell University), available at 1999 WL
161089, at *8 (noting that “[d]espite the traditional strictures against delegating U.S. treaty
making authority to international bodies, there has always been an exception for judicial
authorities”).
153. The most significant instance involves the general arbitration treaties with
France and Great Britain. General Arbitration Treaty between the United States of
America and the French Republic, Aug. 3, 1911, U.S.-Fr., 4 Unperfected Treaties of the
United States of America, 1776–1976, at 217–23 (Christian L. Wiktor ed., 1979); General
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tween international institutions exercising judicial power and those exercising legislative power is a continuing concern,154 and one directly germane here. While legislative delegations are faulted largely because they
diminish political accountability,155 judicial delegations are frowned
upon because they enhance political accountability for activities that
should be assigned to separate, independent Article III jurists.156 The
difficulty in distinguishing between legislative and judicial assignments,
and the conflicting objections to them, hint at the need for care in the
normative assessment of legislative delegations and for caution in establishing any inflexible rules as to their constitutionality.
***
The ubiquity of delegation issues should not be read to suggest that
they go unremarked: The lesson, rather, lies in their persistence. A case
in point is the Law of the Sea Convention.157 When President Reagan
concluded that the deep seabed regime described by Part XI of the 1982
Convention was unacceptable, he cited, inter alia, the need for decisionmaking rules to protect the interests of participating states, and for a
treaty that “will not allow for amendments to come into force without
approval of the participating states, including in our case the advice and
Arbitration Treaty Between Great Britain and the United States, Aug. 3, 1911, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra, at 225–31. After the Senate attached amendments to
its advice and consent, President Taft refused to ratify them, rejecting as “untenable” the
view of the Senators that permitting an arbitral panel to determine whether it had
jurisdiction over a particular dispute “would be an invalid delegation of the function of the
Senate.” 5 Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 67–68 (1943) (quoting
William Howard Taft, The Presidency 102–04 (1916)); see also Chandler P. Anderson, The
Senate and Obligatory Arbitration Treaties, 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 328, 331–32 (1932)
(describing controversy).
154. See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 709, 714–19 (1999) (noting difficulty
of classifying as judicial the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies).
155. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582–83
(1985) (observing that Article III authority is designed to vest authority “in courts whose
judges enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation,” and that “[t]hese requirements protect
the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government and assure impartial adjudication in federal courts”); see also Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (noting that Article III not
only preserves litigants’ interest in federal adjudication of claims, but also “safeguards the
role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts ‘to
transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’
constitutional courts” (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949)
(Vinson, C. J., dissenting))).
157. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter LOS
Convention]; see Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836
U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter Part XI Agreement].
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consent of the Senate.”158 Renewed negotiations ultimately produced a
supplementary agreement in 1994, and U.S. officials have since made ratification a priority, emphasizing improved sovereign control over the
amendment process and other aspects of Convention governance.159
Despite these negotiating successes and other precautions,160 delegation issues remain. Even if the United States opted out of dispute settlement by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice, it would still be subject to arbitral tribunals161 and,
in some cases, to the Seabed Disputes Chamber.162 It would maintain a
veto over formal amendments of the Convention,163 but continue to lack
158. Statement on United Nations Participation in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1982 Pub. Papers 92 (Jan. 29, 1982); accord Statement
on the Withholding of United States Funds From the Law of the Sea Preparatory
Commission, 1982 Pub. Papers 1652 (Dec. 30, 1982).
159. Letter of Submittal of the Secretary of State to the President of the United States,
Sept. 23, 1994, reprinted in Message from the President of the United States and
Commentary Accompanying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of the Part XI Upon Their Transmittal to
the United States Senate for its Advice and Consent, 7 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 77, 83
(1994) (“The [Part XI] Agreement guarantees a seat for the United States on the critical
executive body and requires a consensus of major contributors for financial decisions.”);
id. (“A future decision, which the United States and a few of its allies can block, is required
before the organization’s potential operating arm (the Enterprise) may be activated, and
any activities on its part are subject to the same requirements that apply to private mining
companies.”); Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the
1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of the Honorable
William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (emphasizing U.S. veto authority
under Part XI agreement). See generally Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and
the Convention, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 687 (1994) (comparing official objections to the 1982
Convention with subsequent developments).
160. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10 (2004), reprinted in 150 Cong. Rec. S2712 (daily
ed. Mar. 11, 2004) (setting out terms of Senate advice and consent, including declarations
and understandings, as approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
161. Articles 287(1) and 298(1) of the LOS Convention permit members to select
special arbitral panels for dispute resolution, in lieu of those courts, and the United States
has expressed the intent to avail itself of that option. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, § 2, 150
Cong. Rec. at S2712.
162. The United States would avoid the Chamber to the extent possible. See id. But
not all of the Chamber’s authority may be circumvented, see LOS Convention, supra note
157, art. 187, Annex VI arts. 14, 36, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 475–76, 564, 569–70, and the
Convention provides that its judgments are fully enforceable in the territories of state
parties, id. Annex VI art. 39, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 570. The U.S. declaration on this point is
begrudging, and its international effect is unclear. S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, § 3(22), 150
Cong. Rec. at S2713 (declaring that Chamber decisions “shall be enforceable in the
territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures established by
implementing legislation and . . . shall be subject to such legal and factual review as is
constitutionally required and without precedential effect in any court of the United
States”).
163. The precise scope of the veto, and its ability to resolve President Reagan’s
concern about the Senate’s prerogatives, is uncertain. Amendments relating to Part XI
(that governing the seabed regime) require a consensus vote in the Council, LOS
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any true veto over most means by which the International Seabed Authority may promulgate binding rules and regulations.164 These issues are
likely to play a continuing role in the Convention’s domestic
consideration.165
Convention, supra note 157, art. 161(8)(d), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 462, and the United States is
guaranteed a position on the Council by virtue of its economic standing when the
Convention entered into force, Part XI Agreement, supra note 157, Annex § 3(15)(a),
1836 U.N.T.S. at 59. But these amendments then enter into force for every state one year
after ratification or accession by three-fourths of the parties—that is, without any
prerequisite of ratification. LOS Convention, supra note 157, art. 316(5), 1833 U.N.T.S. at
521. The Senate’s provisional advice and consent terms would declare that U.S.
ratification of amendments follows the normal treaty process. S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10,
§ 4(a)(5), 150 Cong. Rec. at S2713 (declaring that “[t]he United States . . . shall take all
necessary steps under the Convention to ensure that amendments under article 316(5) are
adopted in conformity with the treaty clause”); see also id. § 4(a)(1)–(3), 150 Cong. Rec. at
S2713 (proposing presidential consultation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
But that proviso may not apply to all amendments, see id. § 4(a)(4), 150 Cong. Rec. at
S2713 (proposing that all amendments “other than amendments under article 316(5) of a
technical or administrative nature” be submitted for advice and consent), and its effect on
the United States’ international obligation to respect amendments that it has not so
ratified is unclear.
164. General policies of this kind may be established by a two-thirds majority of state
parties acting through the Assembly. Part XI Agreement, supra note 157, § 3(1), (3), 1836
U.N.T.S. at 57. The U.S. check exists by virtue of its position in the Council, which issues
recommendations in its areas of competence that the Assembly must heed. Id. § 3(4),
1836 U.N.T.S. at 57; see also LOS Convention, supra note 157, art. 162(2), 1833 U.N.T.S.
at 463–66 (noting, among others, Council competence for budget, finance, and seabed
activities). Some Council decisions, however, require only a two-thirds majority, and may
be blocked by a majority in any one of five “chambers” of member states. Part XI
Agreement, supra note 157, § 3(5), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 57. The United States, as a
presumptive member of one of the smaller Council chambers, may find it easier than most
to block Council decisions. Id. §§ 3(9)(a), 3(15), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 58–59; Jonathan I.
Charney, Entry Into Force of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35 Va. J. Int’l L.
381, 393–94 (1995); Oxman, supra note 159, at 689–90. But for matters not requiring a
consensus, this is less secure than a veto, since the United States is powerless to oppose
measures supported by a two-thirds majority of the Council and at least two of the four
members of its chamber.
The U.S. position is more secure with respect to financial and budgetary matters.
Decisions by the Assembly or Council “having financial or budgetary implications” must be
based on recommendations by the Finance Committee. Part XI Agreement, supra note
157, § 3(7), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 57; cf. id. § 9(7), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 65–66 (providing that
decisions on a list of financial and budgetary matters “shall take into account” Finance
Committee recommendations). Substantive Committee decisions must be taken by
consensus, id. § 9(8), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 66, and the five largest contributors to the
Authority’s budget are guaranteed Committee membership until such point as the
Authority is financially self-sufficient, id. § 9(3), 1836 U.N.T.S. at 65. While this has been
equated to a U.S. veto, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Oceans Policy and the Law of the Sea
Convention, reprinted in Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 733, 738 (1994), it depends (for the foreseeable
future) on maintaining U.S. contributions.
165. See, e.g., Steve Hirsch, Law of the Sea Treaty Getting Submerged, Nat’l J., Apr.
10, 2004, at 1126, 1126–27 (noting argument by treaty opponents that “the treaty would
jeopardize U.S. sovereignty and surrender too much power to the United Nations and to
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NONDELEGATION CANON

While international delegations are many and various, the hurdles
awaiting any nondelegation objection are forbidding. Extending domestic doctrine to international circumstances may be problematic, and
there is also the question of the domestic doctrine’s vitality. As if this
were not enough, recent scholarship has claimed that the doctrine is
based on a conceptual error: Congressional allocations of authority to
others constitute an exercise of legislative power, rather than a transfer of
it, and thus have no implications for national welfare or democracy. That
argument, as this Part details, is far less persuasive with regard to international delegations, which involve the surrender of congressional authority
and the loss of ex post controls.
It does not follow, of course, that such delegations are unconstitutional, but only that they are worth evaluating as a distinctive legal phenomenon. Indeed, those insisting instead on heightening the salience of
the nondelegation doctrine—reviving it, for example, as a basis for invalidating international agreements, as an interpretive canon, or by analogy
to treaty non-self-execution—may be insufficiently sensitive to the differing character of international delegations, while slighting mundane reasons why the nondelegation doctrine has been unenforceable since its
debut.
A. The Apparent Relevance of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Perhaps because it has so rarely been applied, the basics of the
nondelegation doctrine are easily sketched. Article I of the Constitution
vests “[a]ll legislative [p]owers herein granted” to the full Congress.166
On the premise that this vesting is exclusive, the nondelegation doctrine
provides that “Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
another Branch,”167 or for that matter, to any other “entity,”168 such as a
private party.169 The objective, according to the Supreme Court, is to
new international organizations envisioned under the convention,” and citing predictions
that opposition would prevent consideration of the Convention during 2004).
166. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (interpreting constitutional grant of legislative power to Congress as
exclusive); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (same). That these powers are
vested in the full Congress, and thus seem different than the individual entitlement of
members to vote, figures prominently in a recent defense of the nondelegation doctrine.
See generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation
Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297 (2003).
167. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
168. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996).
169. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936) (invalidating delegation
to coal producers and miners party under Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, described as
“legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official
or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may
be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business”); Schechter Poultry,
295 U.S. at 537 (criticizing delegation to “trade or industrial associations or groups” in
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“ensure[ ] to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.”170 Reflecting the sense that delegation is unavoidable in modern government,
but that Congress should be kept accountable,171 the Court has required
Congress to establish an “intelligible principle” according to which the
party vested with authority must conform.172
In the absence of any constitutional provisions addressing delegations to international institutions,173 the domestic doctrine provides us
with the starting point for analysis, and even this brief account highlights
arguments for taking international delegations less seriously than their
domestic kin. The first would emphasize U.S. participation in any institution’s decisionmaking process, which arguably leaves any delegation unconsummated. The nature of that process, of course, is of considerable
significance. If U.S. preferences may be overridden—such as where delegated authority is exercised by an independent organ, like a tribunal, or
by majority or qualified-majority voting among the members174—the initial delegation remains highly salient. If the institution acts, a nondelegaconnection with National Recovery Act). But see George W. Liebmann, Delegation to
Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 Ind. L.J. 650, 664–65 (1975) (reading
Carter v. Carter Coal as primarily concerning due process).
170. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in result), and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting in part)).
171. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–80 (1989); cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 490 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting, in discussing potentially problematic
delegation, that the President, unlike agency officials, is directly responsible to electorate).
172. In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Taft opined that “[i]n
determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.” 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). At
least where “Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 409; accord
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (discussing “intelligible
principle” standard and upholding statute instructing EPA to administer policy so as to
“protect public health”).
173. Compare, for example, the Dutch Constitution, which expressly permits
allocating legislative, executive, and judicial functions to international organizations, see
Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law 205 (2002), with the
Danish Constitution, which appears to incorporate an international nondelegation
doctrine, permitting delegations but only if they are specified in particular detail, see Sten
Harck & Henrik Palmer Olsen, Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 93 Am. J. Int’l
L. 209, 210–11 (1999) (summarizing Danish Supreme Court case discussing constitutional
requirement of specificity). For surveys of such provisions, see Magdalena M. Martin
Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations 9–62 (1996); Antero
Jyränki, Transferring Powers of a Nation-State to International Organisations: The
Doctrine of Sovereignty Revisited, in National Constitutions in the Era of Integration 61
(Antero Jyränki ed., 1999).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

1538

unknown

Seq: 47

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

19-OCT-04

11:01

[Vol. 104:1492

tion issue is presented, regardless of whether the United States has actively opposed the initiative.175
Even the ability to exercise a veto is something less than a categorical
distinction.176 The veto’s potential decisiveness may be checked by countervailing interests—including the desire to avoid encouraging other nations to exercise their vetoes—and if waived is no more helpful than an
ordinary vote. Its force may also be limited by the default condition. In
some instances, vetoes act not to restore national discretion, but instead
to maintain constraints on national sovereignty that came into being with
the institution in question.177 In other instances, vetoes preserve the exercise of delegated authority by subordinate agents.178
The limited comfort afforded by veto authority is best illustrated by
the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority. The Charter generally bars
the use of force, but also delegates to the Security Council power to au175. It is plausible, for example, that the United States would elect not to oppose an
initiative against which it could not prevail. The same reasoning may be behind the
principle that the President’s failure to veto legislation does not waive separation of powers
objections to it. See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 464 n.166
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying “that the President in any way waives his right to object to the
legislative veto if he fails to veto it or if his veto is overridden”), aff’d sub. nom. Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (noting
instances in which “laws were held unconstitutional, because they trenched on the
authority of the Executive Branch,” notwithstanding the President’s failure to exercise veto
authority); see also Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 n.12 (1976) (“Judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislative acts is independent of the presidential veto
power. The Supreme Court has never hesitated to find an unconstitutional encroachment
on presidential authority simply because the President signed the statute at issue.”).
Because Congress always possesses the power to override such a veto, see U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2, there may be instances in which exercising a veto would simply forestall the
inevitable, and insisting that it be so exercised could be counterproductive.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44 (discussing relevance of unanimity to
defining international legislation). But cf. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 254
(describing “probably a complete answer” to constitutional objections: “[T]he United
States has a veto in the Security Council”); id. at 263 (responding to constitutional
objections).
177. See infra text accompanying notes 179–181 (discussing Security Council). For
example, in the U.S.-Russian Polar Bear Treaty, national representatives must concur
before the U.S.-Russia Polar Bear Commission makes any decision establishing annual
taking limits, which appear to be a prerequisite for most takings of polar bears from the
governed population. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Conservation and
Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population, Oct. 16, 2000, U.S.-Russ, art.
5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-10 (banning any takings inconsistent with the Agreement); id.
art. 6 (exempting certain takings by native people and for scientific research); id. art. 87
(assigning responsibility for establishing limits to Commission). To be sure, the discretion
afforded national sovereigns was previously constrained. Agreement on the Conservation
of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918, 13 I.L.M. 13 (binding United States, Norway,
Denmark, Canada, and former Soviet Union).
178. See supra note 55 (explaining how DSB acts by consensus, but absent such
consensus is deemed to have accepted arbitral panel and Appellate Body decisions).
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thorize it;179 as a Permanent Member, the United States may veto any
proposed authorization, but by the very same token any of the other four
Permanent Members may thwart a U.S. initiative.180 Once the Security
Council has taken action, moreover, the failure to obtain unanimity
among the Permanent Members operates as a “reverse veto” that preserves existing resolutions, including any with which the United States has
come to disagree.181
The existence of a veto, finally, does little to redeem international
delegations relative to their domestic kin. Even where completely effective, a veto simply substitutes executive branch officials, who exercise U.S.
veto authority, for the international delegate—meaning that Congress
still loses control.182 The mere fact that U.S. officials have endorsed the
179. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting “the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”), and id. art. 51 (exempting
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security”), with id. art. 42 (providing that Security
Council, having determined existence of threat to “international peace and security,” may
take corrective military action), and id. art. 43 (requiring member states to assist in
effectuating Security Council determinations).
180. Id. art. 27, para. 3. Joel Westra has noted that the veto, by checking centralized
control, indirectly liberates an offsetting power of member “autointerpretation.” Joel H.
Westra, The UN Charter and Uses of Force by Major Powers: An Initial Assessment 6 (Apr.
18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). As he also
observes, however, member states have an incentive to curb any extreme, self-serving
interpretations, lest they diminish the incentive of other states to support the system. Id. at
6–7.
181. See Caron, supra note 52, at 577–88. As an historical matter, this check has
inured primarily, if not solely, to the benefit of the United States, which (together with the
United Kingdom) used the threat of a reverse veto to prevent the lifting of sanctions on
Iraq. See id.; Simon Chesterman & Beatrice Pouligny, Are Sanctions Meant to Work? The
Politics of Creating and Implementing Sanctions Through the United Nations, 9 Global
Governance 503, 508–09 (2003). Some have also suggested that the problem may be
passé, due to the new technique of placing time limits on sanctions. See Lutz Oette, A
Decade of Sanctions Against Iraq: Never Again! The End of Unlimited Sanctions in the
Recent Practice of the UN Security Council, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 93, 95–96 (2002). But that
technique has not been universally exploited. Chesterman & Pouligny, supra, at 509–10
(citing example of Resolution 1390 on Afghanistan, which provided only for “‘review[ ]’”
of financial sanctions and travel bans in twelve months, after which point the Security
Council “‘will either allow these measures to continue or decide to improve them’”—with
the failure to act resulting, presumably, in Resolution’s continuation (quoting S.C. Res.
1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452d mtg., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002))).
182. See Damrosch, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 160 (responding to Louis Henkin’s
invocation of veto authority by noting concern about “activist use” of U.S. powers by the
President). Congress does sometimes try to avoid this delegation reallocation problem by
directing executive branch voting, but that has been bitterly resisted. See, e.g., Statement
on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, 2 Pub. Papers 1847–48 (Oct. 23, 1998) (objecting to, and regarding as advisory only,
statutory provisions requiring reporting to Congress prior to voting for UN peacekeeping
missions, or directing the executive branch as to how to conduct negotiations with
international organizations); Statement on Signing the FREEDOM Support Act, 2 Pub.
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exercise of the delegated authority by withholding the veto is not much
different from the kind of acquiescence that the Congress and President
invariably exhibit in domestic delegations—which, courts have suggested,
should be irrelevant.183
A second argument for distinguishing international delegations, that
the United States may always withdraw from its international obligations,184 overstates the ease of doing so. On the international plane, withdrawal is costly by design and infrequently done.185 That the United
States may also override international delegations as a matter of domestic
law seems particularly unconvincing.186 Congress equally possesses the
Papers 1973–74 (Oct. 24, 1992) (objecting to, and regarding as advisory only, “provisions
purport[ing] to direct me or my delegates with respect to U.S. participation in
international institutions”); Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch
Authority, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 248, 257 (1989) (“No limitations on the President’s
authority to discuss certain issues with foreign governments, or to recommend or concur in
courses of action taken by other nations, should be sanctioned.”).
183. As noted earlier, an analogy between the President’s legislative veto and a U.S.
veto in some international institutions is not entirely apposite, since the President’s veto
may be overridden. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. But the Supreme Court
has declined to endorse any waiver of constitutional claims even under circumstances in
which an institution’s objection would be decisive, as when the House has acquiesced in an
Origination Clause violation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990)
(“A law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from
judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and signed by the President than
would a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.”).
184. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 262 (“Perhaps the fact that the
United States retains the power to terminate its participation saves any otherwise
questionable delegations.”); cf. Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 846–47 (noting
possibility of exiting international treaties or organizations as a check on compromised
sovereignty).
185. Some treaties, like the agreement that established the WTO, make withdrawal
relatively straightforward. WTO Agreement art. XV (establishing permission for
withdrawal after six months notice). But treaties often fail to provide explicitly for a right
to withdraw; barring express mention, there is no right to withdraw unless it can be
established that the parties intended to permit withdrawal or that such a right may be
implied by the nature of the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 65, art. 56(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
345. Even where withdrawal is permitted, as with the WTO, the regime may create such
dependence as to make withdrawal nearly impossible. Compare Raustiala, Rethinking,
supra note 12, at 847 (suggesting that “no one seriously thinks . . . that Japan or Canada
cannot leave the [WTO] and thus retract whatever power they in essence delegated to that
institution, though it may be costly to do so”), with Perez, supra note 55, at 38 (stressing
impracticality of leaving the WTO). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 293–297.
Similar problems attend attempts to withdraw from customary international law, at
least on the international plane. The right of a nation to liberate itself by persistently
objecting is limited to the period of custom’s formation, and evaporates at that (uncertain)
point when custom has been formed. Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 102 cmt. d (1987). Custom may be amended by
another supervening custom or by treaties, id. § 102 reporters’ note 4, but these are not
options that a dissatisfied nation may independently pursue.
186. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 15, at 1741 (observing that, due to last-in-time rule,
“Congress can simply supersede, as a matter of domestic law, a treaty, or a self-executing
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authority to reverse and override its prior domestic delegations. While
there are significant impediments to revising domestic statutes, it is hard
to say that it is categorically more difficult, and equally hard to conclude
that the power to withdraw should uniquely disqualify international
delegations.187
A third argument for distinguishing international delegations is not
unrelated: the sense that they may generate international legal obligations for the United States, and constrain its government, but lack domestic legal effect equivalent to other delegations.188 The point is a fair one,
so far as it goes,189 but its significance for delegation analysis is unclear.
Legislative authority exercised by virtue of international delegations—at
least those not implemented by assimilative statutes—indeed lacks the legal consequences for private conduct that most domestic delegations
might claim.190 But it is not clear why that should be a litmus test for
resolution of an international body made pursuant to a treaty, by enacting an inconsistent
statute, and domestic courts will enforce Congress’s later expressed will,” so that “even
when the resolutions of international bodies are made self-executing, they always remain
subject to domestic revision by the political branches”).
187. Cf. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1595 n.186 (disputing
that non-self-execution solution is unnecessary in light of congressional power to
override). One practical difference, I suppose, is that in purely domestic delegations to
the executive branch, the delegate-in-chief may exercise a veto over any subsequent statute.
But this has not been thought to warrant different treatment of domestic delegations to
private parties or to the states. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing
delegation to private parties); infra text accompanying note 322 (discussing delegation to
states). Moreover, the President certainly has a stake in international delegations as well,
and equal access to the veto. See infra text accompanying notes 281–284 (discussing
President’s role in international delegations). Finally, Congress retains, of course, the
authority to override any veto, and thus to retract any delegation, domestic or
international, that may have been effected. See infra text accompanying note 272 (noting
congressional authority to override veto).
188. See, e.g., Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 263–65 (describing
differences between U.S. international obligations and domestic law). I discuss below one
solution to international delegations that would accentuate that difference. See infra text
accompanying notes 250–259 (discussing non-self-execution approach).
189. How far it is in fact intended to go is somewhat obscure. Professor Henkin
suggests, for example, that
[a]n international regulation might impose obligations on the United States that
might require changes in U.S. law, but it is the United States that will have to
legislate to that end, whether it does so by giving legal effect directly to a selfexecuting treaty, or by act of Congress to implement the agreement.
Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 264. What it means to “legislate to . . . giv[e]
legal effect directly to a self-executing treaty” is unclear, where the dominant meaning of
self-executing is to have legal effect “without awaiting any act by Congress,” id. at 199,
unless it is meant to connote something more like an act of will. In any event, Henkin
elsewhere dismisses the significance of such niceties. See infra note 197.
190. Domestic delegations to nonfederal entities, again, may be more comparable:
The delegation at issue in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., for example, merely authorized private
parties to fix minimum wages that regulated parties might accept or reject (though, were
the wage levels rejected, the regulated parties would be subject to other federal law). 298
U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936).
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delegations.191 International exercises of authority, even those without
separate assimilation, still have direct, material consequences for U.S. citizens192—for example, for persons awarded damages by a NAFTA Chapter
11 arbitration,193 or for persons immunized from prosecution by Security
Council Resolution 1422.194 Even where international law lacks direct
effect, its domestic influence may be substantial: It is unlikely that Congress simply ignores the discontinuity between domestic and international law on many occasions,195 and more likely that the United States
does what it is obligated to do.196
In any case, the fact that the United States remains obligated on the
international plane to implement its obligations is of sufficient constitutional significance.197 There is room for dispute as to whether all international obligations require domestic implementation,198 and whether
191. The starting point, perhaps, is the insight that international exercises lacking
domestic legal effect cannot be the precise equivalent of congressional lawmaking. Cf. Alf
Ross, Delegation of Power, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 18 (1958) (contending that, for purposes
of the doctrine delegata potestas non potest delegari, “[d]elegation of powers takes place when
an authority . . . authorizes another to issue regulations which the authority itself could
have made, and having the same legal force as if made by the delegator himself”). The
problem is that even the authority exercised under domestic delegations lacks equivalence.
For example, where Congress has itself exercised its lawmaking authority, later enactments
are presumed not to have repealed that exercise—but no equivalent presumption would
be extended to executive branch exercises of delegated authority. Cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. &
Loan v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108–11 (1991) (distinguishing between clear statement
rule applicable to implied repeals and presumption favoring administrative estoppel). The
President, moreover, is at liberty to countermand exercises of delegated authority (at least
within the limits of the delegation), but does not enjoy that authority where Congress has
itself made the law.
192. Cf. Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 181–85 (suggesting that lawmaking is
distinguished by its creation of rules of conduct to affect expected behavior of individual
citizens).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 120–128.
194. See supra text accompanying note 87.
195. See Young, Trouble, supra note 3, at 535. One clear signal in this regard is the
number of assimilative statutes, which essentially implement international delegations on
the home front. See supra Part I.C. But see Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic, supra note
15, at 254 (arguing that the effects of international obligations on domestic political
dynamics are uncertain and insufficient to frame constitutional issues).
196. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 47 (2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter Henkin, How Nations Behave] (“It is probably the case that almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time.” (emphasis omitted)).
197. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 203 (“Whether a treaty is selfexecuting or not, it is legally binding on the United States. Whether it is self-executing or
not, it is supreme law of the land.”); id. (noting that while Chief Justice Marshall suggested
that a non-self-executing agreement “is not ‘a rule for the Court’[,] he did not suggest that
it is not law for the President or for Congress” (quoting Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1829))).
198. For example, there is disagreement as to whether the United States is legally
bound to comply with WTO dispute settlement decisions—but substantial authority to the
effect that they must. E.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Measures
Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 297

R

R
R
R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 52

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

19-OCT-04

11:01

1543

and how the President and Congress may be constrained,199 but it is unnecessary to suppose the most stringent view on such questions. That the
relevant actors may choose not to fulfill their legal obligations is also not
decisive, since law may always be disregarded.200 While the courts have
deferred a great deal to the political branches in foreign affairs, they have
never declared each and every dispute about external matters to be a
political question.201 In any case, the constitutional significance of even
nonjusticiable questions of international legal authority seems beyond
doubt.202 For these reasons, whether or not international law is truly
“part of our law” for all intents and purposes,203 the existence of interna(1993) [hereinafter GATT Report on Alcoholic Beverages] (“GATT law is part of Federal
law in the United States and as such is superior to GATT-inconsistent State law.”); see John
H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 109 (2004) (describing controversy and
arguing for legal obligation to comply).
199. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich.
L. Rev. 1555, 1568 (1984) (discussing obligations of President and Congress with respect to
enforcing international obligations); see also Damrosch, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at
160–61 (describing and assessing position that “[t]he United States remains
constitutionally free to disregard whatever legal obligations might arise from involvement
in international organizations,” but noting Henkin’s increasing discomfort with this
position). The issue has arisen with special force in connection with customary
international law obligations, see generally Agora: May the President Violate Customary
International Law?, 80 Am. J. Int’l L. 913 (1986) (debating power of executive branch to
violate or abrogate customary international law), and with decisions by the International
Court of Justice relating to nonfederal actors, see generally Agora: Breard, 92 Am. J. Int’l L.
666 (1998) (debating state sovereignty issues involved in compelling compliance with
International Court of Justice decision).
200. For example, states and localities have resisted federal decrees, see Frank B.
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1471 & n.229 (2001), Congress and federal agencies largely
disregarded the Supreme Court’s declaration that legislative vetoes were unconstitutional,
id. at 1471 n.228, and the executive branch sometimes refuses to enforce statutes that the
President deems unconstitutional, see Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute
Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994) (defending
nonenforcement).
201. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 143–48; Ku, supra note 15, at 98–99;
see also infra text accompanying notes 219–227 (discussing United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
202. Indeed, the fact that international law had domestic and international
significance was of paramount concern to the Framers. See Carlos Vazquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695, 697–700 (1995) (describing
how Framers intended Supremacy Clause to guarantee that treaties automatically became
law in the states); see, e.g., James Madison, Helvidius, No. I, in answer to Pacificus
[Alexander Hamilton], on President Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality (1793),
reprinted in 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 611, 614–15 (Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867), microfiched on 19th Century Legal Treatises (Research
Publications) (explaining significance of Treaty Clause as partly due to the fact that treaties
“have sometimes the effect of changing not only the external laws of the society, but
operate also on the internal code”).
203. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense . . . is
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tional obligations is enough to frame a constitutional question of
nondelegation.
B. Nondelegation as an Underenforced Norm
By analogy to domestic affairs, then, international delegations raise
legitimate constitutional questions. But that is scarcely the end of the
matter, even as a question of positive law, given the longstanding reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine.
1. The Practice of Underenforcement. — The Supreme Court has described the nondelegation principle as a first principle of constitutional
government,204 adverted to the doctrine over a reasonably long tenure,205 and never renounced it.206 At the same time, the doctrine plainly
lacks vitality. As much as it has maintained that all legislative delegations
are unconstitutional, the Court has also said that they must, under some
circumstances, be permitted.207 The bottom line is noteworthy. The
part of our law.”). But cf. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1986)
(finding “sufficiently express evidence of congressional intent as to interdict the
application of international law” with respect to certain indefinitely detained aliens); id. at
1454–55 (finding that decision by Attorney General constituted a controlling executive act,
and a prior circuit court decision constituted a controlling judicial decision, so as also to
pretermit international law).
204. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (describing
delegations of legislative power to executive branch, inter alia, as “a breach of the National
fundamental law”); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to
. . . the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”).
205. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a
delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated
legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no
delegation of those powers . . . .” (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771
(1996))); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress generally cannot
delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be
delegated is, of course, clear.”); Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (“Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President . . . .”).
206. Indeed, then-Justice Rehnquist would have based at least two decisions on the
doctrine. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543–48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Thomas, moreover, would have it
broadened. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (faulting intelligible
principle doctrine for failing to “prevent all cessions of legislative power,” since “there are
cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision
is simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative’”).
207. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[I]n our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933) (“What is done by the Tariff
Commission and the President in changing the tariff rates to conform to new conditions is
in substance a delegation, though a permissible one, of the legislative process.”); see also
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737,
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Court has struck down statutes on nondelegation grounds only twice,208
and not since 1935, despite a fair number of opportunities.209 Adverting
to this history, Cass Sunstein quipped that the doctrine “has had one
good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”210 Gary Lawson tallied the
combined vote by members of the Supreme Court as standing 53-0
against the nondelegation doctrine over a recent twelve-year span.211
So far as one can tell, this pathetic history does not signal that the
Court has rejected the doctrine’s premise—that only Congress may constitutionally exercise legislative authority. The problem, instead, seems to
be the lack of any judicially manageable standard.212 The recent decision
in Whitman v. American Trucking illustrates contemporary attitudes perfectly. A panel of the D.C. Circuit had held that the Clean Air Act, as
then construed, unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the
Environmental Protection Agency,213 but suggested that the EPA might
cure the difficulty by adopting a narrowing construction of the statute.214
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court rejected that solution,
745 (D.D.C. 1971) (“[T]he Constitution does not forbid every delegation of ‘legislative’
power.”). The Court emphasized anew in Whitman that legislative delegations were never
permissible, but that the delegation in that case was not legislative in character, provoking
Justice Stevens to argue (for himself and Justice Souter) that the better course would
simply be to admit that some legislative delegations were constitutional. Whitman, 531 U.S.
at 487–90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539–42 (1935)
(striking down delegation of authority to regulate “fair competition” under National
Industrial Recovery Act); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (striking down
essentially standardless delegation of authority to promulgate Petroleum Code under
National Industrial Recovery Act). As the Court explained in Mistretta, in Schechter and
Panama Refining the Court found that Congress not only had utterly failed to cabin the
authorities’ discretion, but also either had criminalized acts for the first time (Panama
Refining, 293 U.S. at 414) or had delegated regulatory power to private parties (Schechter,
295 U.S. at 539–40). 488 U.S. at 373 n.7; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,
486 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing extraordinary character of those
circumstances).
209. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373–74 (citing examples).
210. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation].
211. Lawson, supra note 20, at 330. It seems unfair not to count Justice Thomas’s vote
in Whitman in nondelegation’s win column, since Justice Thomas indicated that he would
have voted for a nondelegation challenge had it been properly briefed. Whitman, 531 U.S.
at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
212. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1374 (2001) (“The Court’s reluctance to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine more vigorously appears to stem from the judiciary’s limited institutional
competence rather than any fundamental disagreement with the doctrine’s goal . . . .”);
Manning, Textualism, supra note 149, at 727 (noting that distinguishing between
“permissible and impermissible delegations” is “a terrible task” for the judiciary, and that
“the Court accordingly has been reluctant to enforce an aggressive interbranch
nondelegation doctrine”).
213. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
214. Id. at 1038.
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emphasizing that legislative delegations were never permissible215 and
could not be cured by agency self-restraint.216 At the same time, Justice
Scalia reiterated his view—originally authored in dissent—that “we have
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.’”217 Without necessarily endorsing the Court’s commitment to nondelegation in theory, commentators generally side with its
decision to steer clear of applying it in practice.218
The nondelegation doctrine becomes still feebler, if that is possible,
in the realm of foreign affairs. That international delegations deserve
different treatment is conventionally traced to United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., in which the Court opined that “congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within
the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”219 Curtiss-Wright remains
215. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
216. Id. at 472–73. For the preceding debate concerning whether agencies could be
trusted to resolve nondelegation problems, compare, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter
Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J.
1399, 1422–31 (2000) (arguing that administrative standards improve accountability and
promote other nondelegation virtues), and Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 349–61 (1999) (defending use of administrative
standards to constrain administrative discretion), with Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The
False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 15–16, 19
(2000) (arguing against administrative nondelegation doctrine).
217. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia had earlier added the following:
[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can
be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving
policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the
judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate
not over a point of principle but over a question of degree.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 393–403 (1987) (arguing that courts
are “institutionally incapable of creating and applying a delegation doctrine” that limits
legislative grants of discretion); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am.
U. L. Rev. 323, 324–28 (1987) (agreeing with Pierce, supra, and concluding that there are
no “judicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish permissible from
impermissible delegations”); Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 210, at 327 (speculating
that the reason is likelihood that “judicial enforcement of the doctrine would produce ad
hoc, highly discretionary rulings” that would “suffer from the appearance, and perhaps the
reality, of judicial hostility to the particular program at issue”). See generally id. at 317–28
(summarizing case against judicial enforcement).
219. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). After citing recurring legislative practice that
respected the need for executive autonomy, the Court added:
[I]t is evident that this court should not be in haste to apply a general rule which
will have the effect of condemning legislation like that under review as
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controversial,220 and its precise reasoning may have few contemporary
adherents,221 but subsequent cases have certainly echoed its notion of
applying a (still) more deferential approach to delegations in relating to
foreign affairs.222 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated enforcing
the domestic nondelegation doctrine while an Associate Justice, he had in

constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The principles which
justify such legislation find overwhelming support in the unbroken legislative
practice which has prevailed almost from the inception of the national
government to the present day.
Id. at 322.
220. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power
After the Iran-Contra Affair 94 (1990) [hereinafter Koh, National Security Constitution]
(summarizing “withering criticism” of Curtiss-Wright); see Bradley, International
Delegations, supra note 3, at 1583 & n.126 (citing critical authorities). Many are
particularly frustrated with the notion that the President can be delegated unlimited
discretion in the exercise of the war powers. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath 24–25 (1993)
[hereinafter Ely, War] (arguing, halfheartedly, for application of nondelegation doctrine
in connection with war powers); Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the
Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law 210–19 (2d ed. 1989)
(arguing wholeheartedly for such application).
221. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & Pol. 1,
14–15 (2000) (analyzing compatibility of Curtiss-Wright and the Steel Seizure Case); Edward
T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49
Duke L.J. 1127, 1142 nn.46–47 (2000) [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federalism]
(citing critical authorities, and those questioning continuing influence of underlying
constitutional theory).
222. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445–46 (1998) (noting that
President is granted greater discretion regarding statutes relating to foreign trade than
would be permissible if statutes related to domestic affairs); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
691 (1892) (“[I]n the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often
desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people . . . to invest the
President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to
[foreign] trade and commerce . . . .”); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768
(1996) (acknowledging greater deference to congressional delegations in matters
involving military affairs); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
holding in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), as rooted in wartime exigencies);
United States v. Approximately 633.79 Tons of Yellowfin Tuna, 383 F. Supp. 659, 661–62
(S.D. Cal. 1974) (“[W]hen considering a delegation of authority to engage in international
negotiations, only the most clear abuse or true congressional abdication or a violation of
individual constitutional rights should lead to the invalidation of the legislation by the
courts.” (citations omitted)); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 754 (D.D.C. 1971) (“The consequence for international trade,
liquidity and monetary relationships, enhances the range of power Congress may
permissibly delegate to the President.”). But see Michael J. Glennon, The NATO Treaty:
The Commitment Myth, in First Use of Nuclear Weapons 51, 57 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed.,
1987) (“[T]he Court appears in successive stages to have backed steadily away” from
“exempting foreign affairs powers from the operation of the [non]delegation doctrine
. . . .”).
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prior government service expressed the view that nondelegation simply
“does not apply in the field of external affairs.”223
The Court has never taken such an extreme position, and the import
of its case law seems more modest. Given the relative breadth of national
authority over foreign affairs, it is probable that limits on congressional
power established in the domestic sphere—like nondelegation—do not
apply with precisely the same force to treaties and congressional-executive agreements.224 On the other hand, there is no precedent legitimating delegations through the President to international institutions,225 and
some opinions caution that Congress remains subject to constitutional
limits.226 The absence of any case law more clearly establishing an international nondelegation doctrine may plausibly be attributed to the Senate’s (relatively) strict constraints on international delegations.227 At present, the only safe conclusion is that, in foreign as in domestic matters,
the Court will be disinclined to enforce any limits it may perceive.

223. William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues—Administration Position, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 628, 637 (1970).
224. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for
Clinton v. City of New York, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 265, 271 (2001) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine
probably does not apply to various matters, including foreign and military affairs, foreign
commerce, rules governing the internal operations of the judiciary and the executive, and
the management of governmental real estate.”). The persuasiveness of this view depends
in part, of course, on whether the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs is
genuinely plenary. There is case law supporting that conclusion, see, e.g., Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–35 (1920) (upholding federal government’s power to make
and enforce treaties that conflict with powers reserved to states), but it has become newly
controversial. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty
Power?, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 403 (2003) [hereinafter Swaine, Treaty Power] (evaluating
federalism constraints on the treaty power in light of “new federalism” displayed in recent
Supreme Court decisions).
225. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1584 (“Curtiss-Wright
concerned a delegation within the U.S. system, between Congress and the President, not
an international delegation.”); see Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Constitution and World
Government, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 355, 368–69 (1962) (suggesting that Curtiss-Wright may be
inapplicable to international delegations).
226. E.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958) (“Broad as the [foreign affairs]
power . . . must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining
Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution
apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other nations.”);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Congress and the President, like the courts,
possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”).
227. See Nathanson, supra note 225, at 367 (claiming, in 1962, that the lack of
precedent reflects “the reluctance of the Senate to permit any delegations comparable to
those which have become common so far as legislation is concerned,” and its insistence
instead “upon strictest conformity with principles of non-delegability”). It is worth noting,
however, that some of the Court’s nondelegation cases were suffused with foreign context.
See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421–30 (1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928).
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2. Disinterring the Nondelegation Doctrine. — Few call for reviving a fullbore nondelegation doctrine,228 and some who do seem resigned to its
failure.229 For reasons just mentioned, anyone arguing that courts
should strike down international delegations based on a disinterred
nondelegation doctrine faces a still tougher slog. In the most systematic
and persuasive argument for that result, Julian Ku concentrates on closing the gap between domestic and international matters, concluding that
courts should take “an active judicial role in policing international delegations.”230 What remains elusive, however, is a comprehensive answer to
the problems bedeviling the doctrine’s domestic application.231 Professor
Ku suggests that courts should reject functional analysis in favor of formalism, but that distinction seems of little assistance; assuming one can
get past the notion of courts electing a rule-bound approach,232 there is
no clear text or precedent to inform this formalism,233 and its principal
characteristic seems to be that it would render international delegations
unconstitutional rather than permitting them.234 It is unclear, moreover,
228. Among its less conflicted proponents, see Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution
and the Delegation of Congressional Power (1975) (questioning argument that Congress’s
incapacity to manage increased responsibilities of government justifies delegation); John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131–34 (1980) (arguing that nonenforcement of the
delegation doctrine allows legislators to avoid accountability by delegating important
policy choices to administrators); Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, reprinted in
Peter H. Schuck, Foundations of Administrative Law 163, 166–67 (1994) (lamenting that
“delegation has been elevated to the highest of virtues, and standards have been relegated
to the wastebasket of history because that is the logic of interest-group liberalism”);
Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 3 (“When the lawmakers we elect have others make the law,
the people lose.”); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 63–67 (1982) (“[A] renewed nondelegation doctrine . . . should reduce the use
of regulation to produce private benefits and to satisfy high demanders at collective cost
. . . .”); Lawson, supra note 20, at 333–35 (explaining that nondelegation doctrine is within
original meaning of the Constitution).
229. See, e.g., Ely, War, supra note 220, at 24–25 (counting himself among the few
arguing for reviving the nondelegation doctrine, but acknowledging that such a revival
would require “another Vietnam” and even then would likely not last).
230. Ku, supra note 15, at 131; see id. at 131–44 (identifying objections to judicial
review of international delegations and offering reasons why such review is “necessary and
desirable”).
231. See supra note 218 (citing reservations by leading commentators about
application of nondelegation doctrine to domestic matters).
232. It is clearly a discretionary, case-by-case matter under his approach, rather than
any fundamental jurisprudential commitment. E.g., Ku, supra note 15, at 76–77.
233. The argument, indeed, is that courts have failed the nondelegation doctrine by
refusing formalism in the past. Id. at 116–17. Professor Ku alludes to “a few exceptions in
the now distant past,” but cites to Professor Krent for his conclusion that delegations to
third parties could not withstand formalist scrutiny. Id. at 120 (citing Harold J. Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 68 (1990)).
234. Thus, Professor Ku explains that while “[a]t first glance, international
delegations fall neatly into the Court’s constitutional system, creating no serious difficulties
. . . [t]his view depends . . . on the adoption of a functionalist approach to constitutional
interpretation,” whereas formalist analysis shows that they suffer from “two serious
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how one would adapt doctrinal cornerstones—such as the insistence that
Congress provide a guiding “intelligible principle” to its agent235—to the
international setting, where Congress itself may have little control over
the principles ultimately conveyed.236
Even assuming a solution to these problems, asking the courts to revert to a more stringent approach—in the international context to
boot—is likely to encounter fatal resistance. The backlash that marked
the nondelegation doctrine’s heyday,237 and the belief that national political powers (and the urge to delegate) are at their zenith in foreign affairs,238 will tempt courts to invoke nonjusticiability doctrines to betray
any nondelegation revival.239 The consequences of that betrayal, moreover, may be worse than if matters were left alone. If passing muster under
a reinvigorated standard may confer legitimacy upon the organization in
institutional failings”—lack of accountability and lack of legitimacy. Ku, supra note 15, at
130.
235. See supra notes 172, 206 and accompanying text (discussing intelligible
principle requirement).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 286–296 (discussing problem posed by
multiple principals).
237. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17, 143 (2000) (describing
nondelegation doctrine as “carry[ing] some heavy baggage”).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 219–223. For examples postdating Ku’s
work, see American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003) (referring
to broad congressional authority and extratextual presidential authority in foreign
relations (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936))); id. at
416 (“While a sharp line between public and private acts works for many purposes in the
domestic law, insisting on the same line in defining the legitimate scope of the Executive’s
international negotiations would hamstring the President in settling international
controversies.”); id. (cautioning against “transplanting ‘judicial subtleties’ of domestic law
into ‘the solution of analogous problems between friendly nations’” (quoting United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 234–42 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380–81 (2000) (explaining that “[a]s with
Congress’s explicit delegation to the President of power over economic sanctions,
Congress’s express command to the President to take the initiative for the United States
among the international community invested him with the maximum authority of the
National Government in harmony with the President’s own constitutional powers”
(citation omitted)).
239. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment) (declining to review presidential authority to terminate treaties on ripeness
grounds); id. at 1002, 1003–06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (invoking political question
grounds). Not all such invocations will be persuasive—for example, the delegations may
have domestic consequences, and the political solutions may be less obvious, contrast id. at
1004–05, but alternative bases for abstention are likely to be available, particularly if the
President chooses not to object. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (contending that presidential authority “is at its
maximum” when exercised consistent with congressional authorization, “for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . . . If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government
as an undivided whole lacks power”).
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question,240 it raises the specter that international delegations with pernicious effects might be legitimated by a reinvigorated, but porous, judicial
review.
The more popular method for resuscitating nondelegation has been
to find a more flexible tool. Some appealing possibilities for coping with
underenforced norms—self-enforcement, self-help, and third-party intervention—are unlikely to be of assistance in coping with international
delegations.241 The principal alternative, occasionally employed by the
Supreme Court, has been to interpret delegations narrowly.242 In Kent v.
Dulles, for example, the Supreme Court invoked liberty and nondelegation interests in reading narrowly the Secretary of State’s discretion to
evaluate the passport application of a Communist Party member.243
240. Ku, supra note 15, at 143 (“If a court finds that a challenged international
delegation can fit within the Constitution’s formal structural requirements, a court (and in
the U.S. system perhaps only a court) can confer upon an international organization the
independent source of political legitimacy that it currently lacks.”). Professor Ku
elsewhere notes, however, that international organizations may in fact suffer both from
illegitimacy, id. at 126–30, as well as a lack of accountability, id. at 121–26, so any
whitewashing may be undesirable.
241. See, e.g., Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 17, at 1227 (describing general
obligation of officials to avoid unconstitutional conduct); id. at 1239–41 (describing
potential for Congress to enforce Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the
Supreme Court’s construction); id. at 1248–50 (proposing that the Supreme Court should
decline to “polic[e] state courts against overly generous interpretations of federal
constitutional values”). Both supporters and critics of the nondelegation doctrine suppose
that Congress utilizes delegation for its own ends, so it is hard to rely on national political
intervention as a complete solution. In the international context, moreover, the judiciary’s
heightened deference to the political branches is more than matched by Congress’s own
deference to the executive branch, to which it may effectively delegate any policing of
nondelegation as well. State courts play a limited role in matters involving foreign affairs,
and the states as a whole appear to have no legally protected role in foreign affairs. As G.
Edward White has noted, “the early-twentieth-century transformations of the constitutional
jurisprudence of foreign relations had the effect of eliminating state legislatures and state
courts as contributors to the jurisprudence.” G. Edward White, Observations on the
Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1118 n.24 (1999).
State court interventions were slapped down in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–35
(1968), which seemingly remains good law. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417–19 (discussing
Zschernig).
242. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 223 [hereinafter Manning, Canon of Avoidance] (“The nondelegation
doctrine . . . now operates exclusively through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance
of serious constitutional questions.”); Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 210, at 342
(reviewing various nondelegation canons “show[ing] that the nondelegation doctrine is
alive and well. It has merely been relocated and left unnamed.”); see, e.g., Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our application of the
nondelegation doctrine has been limited . . . to giving narrow constructions to statutory
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”); Indus. Union Dep’t
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (“A construction of the statute that avoids
this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.”).
243. 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (explaining that implicated liberty interest could only
be regulated by Congress, “[a]nd if that power is delegated, the standards must be
adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests”; further, “[w]here activities or enjoyment,
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Whatever the general merits of interpretive solutions to underenforcement,244 they seem inappropriate to a terminal case like nondelegation—that is, if there is so little to the nondelegation doctrine proper,
why pervert statutory interpretation?245 (Conversely, if there is a genuine
basis for the nondelegation doctrine, an interpretive canon only goes
partway to eliminate the problem, since in the case of clearly written statutes the nondelegation doctrine will continue to be underenforced.246)
Putting this to one side, the interpretive approach seems self-defeating.
As John Manning has observed, “If the point of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that Congress makes important statutory policy, a strategy that requires the judiciary, in effect, to rewrite the terms of a duly
enacted statute cannot be said to serve the interests of that doctrine.”247
That conundrum is particularly pronounced in foreign affairs. Because
the courts often defer to the President’s construction of foreign relations
statutes,248 or choose on their own to interpret statutes so as to confer
substantial powers on him,249 the delegated power to interpret runs
through the courts to the executive branch—not the same thing as delegating to international institutions, but surely inconsistent with the basic
concern.
A different interpretive tack would be to adopt a non-self-execution
presumption.250 As elaborated by Curtis Bradley, courts could presume
natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are
involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them”); see
Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 41–42 (discussing civil liberties reading of Kent v. Dulles, and
bemoaning failure to extrapolate it to liberty interests protected by broader nondelegation
doctrine).
244. For a sustained defense, see Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 17,
passim.
245. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1761 (“Statutory
interpretation that construes delegations narrowly can be justified, if at all, only on the
ground that the underlying interpretive theory lets the judges employ clear statement
canons that lack constitutional underpinnings.”).
246. Those genuinely concerned about nondelegation, consequently, do not seem to
put much stock in the solution. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing
the Court’s repeated failure to adequately clarify or define its position on nondelegation).
247. Manning, Canon of Avoidance, supra note 242, at 228.
248. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1586 (citing El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982), and Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649
(2000) (discussing, and defending, deference).
249. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 Va. J. Int’l L.
481, 499–501 (2001) (describing Supreme Court’s reasoning in attributing broad
preemptive scope to federal statute in Crosby).
250. Academics and courts disagree as to whether there already is, or should be, a
presumption for or against self-execution. Compare, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 808 F.
Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (suggesting that “the courts have generally presumed
treaties to be non-self-executing”), and John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955,
2092 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution] (supporting presumption
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that the outputs of international institutions “do not create enforceable
federal law [within the United States] unless and until they are implemented by Congress.”251 That path may be one that courts and the political branches are intuitively adopting,252 but establishing a more systematic principle might lend needed clarity.
That said, the precise warrant for this solution is unclear. Professor
Bradley provides an authoritative and illuminating survey of potential delegation objections without stating conclusively which is decisive, and
why.253 This is consistent with his proposed remedy, which avoids establishing any fixed rules for judicial application, but his analysis also suggests problems with too readily assuming that international delegations
are unconstitutional. He brackets the controversy surrounding whether
non-self-execution is compatible with the Supremacy Clause by claiming
to invoke the doctrine only “by analogy,”254 since U.S. treaty commitments do not “purport to convert the decisions and actions of international institutions into self-executing federal law.”255 But if the treaties in
question do not themselves give domestic legal force to the delegated
actions—and a discrepancy between international and domestic law is tolerable—then international delegations are qualitatively different from
domestic delegations, since legislative authority exercised by executive
agencies typically does have legal force. International delegations are constitutionally troubling, then, only “by analogy,” leaving their standing
unclear.256
Like other interpretive solutions to underenforcement, a presumption of non-self-execution also seems ill tailored. It is unclear whether
Professor Bradley’s proposal would apply to all emissions from international institutions, solely those violating (or potentially violating) the U.S.
Constitution, or perhaps only those exhibiting some aggravating facagainst self-execution), with Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 686 F. Supp.
354, 357 (D.D.C. 1988) (applying presumption that treaties are self-executing unless
contrary intention is expressed), Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 346–47 (1995) (arguing for
self-execution based, in part, on Supremacy Clause), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2157–58 (1999) (concluding that
Supremacy Clause cases adopt presumption favoring self-execution, which may be
overcome by clear statement).
251. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1587.
252. Id. at 1591–92 (reviewing decisions); id. at 1592–95 (citing efforts to limit force
of U.S. treaties and statutes).
253. He stops short, accordingly, of claiming that the nondelegation doctrine would,
even if applied, invalidate international delegations. E.g., id. at 1584 (alluding to
“constitutional concerns posed by U.S. involvement with international institutions,”
including nondelegation doctrine); see id. at 1560–61 (describing nondelegation and
other constitutional limits as potentially “relevant to international delegations”).
254. Id. at 1588.
255. Id. at 1589.
256. If, on the other hand, the analogy is very strong, then a Supremacy Clause
objection is not so easily avoided.
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tor.257 Given the range of delegations addressed, however, it seems likely
to apply quite broadly; if so, it may materially undermine the strength of
U.S. international commitments, and diminish the concessions made by
other states, without any certain legal warrant.
At the same time, the non-self-execution solution is liable to overlook
some of the more pressing problems. Delegated authority would remain
entirely enforceable on the international plane; this means that Security
Council resolutions, for example, would lack domestic legal effect but
retain all their international significance,258 and there can be little doubt
of the latter’s importance. Even in the domestic context, the non-selfexecution proposal underenforces any norm against international delegations. Inadvertent or indifferent delegations, the kind most likely to be
checked by Professor Bradley’s rule, do not seem as prone to mischief;
deliberate and explicit delegations, on the other hand, are least likely to
be checked.259 If delegations are counterproductive because of what they
intend to accomplish, we should be wary of a decision rule that lets pass
the most egregious types, unless we are especially confident that clearer
statutory language has ensured congressional accountability.
C. The Continuing Salience of the Nondelegation Doctrine
While some would reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, perhaps
the more common reaction to the puzzle of international delegations is
to find a way to quit worrying about them. Some do this reluctantly—
due, for example, to justiciability concerns—but others, most recently
257. For example, when explaining the gravity of international delegations, Professor
Bradley highlights that NAFTA Chapter 19 panels apply U.S. law, see Bradley,
International Delegations, supra note 3, at 1576, but also appears to stress the fact that
Chapter 11 panels apply international law, id. at 1577. One could take the view that either
is more invasive.
258. As Professor Bradley elaborates, non-self-execution means that such a resolution
“would not by itself satisfy the constitutional requirements for the use of force.” Id. at
1591. This is, it bears mention, a somewhat unconventional type of non-self-execution.
For one, self-execution usually concerns the status of a treaty in courts of law, but Security
Council resolutions typically have little pertinence in courts. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (describing a non-self-executing treaty as one “address[ing] itself to
the political, not the judicial department,” such that “the legislature must execute [the
treaty], before it can become a rule for the Court”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 111(3) (1987) (identifying non-self-executing
agreements as exceptions to the principle that U.S. courts must give effect to international
law and to international agreements of the United States). In any case, many consider this
the kind of international commitment that is never directly effective—meaning that an
extra presumption of non-self-execution is irrelevant. Id. at § 111 cmt. g (“It has been
commonly assumed that an international agreement cannot itself bring the United States
into a state of war.”).
259. The Pelly and Packwood Amendments, for example, were enacted by Congress
specifically in order to make enforceable agreements for which international sanctions
were unavailable. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 224–26
(1986).
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Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, mount a frontal attack.260 In their
view, “there just is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there
ever been. The nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”261 Instead, what Posner and Vermeule
charmingly dub their “naı̈ve view” holds that statutory grants of authority
do not transfer legislative authority, but exercise it, making any derivative
exercises of authority executive in character.262 On this view, legislation
should be condemned as delegative only if Congress compromises the
legislative authority of its members (for example, by ceding their power
to vote);263 otherwise, nondelegation is simply irrelevant to constitutional
analysis.264
This argument is appealing, and of evident significance here. If, as
Professors Posner and Vermeule say, nondelegation lacks any distinctive
legal or normative character, complaints about international delegations
should not make it out of the gate. I do not attempt a comprehensive
assessment of their argument;265 as should be evident from the preceding
260. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1721 n.2 (noting relative
infrequency of challenges to the merits of nondelegation, and providing an “honor roll of
. . . serious critiques”).
261. Id. at 1722.
262. Id. at 1723, 1725–26.
263. Id. at 1726 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424–25 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); id. at 1756. Perhaps another example, which they do not cite, is Clinton v.
City of New York, in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to
delegate to the President (as the Court saw it) a more finely tuned simulation of the
legislative power to repeal statutes. 524 U.S. 417, 438–41 (1998). As noted previously, this
distinction—between delegations of the power to enact legislation and the power to
exercise a member’s vote—has been criticized. See supra note 166.
264. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1724 (“[W]e will deny that the
nondelegation idea adds any constitutionally meritorious content to the relevant
debates.”). They would separately address attempts by Congress to exercise power that it
simply does not have—either because the power is enjoyed by the executive branch or by a
component of Congress like the Senate. Id. at 1724, 1755, 1758.
265. In order to rehabilitate the doctrine entirely, one would have to evaluate
nondelegation’s intellectual pedigree, the original understanding, and nineteenth-century
case law, since Posner and Vermeule claim not only to have found no support for the
nondelegation doctrine in these sources, but also to have found “originalist and Burkean”
support for the naı̈ve view. Id. at 1736. On its face, at least, Article I’s Vesting Clause
seems to draw a distinction between legislative and non-legislative powers. If we assume, as
Posner and Vermeule concede, that this precludes anyone other than Congress from
exercising “legislative Powers,” id. at 1729 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I), the Clause naturally
poses the further question: Might some transfer of authority by an otherwise proper
exercise of Article I be fairly characterized as an unconstitutional divestiture of “legislative
Power”? This is not, I think, merely metaphoric, but simply assumes the possibility of
inquiring into the equivalence of constitutional functions (as opposed to, say, assuming
that only a legislature can ever be said to exercise legislative power). This is, in any event,
the assumption of present doctrine. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The focus of controversy . . . has been whether the degree of
generality contained in the authorization for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a
particular field is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.”).
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discussion, I also do not attempt any dramatic revival of the nondelegation doctrine, which seems plagued by indeterminacy and prone to judicial misapplication. But Posner and Vermeule shrink from focusing on
these more mundane complaints,266 instead emphasizing that delegations may also be functionally indistinguishable from any other exercise
of legislative authority. My limited ambition is to explain why international delegations are distinctive in principle from ordinary legislative
acts and deserve evaluation as such.
1. The Welfarist Case for Nondelegation. — Professors Posner and
Vermeule address the possibility that delegation harms welfare by “conceal[ing] political transfers from the public, making it more difficult”—as
compared to ordinary legislation—“for the public to interfere” with
them.267 They think it most plausible that Congress does not give away
power, but instead retains the ability to discipline its agents—and the
public, in turn, retains the ability to discipline Congress, and to promote
the public interest to the same degree as without delegation.268 Even if
the public cannot directly monitor those exercising delegated power,269 it
may still observe when “Congress has created a mechanism that will make
transfers to interest groups,”270 and prophylactically discipline the kinds
of transfers that may be made in the future.271 As Posner and Vermeule
For a fuller exchange regarding Posner and Vermeule’s historical and textual case against
nondelegation, compare Alexander & Prakash, supra note 166, passim (criticizing Posner
and Vermeule’s account of the nondelegation doctrine and attempting partial
rehabilitation), with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-mortem,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1331 (2003) (responding to Alexander and Prakash and extending
critique of doctrine).
266. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1723 (“Our argument
is not that the courts lack the competence to enforce a nondelegation doctrine.”). But cf.
id. at 1731–32 (noting that the naı̈ve view is more readily administrable).
267. Id. at 1746. The relative nature of the problem is central to their argument:
Delegation, they suggest, simply is not special, and they query why it should be condemned
when, like other legislative mechanisms (e.g., the power to tax), it can be used for good or
ill. Id. at 1753. The point is not without force. But it is not unusual for policymakers to
attack problems on an incremental basis, without any perceived need to extrapolate the
reasoning. The central question is not whether delegation is especially bad, but whether
the benefits (in welfarist or democratic terms) of limiting that form of action exceed the
costs, including the costs of having recourse to alternative mechanisms.
268. Id. at 1746.
269. Their account posits a hypothetical in which the media encounter capacity
constraints when they try to cover the agencies, id., but it also works if we imagine that the
public’s ability to process information is constrained, perhaps resulting in less demand and
less provision of information on agencies in the first place.
270. Id. Interest groups will, however, keep pace, employing “fire alarm” oversight of
the agency decisions affecting their interests to supplement the “police patrol” approach
by which Congress itself gathers information—and signaling Congress when their interests
are being slighted. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166, 171–74 (1984).
271. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1746. Interest groups, again,
will anticipate and check their losses from any congressional attempt to defer difficult
choices, yielding the same result as with ordinary legislation. Congress may, for example,
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emphasize, Congress also possesses the ability to override agency decisions if it errs in its ex ante calculus.272 Given how matters play out, Congress is presumably without any incentive to use delegation instrumentally in the first place.
This account relies heavily on a contested position concerning the
interests of Congress (and its delegates), the incentives to delegate (and
to accept delegations), the scope of agency losses, and the agency costs of
controlling them. If proponents of the nondelegation doctrine typically
fall into the “runaway bureaucracy” camp on these issues, Posner and
Vermeule surely exemplify its “congressional dominance” rival, and that
tilt obscures vulnerabilities in their argument.273 The grounds for concern about legislative delegation might increase, for example, if we
thought that Congress needed to insulate its agents from intervention in
order to increase the credibility of its regulation,274 if monitoring and
disciplining agents were costly,275 or if there were systemic difficulties
with ex post276 or ex ante277 controls. Unfortunately, the theory on these
questions far outweighs the data.278
wish to divest itself of authority—creating a “‘regulatory lottery’” at the agencies—in order
to avoid difficult choices among potential beneficiaries and to save its efforts for more
rewarding efforts. Id. at 1746–47 (quoting Aranson et al., supra note 228, at 61). The end
result, in their view, is much the same. Disappointed would-be beneficiaries will
nevertheless petition Congress to “reverse the agency’s decisions, and indeed even to
retract the delegation.” Id. at 1747. Interest groups will realize in advance of the lottery
that they might benefit or lose from the delegation, “and so they will lobby ex ante about
the delegation as vigorously as they would about any other kind of legislation,” id.,
assuming, of course, that they can effectively estimate their prospects in advance and
harbor no hopes that their prospects are better under the delegation.
272. E.g., id. at 1748, 1752.
273. For an excellent summary of the literature, including these rival views, see Mark
A. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting
in the EU ch. 1 (2003).
274. E.g., id. at 23–24, 29–31.
275. E.g., D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation:
Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process 27 (1991) (“Agency losses can be
contained, but only by undertaking measures that are themselves costly.”).
276. For example, if we assume that the House, Senate, and President have different
preferences but achieve a compromise within the Pareto set defined by those preferences,
an agency with different preferences can move the policy—perhaps just to the margins of
the Pareto set—without enabling a coalition that could agree to overturn the new policy.
See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431,
435–40 (1989).
277. Congress may, for example, adopt controls in the form of agency design or limits
to the agency’s discretion on the particular policy question, or rely on ongoing controls,
but few believe these are perfect. For a good summary, see David Epstein & Sharyn
O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making
Under Separate Powers 25–29 (1999).
278. See Pollack, supra note 273, at 33 (“[S]ystematic analyses of institutional choices
for delegation are still relatively rare.”). Even hard evidence about congressional authority
might matter little if perceptions were sticky: For example, Congress’s potential authority
over delegated powers, on which Posner and Vermeule heavily rely, would mean little if
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It is reasonable to suppose, in any event, that the welfare consequences of delegation depend on the regulatory environment,279 and
Posner and Vermeule err in too readily extending their analysis to international delegations.280 Even on the domestic front, the relationship bevoters and interest groups believed in runaway bureaucrats and thereby facilitated
congressional evasion. Conversely, if voters perceived the scope of congressional powers to
be greater, and its ability to control agency drift more comprehensive, than is actually the
case, they would presumably discourage Congress from delegating.
279. Contrast Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1745 (querying why
Congress might be different from corporations, for which delegation is presumptively
welfare-enhancing); id. at 1749 (describing Congress as accounting for behavior of its
agents as would a corporation).
280. Id. at 1757 (denying that “there is [any]thing special about such cases”); id. at
1757–59 (arguing that relevant inquiry is not into nature of entity receiving powers but
rather into nature of powers being delegated). Their argument depends in part on
supposing that the identity of the delegate is irrelevant for delegations of legislative power,
since “the delegation inquiry focuses on the abdication of Congress, the delegator, rather
than on the nature of the delegate.” Id. at 1757; accord Krent, supra note 233, at 71 (“The
nondelegation doctrine is indifferent to the identity of Congress’s delegate.”). Article I’s
Vesting Clause, indeed, suggests a focus on whether “legislative Power[ ]” is at issue, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 1, but there is some ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s case law. See
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The
proper characterization of governmental power should generally depend on the nature of
the power, not on the identity of the person exercising it.” (emphasis added)); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1957) (asserting that “[t]he President’s
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker”); Clark, supra note 212, at 1382 (“Classification of policymaking discretion as
either legislative or executive power may often depend on the identity of the actor in
question.”); id. at 1385–86 (“Although it is sometimes difficult to characterize broad
policymaking discretion as either executive or legislative power in the abstract, the identity
of the actor exercising such power largely determines its constitutionality.”); Peter Strauss,
Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto
Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789, 797 (noting, but criticizing, reasoning in the Steel Seizure
Case).
Posner and Vermeule also suggest that “the delegation inquiry . . . asks what Congress
has given away, not who has received the gift,” Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note
23, at 1757, but this rephrasing is telling: “[W]hat Congress has given away” plausibly
depends upon the effect given the recipient, and the Supreme Court’s inquiry has indeed
emphasized effects. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 489 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that “there are important differences between the delegation
before us and other broad, constitutionally acceptable delegations to Executive Branch
agencies,” in that agency discretion—as opposed to presidential discretion—is typically
more constrained); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 241 (claiming support from “the established, congressional
nondelegation doctrine . . . in that it responds to concerns about the accountability and
discipline of administrative action by focusing on the identity of the decision maker”). In
addition, the Court has sometimes expressed interest in whether the recipient has
independent constitutional authority. See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445–46 (noting
additional discretion permissibly afforded to President in matters of foreign affairs);
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (citing the President’s Commander-inChief authority as additional basis for permitting Congress to delegate “wide discretion
and authority”). By either measure, international delegations—to institutions entirely
absent from the face of the Constitution—might merit distinct treatment.
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tween Congress and the President is meaningfully different in foreign
affairs. Posner and Vermeule’s discussion of congressional accountability
assumes that Congress possesses plenary authority over the issue area,
and may retain or retract any welfare-reducing transfers. But Congress is
generally considered less influential in foreign affairs, where the President’s constitutional authority, administrative capacity, expertise, and access to information offer distinct advantages.281 The President may also
gain leverage, and reduce public accountability, by virtue of his ability to
choose among several distinct routes for international lawmaking.282
To the extent that international delegations run through the President, then, their hazards may be distinct. When the President’s view diverges from that held by Congress, he may more effectively thwart attempts to hold the international institution, and Congress,
accountable.283 When the President sides with Congress, the problem
may be still more serious. As Robert Cooter has noted, interbranch dele281. See generally, e.g., Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., et al., Congress and the Foreign Policy
Process (2000) (discussing factors limiting congressional assertiveness in foreign policy);
Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the
Assertive Congress (1994) (arguing that congressional struggle for increased power in
foreign affairs is largely illusory and that congressional assertiveness in this area may have
decreased in recent years); Koh, National Security Constitution, supra note 220, at 123–33
(discussing congressional acquiescence); Stephen R. Weissman, A Culture of Deference:
Congress’s Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy 12–16 (1995) (describing congressional
efforts at foreign policy as “reactive” and “well below even its general norm,” due largely to
lack of constituent interest). Lisa Martin has suggested that these views may be ill
informed, since legislative influence may be subtle, and even nonexistent when anticipated
in equilibrium. Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International
Cooperation 7–8 (2000) [hereinafter Martin, Democratic Commitments]. She would not
deny, however, that legislatures tend to be more dependent on executive agents in
international matters. Id. at 24.
282. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1267 (1994)
(arguing that impact of international agreement on U.S. sovereignty determines its status
as a treaty).
283. Thomas Franck elaborated:
It is true that this transfer [from Congress to the President to an international
regime] is contingent. Congress, by subsequent legislation, can block domestic
implementation of treaty norms or of treaty implementing decisions made by an
instrumentality established by a treaty. Realistically, however, it can do so only if
it musters a two-thirds majority whenever the President chooses to act on the
authority of the international regime, in which the U.S. Executive is usually wellrepresented. The effect of such a treaty regime, then, may be seen as potentially
creating a new, less accountable, locus of foreign relations power consisting of the
presidency and the transnational regime acting in concert. Some Americans have
problems with both the wisdom and the constitutionality of such transfers of
authority.
Thomas M. Franck, Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International
Regimes?, in Delegating State Powers: The Effect of Treaty Regimes on Democracy and
Sovereignty 1, 4–5 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000). It seems doubtful, however, that the
President will often take the side of an international institution in concerted opposition to
Congress.
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gations from a powerful branch to a weak branch presumptively disperse
power, but interbranch delegation from a weaker to a stronger branch
may “concentrate state powers” and so “remove[ ] obstacles to a political
cartel.”284
On the international plane, furthermore, the distinctive character of
international institutions has significant consequences for delegations.285
One pervasive difference has to do with the number and nature of the
principals involved.286 To be sure, multiple principals with varying objectives (for starters, the President, House of Representatives, and the Senate) may also be involved in domestic matters,287 but the assumption of
an imperial Congress, with plenary authority, is relatively plausible. In
contrast, a central premise of international delegations is that national
governments lack plenary authority—and are willing to surrender some
of the authority they do possess for the sake of securing cooperation from
other nations, achieving productive centralization, and taking advantage
of agency competences.288
284. Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 89 & n.20 (2000). These are not
the only possibilities, and the President may actually serve to limit any welfare losses due to
delegation. For example, by serving as a more genuine representative of the national weal
than Congress, the President may facilitate the organization of otherwise diffuse interests
(for example, pro-trade exporters) on the international plane. See Lisa L. Martin & Beth
A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, in International
Institutions 437, 456 (Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2001) (noting that “actors
who have the most to gain from pursuit of general welfare—such as executives elected by a
national constituency—will show the most interest in turning to international institutions
under such circumstances”); Judith Goldstein, International Law and Domestic
Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws, 50 Int’l Org. 541, 556–57,
559–60 (1996) [hereinafter Goldstein, International Law]; see also John O. McGinnis &
Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J.
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing WTO); John O.
McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511
(2000) [hereinafter McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution] (same). As a
general matter, though, the President’s authority over foreign affairs seems to diminish the
opportunity to discipline delegations.
285. I rely here solely on differences perceivable within a rationalist framework, but
other accounts of international relations would accentuate the differences between
international and domestic delegations. Constructivism, in particular, might put far
greater stress on the “pathologies” of international organizations, including undesirable
behavior that would reduce the authority of principals. See generally Michael N. Barnett &
Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,
53 Int’l Org. 699, 699 (1999) (discussing “power of [international organizations] and their
propensity for dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior”).
286. The analytic premise, again, is that Congress (or the national government) is the
relevant principal. Considering interest groups as the true principals would have a leveling
function, though there would continue to be divergences among each nation’s domestic
interests.
287. Pollack, supra note 273, at 43–44.
288. See generally, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
Through Formal International Organizations, in The Politics of Global Governance:
International Organizations in an Interdependent World 9 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 2d ed.
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The multiplicity of principals has implications both for initial delegations and for their policing. Because an international institution’s rules
are the result of bargaining, Congress’s ideal may require modification in
light of other nations’ preferences.289 (The United States may even have
to modify how its preferences are manifested, so as to show internal consensus that enhances credibility,290 or alternatively to show discord that
restricts the range of bargains to which the United States could agree.291)
Once an international institution has been brokered, moreover, the U.S.
government remains one among multiple principals, or becomes part of
a collective principal, making it more difficult to correct any drift from its
preferences.292 Absent the ability to coordinate with the other principals,
or to directly influence the institution, the alternatives may be stark. As
Paul Stephan summarized:
[L]egislators may have less freedom to alter or repudiate [an
international] proposal than they do with respect to domestic
measures. As a practical matter, most national legislatures have
only two means of disciplining international lawmakers, because
substituting a different rule is not an option. They can reject
the rule generated through the international process, or they
can withhold funds from the lawmaking body. With respect to
2001); Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice View of International Political Economy, 38 Int’l
Org. 199 (1984).
289. Cf. Martin, Democratic Commitments, supra note 281, at 23–24 (describing
need to find means of influencing foreign nations to be “one of the fundamental
differences—perhaps the fundamental difference—between domestic and foreign policy”).
290. One example is what used to be called “fast track” negotiating authority, in
which Congress agreed to limit itself to a simplified approval mechanism in order to
enhance the President’s authority in trade negotiations. See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard,
Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known As Fast Track: Building Common Ground on
Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 1 (2003). For
more general discussions of the importance of credible commitments in international
relations, and how to achieve them, see, e.g., Jon Hovi, Games, Threats and Treaties:
Understanding Commitments in International Relations (1998); Charles Lipson, Why Are
Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 Int’l Org. 495, 508–11 (1991); John K.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory
and International Law, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139, 139–42 (1996).
291. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 456–58 (1988); see Lisa L. Martin, The Contributions of Rational
Choice: A Defense of Pluralism, 24 Int’l Security 74, 79–80 (1999) (noting how these
credibility hypotheses may both be maintained, depending upon the context).
292. Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 Int’l Org. 241,
248–49 (2003). Delegations with a collective principal are said to take place when the
agent has a single contract with a principal composed of more than one actor, whereas
multiple principals are organizationally distinct entities that have different contracts with
the agent. Id. at 247. Nielson and Tierney generally treat international organizations as
collective principals, id. at 247–48, but it is not clear how organizations with tiered
memberships—like the UN Security Council—should be categorized. Cf. id. at 254–56
(hedging as to depiction of World Bank).
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multilateral bodies, each of these variants is problematic. Rejection or a dues default may entail exit from the organization generating the rule, not simply negation of a particular proposal.
But these organizations offer significant benefits to their members, and few international rules impose costs on a particular
country so great as to justify resigning from a desirable club.293
To be sure, these phenomena are not unique to the international setting.
Congress may also face significant externalities from disciplining domestic agents, and it may in both contexts rationally limit its disciplinary powers in order to buttress a delegation’s credibility. But credibility is a more
pervasive issue in negotiating the terms of international institutions,
where nations have a plainer interest in inhibiting defection in order to
promote stable, collaborative investment in the regime.294 In the international setting, moreover, one nation’s repudiation of an agent does not
necessarily kill it or eliminate its impact, as the United States has discovered,295 and nations may rationally decide to stick with institutions that
nominally harm their interests.296
The welfare implications of these differences in any particular case
are unclear, and they certainly do not suggest that international delegations invariably detract from national welfare. On the one hand, the abil-

293. Stephan, supra note 12, at 682–83.
294. See Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 849 (acknowledging possibility that
“exit from international economic institutions, though legally permissible—as it expressly
is in NAFTA, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, among other economic
institutions—can be prohibitively costly for a state,” in part because states often join such
institutions to “lock-in desired policy outcomes”); Swaine, Unsigning, supra note 119, at
2074–76 (discussing underinvestment in reliance and possible remedies where parties are
free to exit a treaty); see also supra text accompanying notes 184–185 (addressing exit as a
distinguishing feature of international delegations).
295. See, e.g., Bob Reinalda, Organization Theory and the Autonomy of the
International Labour Organization, in Autonomous Policy Making by International
Organizations 42, 59 (Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek eds., 1998) (describing U.S.
withdrawal from, and return to, the ILO); cf. William P. Alford, The Prospective
Withdrawal of the United States from the International Labor Organization: Rationales
and Implications, 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 623, 637–38 (1976) (describing how U.S. letter of
intent to withdraw from ILO was intended to induce changes in the organization’s
policies); Robert S. Jordan, Boycott Diplomacy: The U.S., the U.N., and UNESCO, 44 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 283 (1984) (observing that effectiveness of multilateral organizations depends
on member states’ commitment but noting power of strong member states to shape policy
through boycott, and discussing alternatives to withdrawal from international
organizations).
296. See Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek, Autonomous Policy Making by
International Organizations: Purpose, Outline and Results, in Autonomous Policy Making
by International Organizations, supra note 295, at 1, 3. Refusing to cooperate, for
example, may sacrifice a nation’s entitlement to continue benefiting from the institution’s
previous good works, or result in an international standard that is worse than the
(admittedly imperfect) standard likely if some influence is maintained.

R
R

R
R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 72

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

19-OCT-04

11:01

1563

ity of interest groups and other constituencies to police Congress, and to
advance the public interest, may not be so easily preserved when it comes
to international delegations. On the other hand, condemning such delegations risks overlooking why they are made in the first place: They may
be the only vehicle for engaging in welfare-enhancing international coordination, and perhaps the circumvention of interest groups itself enhances welfare.297 The only safe conclusion, in my view, is to avoid assuming that international delegations resemble ordinary legislation, so as
to render the category normatively irrelevant.
2. The Democratic Case for Nondelegation. — Democratic values, including accountability, are frequently invoked as a basis for resisting delegations,298 and international delegations again warrant distinctive treatment. Addressing and rejecting the democratic warrant, Professors
Posner and Vermeule depend upon many of the same suppositions—that
the public will hold Congress accountable, and that Congress can enact
ex ante controls and intervene—already discussed in connection with
welfarist concerns.299 It remains to be demonstrated, they suggest, that
297. See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 284,
passim. For a more pessimistic view, see Benvenisti, Exit and Voice, supra note 12, passim
(arguing that smaller domestic groups take advantage of international processes to
advance their interests).
298. See, e.g., James O. Freedman, Review—Delegation of Power and Institutional
Competence, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 308 (1976) (“The question of whether and upon what
conditions Congress should be permitted to delegate legislative power to other institutions
is central to the theory of democratic government as well as to the effective performance of
administrative agencies.”); Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegations of Legislative Power:
I, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 360 (1947) (noting that “the objection to indiscriminate and illdefined delegation . . . . expresses a fundamental democratic concern”); cf. Robert A.
Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in Democracy’s
Edges 19, 21 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999) [hereinafter Dahl,
International Organizations] (stressing that “in practice, delegation might be so extensive
as to move a political system beyond the democratic threshold”). But see Barber, supra
note 228, at 34–36 (denying that representation constitutes a warrant for nondelegation
independent of constitutional restraints).
299. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1748. Posner and Vermeule also
address the possibility of congressional dissembling, as when Congress “claim[s] victory
over some tough problem (for example, pollution), . . . but in fact delegates authority to
an agency that will have to make the difficult compromises (between clean air and
economic growth)”; they respond that Congress can equally engage in “happy talk about
nondelegating statutes,” and can be held accountable whether or not a delegation is at
issue. Id. at 1748–49. That answer is largely convincing, save that a delegating Congress
may also trumpet its own intervention against the agency, so as to “take credit coming and
going.” Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 48
(1977); see Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 277, at 22–23 (describing Fiorina’s theory as
“exceptionally cynical”). This is a plausible description of how the United States actually
treats the UN. See, e.g., Paul Kennedy & Bruce Russett, Reforming the United Nations,
Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 56, 70 (acknowledging possibility that “the world
community needs a scapegoat for its setbacks and embarrassments, and since democratic
governments have to deflect criticism from themselves, one of the United Nations’
functions is to take the heat”).
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delegation is any less effective than ordinary legislation at producing policies matching public and interest group preferences.300
Particularly given that congressional management of international
delegations is imperfect,301 it may not be so hard to satisfy this test. Although it is always hazardous to generalize,302 there are several reasons to
be skeptical about the democratic capacity of international institutions.
First, there is as yet no well-defined international community—with informed, engaged, and unified citizens, political parties, and crossnational
dialogue—in which a democratic institution might function,303 and none
300. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1753. Their comparison
assumes that delegation and nondelegation take place under comparable circumstances,
when the choice of method instead depends on Congress’s perception of the tradeoffs
involved. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 277, at 10 (“Congress delegates those
areas in which the legislative process is least efficient, and, accordingly, we should not
expect oversight to be either perfect or desirable.”); id. (“[A] selection bias is at work here:
A theory of oversight divorced from a theory of delegation will overlook the fact that those
issue areas in which the executive makes policy differ fundamentally from those in which
Congress makes policy itself.”).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 273–297.
302. Cf. Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 851, 856–58 (1996) (cautioning against
“[u]ndisciplined comparison of international organizations” in context of discussing
participation by nongovernmental organizations).
303. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 13 (Aug. 31, 2000), at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/clubmodel.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“International institutions lack the key feature that makes representative democracy
possible and that, in democracies, facilitates accountability: an acknowledged public,
operating within a political community in which there is a general consensus on what
makes public decisions legitimate.”); id. (“Minorities are willing to acquiesce to a majority
in which they may not participate directly because they feel they participate in some larger
community. Such a sense of community is clearly absent at the global level, and creates
severe normative as well as practical problems for . . . global democracy.”); accord Dahl,
International Organizations, supra note 298, at 30–31 (arguing that to establish some
semblance of international democracy, “[p]olitical leaders would have to create . . .
institutions that would provide citizens with opportunities for political participation,
influence, and control,” “citizens would need to be . . . concerned and informed about the
policy decisions of international organizations,” and “it would be necessary to create an
international equivalent to national political competition by parties and individuals
seeking office”); see also McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note
284, at 564 (“Quite simply, there is no global demos.”); Robert Post, The Challenge of
Globalization to American Public Law Scholarship, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 323, 323–33
(2001) (explaining how international legal institutions appear “anomalous and opaque” to
constitutional theorists preoccupied with legitimation through “the specific will of an
articulate demos” or its judicial proxy). This problem is considered acute even within the
European Union, which has much greater transnational identification, and better political
mechanisms, than the average international institution. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P.
Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 354,
377–84 (1996–1997) (describing “articulate and powerful No Demos Thesis” commonly
voiced concerning European Community, and proposing alternative vision of European
demos).

R

R

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 74

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

19-OCT-04

11:01

1565

of the political rights that one might require as preconditions.304 Second, since decisionmaking within international institutions results from
an admixture of national political authority,305 civil society,306 and bureaucracy,307 international institutions are typically another step removed
from national voters.308 Third, judicial and other accountability checks
on that decisionmaking—which at least arguably reinforce representation in the domestic sphere—are relatively absent in the international
sphere.309
304. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 12, at 491–94.
305. This means that voting is done by institutions, not by people. Martin Wolf, Of
Tuna, Turtles and Red Herrings, Fin. Times, Nov. 17, 1999, at 27 (“As an agreement
among states, the WTO cannot itself be democratic.”). Voting by governments, moreover,
systematically distorts even indirect political representation, since votes are allocated per
state rather than per capita. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 303, at 13 (“One state:one
vote is not democratic because a Maldive Islander would have 1000 times the voting power
of a citizen of China.”). This was a divisive issue in the original discussions of the UN, and
weighed heavily even upon supporters like Winston Churchill and Henry Cabot Lodge.
See Luck, supra note 4, at 29–34. For a sustained critical analysis, see Athena Debbie
Efraim, Sovereign (In)equality in International Organizations (2000).
306. A number of commentators have criticized the accountability of NGOs. See, e.g.,
Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade
Organization 107–08 (2001); McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra
note 284, at 571 (characterizing NGOs as “sometimes unaccountable even to their own
memberships”); see also Luck, supra note 4, at 303–06 (discussing concerns among
Americans that NGOs are unaccountable). Others suggest a more nuanced view, in which
NGOs are accountable in different ways—and comparable accountability deficiencies in
national governments are also stressed. See generally, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for
NGOs, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 161 (2002); Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3
Chi. J. Int’l L. 197 (2002). But see Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 Cardozo L. Rev.
957, 963 (1996) (noting concerns regarding lack of accountability of NGOs to their
memberships).
307. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 12, at 491 (describing perception that
intergovernmental organizations are “governed by an elite group of national officials who
are instructed by their respective executives, and by international secretariats whose staffs
at times act independently of the top IGO management”). See generally Barnett &
Finnemore, supra note 285, passim (describing tendency of international organizations to
succumb to pathologies of all institutions, notwithstanding supervision by member states).
308. See, e.g, Eyal Benvenisti, Welfare and Democracy on a Global Level: The WTO
as a Case Study, in The Welfare State, Globalization, and International Law 343, 347 (Eyal
Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2004) (noting “doubly-indirect democracy” governing
global institutions). For a forceful example of this criticism, see Thiessen, supra note 10, at
66 (“[T]he new global order is fundamentally undemocratic. It represents a massive
concentration of power in the hands of unelected bureaucrats who preside over
unaccountable institutions that are further and further removed from the people affected
by their decisions.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 12, 14 (citing criticisms of
international delegation).
309. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401,
412–13 (2000) (contrasting prevalence of accountability mechanisms in democracies—
such as judicial review of agency decisions, “intelligible principle” standard, and
congressional and budgetary oversight—with relative absence of such mechanisms in
international institutions).
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The relevant comparison, indeed, may be even more parochial and
stark. One may fairly assume that democratic accountability is at its nadir
on matters involving foreign affairs—so that the relative cost of surrendering control to international institutions is lower than normal310—and further assume that the competence of national democratic decisionmaking
is most compromised in those matters finding their way to the international plane.311 Nonetheless, international institutions are at least less
democratically accountable than are U.S. political institutions to U.S. citizens.312 Consequently, if U.S. citizens wanted to maximize their political
control over the resolution of a given issue, they would choose—were it
practicable—any number of domestic institutions over their international
alternatives. Robert Dahl’s perspective is instructive: While an incisive
critic of constitutional democracy in the United States,313 he is still more
adamant in his judgment that “democracy is unattainable in international
organizations.”314 If international delegations unnecessarily shift decisionmaking to such institutions, and away from Congress, it is at least
plausible that they impair democratic values.
D. Balancing Nondelegation
It is a small step from considering the normative bases for the
nondelegation doctrine to assessing the impact of international delegations on other constitutional values. Some of these values—for example,

310. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 12, at 490 (claiming that the new character of foreign
affairs in democratic systems “makes citizen participation more remote, and parliamentary
control over the executive, notoriously loose in foreign affairs matters, becomes even less
effective”). Robert Dahl makes this point at length, including by citing the American
public’s lack of engagement with the U.S. decision to enter NAFTA. Dahl, International
Organizations, supra note 298, at 23–30; see also Goldstein, International Law, supra note
284, at 541, 557–62 (discussing presidential autonomy in U.S. trade policy). Nevertheless,
he does not seem to regard it as closing the gap between national and international
democratic processes. Dahl, International Organizations, supra note 298, at 23–30.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 481–482.
312. This has not gone unrecognized. See, e.g., Bob Dole, Shaping America’s Global
Future, Foreign Pol’y, Spring 1995, 28, 36 (“International organizations—whether the
United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others—will not protect American
interests. Only America can do that.”); see also infra text accompanying note 474
(discussing lack of exclusive accountability of international institutions to American
people).
313. See generally Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution?
(2002) [hereinafter Dahl, American Constitution] (explaining how U.S. Constitution falls
short of providing an ideal basis for a democratic system).
314. Dahl, International Organizations, supra note 298, at 33; accord id. at 19, 32–33
(“Can international organizations, institutions, or processes be democratic? I argue that
they cannot be.”).
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solicitude for the power of small states in the Senate, which may be compromised by delegations315—may add to the case against delegation.316
Having already established the conceptual relevance of international
delegations, however, it is also possible to consider other constitutional
values as offsetting the welfarist and democratic cases against delegation.
This follows, in my view, from the continued status of nondelegation as
an underenforced constitutional norm.317 Even if the judiciary will not
(and should not) enforce nondelegation as a categorical bar on international delegation, it still seems appropriate to balance nondelegation with
other pertinent constitutional values. Put differently, if the value of underenforced norms may be balanced against the reasons for their underenforcement—such as the considerations counseling against judicial intervention, or the policy benefits of contravening the norm318—and
overcome by clearly stated expressions of congressional intent,319 they
surely may be balanced against other constitutional values.320 For this
reason, the relationship between international delegations and the U.S.
states—not just as they function in the Senate, but in their larger role as
315. Manning, Canon of Avoidance, supra note 242, at 239–40 (summarizing
argument).
316. Posner and Vermeule respond, predictably, that small states should not be
particularly aggrieved, since they may block disadvantageous delegations, and influence
the scope of agency discretion, to the same degree as with a nondelegating statute. Posner
& Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1750–51. Whatever the merits, the value in
question is clearly distinct from the welfare and democratic concerns hitherto discussed.
See Dahl, American Constitution, supra note 313, at 52–54, 85–86 (decrying
antidemocratic influence of less populous states in the U.S. Senate); Lynn A. Baker &
Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & Pol. 21
(1997) (considering impact of protecting smaller states); Ilya Somin, Closing the
Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to
State Governments, 90 Geo. L.J. 461 (2002) (citing counterproductive effects of
disproportionate federal subsidies).
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 17, at 1594–96 (describing
“resistance norms,” constitutional limits that may yield to other values).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 241–257 (discussing interpretive approaches
to nondelegation).
320. Analogously, Hiroshi Motomura has defended the use of “phantom
constitutional norms” to balance a plenary power doctrine applied by courts in
immigration cases. See Motomura, supra note 17, at 564–65. The proposition defended
here is considerably more modest. For one, the constitutional norm that might be
overcome by the balance, unlike the plenary power in immigration law, is itself a
“phantom” norm—namely, the moribund nondelegation doctrine. Second, courts would
not be required to conduct the balancing, thus avoiding the delicate issues involved in that
enterprise. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1373–74 (2004) (arguing,
in Confrontation Clause context, against “replacing categorical constitutional guarantees”
with “open-ended,” “[v]ague,” and “manipulable” balancing tests), with Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that, in determining
immunity of Indian tribes from taxation, the judicial balancing was inappropriate “since it
is that very balancing which we have reserved to Congress”).
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components of constitutional federalism—is worth more careful consideration, however it may cut.
III. INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

Controversies involving delegations of executive or judicial authority
seem to have a remote relationship with federalism: As the Supreme
Court has implied, legislative choices to deprive the other branches of
their rightful authority are not an issue in which the states have an obvious, immediate interest.321 Why isn’t this equally true for legislative delegations? After all, the nondelegation doctrine nominally precludes congressional assignments of legislative power to the states as well322—even,
potentially, in cases when it may plausibly inure to the states’ benefit.323
The first task, therefore, is to understand how federalism values may
be implicated in international delegations. As with nondelegation, it
then remains to assess whether federalism concerns are judicially enforceable—and, if not, whether they are nonetheless constitutional values
worth preserving.
A. The Apparent Relevance of Federalism
Claims that international delegations compromise federalism are
often put quite generally, making it difficult to determine whether the
claim is really a broader one against each and every kind of international
321. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986)
(noting that “prior [nondelegation] precedents . . . have dealt only with separation of
powers concerns, and have not intimated that principles of federalism impose limits on
Congress’ ability to delegate adjudicative functions to non-Article III tribunals”).
322. The Supreme Court, at least, has espoused that position. See, e.g.,
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920) (“Congress cannot transfer its
legislative power to the states—by nature this is nondelegable.”); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545, 560 (1891) (“Congress can neither delegate its own powers nor enlarge those of a
State.”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal
Power, and the Constitution, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 205, 270–77 (1997) (arguing that delegations
to states and their equivalents should be considered unconstitutional). But see Ky. Div.,
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Turfway Park Racing Ass’n, 20 F.3d 1406,
1417 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that “the separation of powers principle and, a fortiori, the
nondelegation doctrine, simply are not implicated by Congress’ ‘delegation’ of power to
the States. Rather than violate the separation of powers principle, such a delegation in fact
furthers another core constitutional value—that of federalism”); Krent, supra note 233, at
80–84, 94–112 (providing qualified defense of delegations to states in light of mechanisms
for ensuring accountability and need to balance separation of powers concerns with state
sovereignty).
323. The Supreme Court has held that the anticommandeering doctrine bars
Congress from directing state officers or legislatures to enforce or comply with federal
law—in the process rejecting arguments that such mechanisms in fact increase state
autonomy relative to the alternative of maintaining exclusively federal control. See
generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). There is good reason to think that the same goes for treaties. Swaine, Treaty
Power, supra note 224, at 423–33; see also id. at 480–87 (noting limits to doctrine).
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engagement.324 Closer scrutiny suggests three ways that international
delegations arguably offend constitutional, potentially constitutional, or
subconstitutional visions of our federal system.325
1. The Aggregate Effect of International Delegations. — First, and most
basically, international delegations may assign authority to international
institutions that would otherwise have fallen to the states. Just as the increased integration of the U.S. economy and the perceived need for effective national administration promoted domestic delegations at the
states’ expense,326 so too globalization and the need for international
regulatory harmonization drive the national government to allocate
power internationally that might have been left local. The cumulative
impact may be quite disruptive. As Thomas Franck remarked,
America’s decentralized and divided constitutional scheme does
not fit easily the exigencies of the growing system of supranational regimes. To the extent these regimes exercise actual powers—to regulate, arbitrate, enforce—these must have been devolved from somewhere else. To the extent that they come by
subtraction either from the fifty states of the United States or
from the representative political bodies of the Congress, there is
bound to be serious concern among Americans: a concern
based on the U.S. commitment both to direct political accountability and to decentralization of governance.327

324. See supra note 16 (citing authorities).
325. The distinctions (though not the precise labels) are drawn from David Shapiro,
who notes that the Supreme Court has sometimes established absolute norms protecting
state sovereignty, sometimes “strongly hinted” at federalism limitations when reaching
dispositions on other grounds, and sometimes recognized significant state interests that
may nevertheless be overcome by explicit, concerted national actions. David L. Shapiro,
Federalism: A Dialogue 64–75 (1995).
326. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1988) (linking the Court’s
abandonment of nondelegation to general expansion of federal regulatory authority at
expense of states); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev.
1349, 1363–64 (2001) (observing that “the most dramatic incursions on state regulatory
authority” have followed the birth of the modern administrative state, and that “[t]he
judicial abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine, as well as the flowering of [federal
common law], have both meant that federal lawmaking no longer need run the
cumbersome gauntlet of Article I”); cf. Clark, supra note 212, at 1374 (observing that
permitting delegation of legislative power would allow the federal government to
“circumvent the lawmaking procedures established by the Constitution to implement the
political safeguards of federalism and preserve the governance prerogatives of the states”).
327. Franck, supra note 283, at 3–4; see also Lawrence J. Auerbach, Federalism in the
Global Millennium, 26 Urb. Law. 235, 241 (1994) (describing globalization and
centralization, “preemptive of local policies,” as “mark[ing] a movement away from local
control”); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev.
390, 396–409 (1998) (describing emerging challenges to relationship between treaty
power and federalism); Barry Friedman, Federalism’s Future in the Global Village, 47
Vand. L. Rev. 1441, 1447–65, 1472 (1994) [hereinafter Friedman, Federalism’s Future]

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

1570

unknown

Seq: 79

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

19-OCT-04

11:01

[Vol. 104:1492

To be clear, a substantial proportion of international harmonization has
been accomplished directly by the national government and cannot fairly
be attributed to international commitments, let alone to the exercise of
authority by international institutions.328 But the states’ fading authority
over the banking and insurance industries, for example, has been accelerated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).329 More
important, although the United States carved out significant exemptions
for the states at both the international and national levels,330 the WTO
and NAFTA have nevertheless restricted state autonomy in regulating
trade and investment,331 and even delegated authority to intervene in

(describing conflicts between international agreements and state regulatory authority, and
concluding with prediction that “globalization will be the cause of a quite substantial
curtailment of state authority”); Thomas O. Hueglin, New Wine in Old Bottles?
Federalism and Nation States in the Twenty-First Century: A Conceptual Overview, in
Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World 203,
220 (Karen Knop et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Rethinking Federalism] (describing
tensions between international trade regulation and federalism); Robert Knowles, The
Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’ Rights and the Louisiana Purchase,
88 Iowa L. Rev. 343, 418–19 (2003) (stating that “the treaty power still poses [a] threat to
states’ rights”).
328. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 250, at 1969. But see id.
(noting that shift to international regulation nonetheless “raises important questions of
whether treaty power can supplant domestic lawmaking process”). State “blue sky”
securities regulations, for example, lost some significance due to international
harmonization. Friedman, Federalism’s Future, supra note 327, at 1449–50; Robert
Knowles, Note, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court’s Answer to Globalization,
95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735, 752 (2001). But greater change has been effected by international
issuers’ use of existing statutory market exemptions, and the greater risk has been federal
preemption. See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 471, 491
(1993) (describing states as “mostly irrelevant” in regulation of global securities market
since international issuers easily qualify for state exemption).
329. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1B, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at
Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 28, at 22,595 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
330. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2), (c)
(entitling U.S. government alone to challenge federal or state action or inaction based on
its consistency with the Uruguay Round Agreements); id. § 3512(b)(1) (establishing
consultation process to improve state compliance with international obligations, but also
requiring that the U.S. Trade Representative take state positions into account, and
enhancing state involvement with the dispute resolution proceedings that directly or
indirectly affect state interests); The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of
Administrative Action, attached to H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 656 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054–55; id., 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4050–54. Similar, if less
elaborate, provisions are applicable to NAFTA. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 103361, pt. 1, at 18 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552, 2569–70; see also Swaine,
Treaty Power, supra note 224, at 420–21 (describing statutory provisions, statements of
administrative action, and international exemptions).
331. See, e.g., Friedman, Federalism’s Future, supra note 327, at 1453–64.
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such formerly sacrosanct areas as government procurement332 and alcohol,333 among others.334
As a political matter, the cost has been keenly felt: The North Dakota Attorney General spoke for many of her peers in opining that
“‘NAFTA and other trade agreements present the greatest challenge to
state sovereignty that we have.’”335 As a legal matter, though, it is less
clear whether the volume of crumbs falling from the federal table is constitutionally significant, and how any constitutional objection may be
332. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, at 17–43, reprinted in Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April
1994, vol. 31, at 25,679–705 (1994); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “OneVoice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 975, 1005–06 (2001) (noting that
“[t]he WTO Government Procurement Agreement, in particular, raised the potential for
conflict with the exercise of traditional state authority,” but recognizing protective
measures taken to respect that sovereignty); cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.10
(1980) (emphasizing, in articulating market participant exception to dormant Commerce
Clause, state “sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for
whose benefit to deal”).
333. GATT Report on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 198, at 206 (holding state
measures governing taxation, marketing, and distribution of alcohol incompatible with
GATT); 140 Cong. Rec. 16,317 (1994) (remarks of Sen. Helms) (asserting that “‘[t]he
Beer II panel struck at the very heart of federalism,’” since its reasoning “‘leaves all State
law potentially at risk of being subject to challenge under the aegis of GATT’” (quoting
Federation of Tax Administrators and Multistate Tax Commission)); Friedman,
Federalism’s Future, supra note 327, at 1461–62 (suggesting that Beer II decision
impinged upon “special prerogative” of the states).
334. Counterexamples may be cited, too. It was feared, for example, that the WTO
panels would make significant inroads into state taxing authority. E.g., 140 Cong. Rec.
16,308–310 (1994) (citing testimony of Dan R. Bucks, Executive Director of the Multistate
Tax Commission); see Friedman, Federalism’s Future, supra note 327, at 1462–63
(predicting that state taxes “are likely to come under increasing scrutiny” due to
international trade agreements). What emerged, however, was less threatening. United
States of America, Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions 9–10, GATS/EL/90 (Apr. 15,
1994), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/SCHD/GATS-EL/EL90.
WPF (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
335. Evelyn Iritani, Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies, L.A. Times, Feb.
28, 1999, at A1 (quoting Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General, North Dakota); see also
Carter Dougherty, Localities Eye Global Trade Role, Wash. Times, May 7, 2002, at C08,
2002 WL 2910098 (quoting California State Senator Sheila Kuehl as remarking that “[i]t
seemed to me that practically everything we do could be challenged under NAFTA”). The
feeling is shared by some at the national level. See, e.g., Withdrawing the Approval of the
United States from the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, H.J. Res.
90, 106th Cong. (2000), 146 Cong. Rec. H4787, H4800 (daily ed. June 21, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Kucinich) (objecting that the Constitution “put the Congress . . . in
charge of trade, and does not give [it] the right to cede that to an international body which
. . . imposes obligations on State and local governments” limiting their regulatory
authority); 144 Cong. Rec. H7278 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bonior) (“No
trade agreement should undermine the values that we have fought so hard for . . . at the
State and at the local level.”); 144 Cong. Rec. H7279 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) (commenting that because of WTO agreements, “the constitutional
foundation for the role of States as laboratories of democracies . . . are in jeopardy”).
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made salient. Absent convincing evidence that an incremental loss of responsibility—as opposed to the general drift of authority, which may be
relevant taken as a whole336—threatens the constitutional structure, it is
difficult to envision this as a decisive objection to any particular
delegation.
2. State Priority over International Delegations. — A second, distinct
claim would be that the states are privileged by the Constitution to seize
regulatory ground that Congress could, but has not, exploited. Reversions to the states are permissible under dormant Commerce Clause case
law,337 but any privileged position would have to rely on other grounds.
If the Supreme Court has not already thrown in the towel by declaring
the Tenth Amendment to be a truism or tautology338—not, presumably,
the ideal interpretive result—this position might be inferred from the
Amendment’s stipulation that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people,”339 or perhaps from atmos336. See, e.g., Greve, Real Federalism, supra note 16, at 18–19 (describing expanded
use of national government’s regulatory authority as risking death of constitutional
federalism); Robert F. Nagel, The Implosion of American Federalism (2001) (same);
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 3 (“The greatest danger to federalism, therefore, is that the expanding regulatory
concerns of the national government will leave the states with nothing to do.”).
337. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983)
(“Where state or local government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not
subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with interstate commerce.”); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining that states may regulate matters
touching on interstate commerce “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, . . . unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits”).
338. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (citing “sense” in which “the
Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered’” (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941))); id. at 156–57
(describing Tenth Amendment as “essentially a tautology”). Although describing the
Amendment as tautological seems inconsistent with the idea that the Tenth Amendment
privileges the states relative to international institutions, that characterization directly
addressed only the question of whether authority was initially assigned to the federal
government or to the states. Id. at 156 (reciting “mirror image” inquiries, by which “[i]f a
power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution
has not conferred on Congress”).
339. U.S. Const. amend. X. The inference of a privilege is hardly manifest; the text
does not refer to what happens when power delegated to the United States is unexercised,
and the powers “reserved” to the states seem to be those that the federal government could
not exercise, rather than those that it did not exploit. But others have made the inference.
See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 73 (1989) (explaining that, following Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), “[t]he Tenth Amendment is treated
as a statement that states possess residual sovereign powers, but the extent of those
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pheric invocations of the states’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”340
As the Court remarked nearer the heyday of nondelegation doctrine,
Under our constitutional system, there necessarily remains to the
States, until Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected. States are thus
enabled to deal with local exigencies and to exert in the absence
of conflict with federal legislation an essential protective
power.341
On this theory, then, international delegations violate the Constitution
not merely because the loss of residual authority risks upsetting the federal structure, but also because the states get dibs—consistent with the
dormant Commerce Clause, and other constitutional constraints—on
that residual authority. This principle is reflected, arguably, in the federalism RUDs sometimes attached to U.S. treaties and agreements.342
These RUDs have been criticized as unnecessary, given the expansive
scope of national authority,343 but they tend to define a pecking order
between the states and international institutions with a pretense to legislative capacity.344

sovereign powers is measured by the area left for state action after Congress has validly
exercised its delegated powers”).
340. The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (stating that the states “are not relegated to the
role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full
authority, of sovereignty”).
341. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1937) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted); accord Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 634 (1951) (emphasizing state
power cited in Kelly).
342. See, e.g., Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102d Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. 8071
(1992) (“[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments.”); Comm.
on Foreign Relations, Report on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S.
Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 18 (1992) (explaining that the federalism understanding “serves
to emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of
authority between the State and Federal governments or to use the provisions of the
Covenant to ‘federalize’ matters now within the competence of the States”). For other
examples of federalism RUDs, see U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
103d Cong., 140 Cong. Rec. 14,326 (1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent
to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101st Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192 (1990).
343. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 65, at 422, 454–55 (noting and
addressing criticism).
344. They are not ubiquitous, however, nor do they abrogate the ability of those
institutions to usurp rulemaking ability—as their use in connection with the ILO and
recent trade agreements indicate. The latter provisions, at least, give states a substantial

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

1574

unknown

Seq: 83

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

19-OCT-04

11:01

[Vol. 104:1492

3. International Delegations as an Affront to State Sovereignty. — A final
theory is that assigning authority to international institutions, rather than
retaining it for use by Congress, is more offensive to state sovereignty.
Articulating this argument is difficult, not least because it relies on
murky, expressivist notions like the “sovereignty”345 and “dignity”346 of
states.347 Such a claim may be gleaned, however, from the significance
placed by the Constitution on “affording national protection to the states
against outside intrusion,”348 as well as from recent case law rejecting attempted incursions by the national government, whether in pursuit of its

voice in the process of their application. See Swaine, Treaty Power, supra note 224, at
420–21 & nn.71–72 (describing procedures relating to state authority in NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round implementing statutes). The ILO clause, however, places the
determination as to whether an ILO-governed matter is “appropriate” for state
implementation in the discretion of the federal government. ILO Constitution, supra note
31, art. 19(7), 62 Stat. at 3526, 15 U.N.T.S. at 76; Robert B. Looper, ‘Federal State’ Clauses
in Multilateral Instruments, 32 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 162, 167, 182–84 (1955–1956) (discussing
ILO clause); see also Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism 175–80
(1973) (discussing ILO clause and other instances of federal-state clauses subject to
interpretation by national governments).
345. Nonlegal academics, in particular, tend to find this usage ridiculous. See, e.g.,
Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 Green Bag 2d 35, 41–44 (1998)
(concluding that traditional concept of state sovereignty, which emphasized its unitary and
absolute nature, has little descriptive value in making sense of the federal system); Jack N.
Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 Green Bag 2d 51, 57–59 (1999)
(“Sovereignty is too vague and anachronistic a term to allow us to reason about anything
more than our propensity to keep using it.”).
346. For representative criticisms of this rhetoric, see Ann Althouse, Lecture, On
Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 245,
249–56 (2000); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121
(2000). For cautious endorsements, see Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State
Dignity, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 81, 84–89 (2001); Judith Resnik & Julie Chihye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921 (2003).
347. Expressivism takes a maddening variety of forms, but is used here to connote a
theory that “tell[s] actors . . . to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward
various substantive values.” Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1504 (2000). For
debate over analogous values relating to anticommandeering doctrine, compare id. at
1556–64 (rationalizing anticommandeering rule on expressive grounds), and Adam B.
Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1309, 1316–20 (2000) (outlining expressive defense of
anticommandeering rule), with Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of
Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 133–40 (skeptically
evaluating expressive defense of anticommandeering).
348. Shapiro, supra note 325, at 60. Professor Shapiro cites Article IV of the
Constitution in general, but also adverts to the obligation of the national government to
protect states against invasion by other states. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3; see also Joseph F.
Zimmerman, Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power 19–23
(1992) (describing five constitutional “[n]ational guarantees” to the states, including
guarantee of territorial integrity under Article IV).
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own regulatory interests349 or in its attempts to enable others who might
challenge the states.350
Even if notions like sovereignty and dignity are of little help in distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable incursions, these cases arguably communicate some kind of hierarchy. The Supreme Court’s allusions to state dignity sometimes seem to draw on the dignity afforded
foreign nations,351 but the differences are also evident. Under Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi, states are immune from suits brought by foreign
nations, notwithstanding the text of the Eleventh Amendment;352 according to the Court, while states agreed to be vulnerable to one another’s
sovereign claims, and to those of the United States, foreign nations were
“outside the structure of the Union” and not part of the same bargain.353
The states were not, in practice, on par with the federal government,
which enjoyed an asymmetric ability to sue them.354 But Congress was
denied the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity on behalf of
349. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (concluding that
“[t]he Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident
of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power”).
350. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002)
(asserting that “the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect state
treasuries . . . but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities”);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (explaining that the federal system established by
the Constitution “reserves to [the states] a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary
sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status,” such
that “[t]he States ‘form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more
subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority
is subject to them, within its own sphere’” (quoting The Federalist No. 39, supra note 340,
at 245 (James Madison))); Resnik & Suk, supra note 346, at 1923 n.9 (citing additional
examples). Peter Smith recently traced the emphasis on dignity in the sovereign immunity
cases to the Court’s decision in Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in CrossDoctrinal Perspective, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1, 11–14 (2003).
351. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
780 n.9 (2000) (“While the States do not have the immunity against federally authorized
suit that international law has traditionally accorded foreign sovereigns, they are sovereigns
nonetheless, [worthy of the] comity and respect [due] our federal system.” (citations
omitted)). See generally Smith, supra note 350, at 6–9, 27–28, 76–80 (tracing notion of
dignity in state sovereign immunity case law to foreign state sovereign immunity doctrine
and law of nations).
352. 292 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1934); see U.S. Const. amend. XI (foreclosing extension
of judicial power to “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
(emphasis added)); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment:
International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1027, 1046–47, 1089–90 (2002)
(justifying literal approach to the Eleventh Amendment based on analogy to immunity of
foreign nations to suit by citizens of foreign nations, but decrying the deviation
represented by Principality of Monaco).
353. Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330.
354. See Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) (“It does not follow that
because a State may be sued by the United States without its consent, therefore the United
States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public policy forbids that conclusion.”).
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others, including foreign nations, with the same ease as it might waive
foreign sovereign immunity.355
The analogy to international delegations, then, would be as follows:
While the sovereign states acquiesced to a system in which regulatory authority would be exercised by the United States, and in which their authority over political and economic issues could be ousted, they did not
so defer to foreign nations or international institutions. Just as the Eleventh Amendment clarified that Congress lacked the right to privilege outsiders (be they citizens of other states, or foreign nations) to take liberties
with the states, so too a restored nondelegation doctrine would prohibit
delegations to international institutions that privileged outsiders to interfere with state sovereign prerogatives.
Such dignitary offenses would be still more acute, presumably, if international delegations encroached on traditional state prerogatives. The
potential for such occasions is evident. A Canadian company, for example, challenged a state statute conferring immunity on the Boston Redevelopment Authority as incompatible with the national treatment obligation under NAFTA, although the panel determined that NAFTA did not
apply retroactively to the dispute in question.356 Another (formerly) Canadian firm challenged an enormous punitive damages award rendered
by a Mississippi jury; while that panel, too, stopped short of deciding the
merits,357 it volunteered that the trial and verdict “cannot be squared
with minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment”358—this in an area that the Supreme Court has determined is primarily for the states to govern autonomously.359
355. Smith, supra note 350, at 98–99. Compare Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (holding that abrogation of
immunity in Trademark Remedy Clarification Act could not be sustained under the
Fourteenth Amendment), and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636, 647 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked authority under Article
I to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, and had not established an adequate basis under the Fourteenth
Amendment), with Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000)
(implementing restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity, and waiving immunity for
certain classes of claims).
356. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, ¶¶
66–75 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/14442.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
357. Loewen Group v. United States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, ¶¶ 217,
234, 42 I.L.M. 811, 846, 849 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003) (concluding that firm’s
reorganization as a U.S. firm after bankruptcy, plus its failure to exhaust local remedies,
insulated Mississippi proceedings from review).
358. Id. ¶ 137, 42 I.L.M. at 833.
359. Id. (describing fear by one commentator that the Loewen dicta will become “the
dicta that ate NAFTA”); see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003) (“A basic principle of federalism is that . . . each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”);
see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984) (“Punitive damages have
long been a part of traditional state tort law.”). In State Farm itself, this “basic principle”
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Collectively, the arguments that international delegations injure federalism are at least colorable. None, notably, have set out any normative
warrants for preserving federalism (or elaborated why the states are the
best guarantors of federalism values), nor have they provided any robust
explanation as to why the national political process would fail to protect
the states against any severe incursions.360 For some concerned about
international delegations, though, the answer to the latter question seems
obvious: The delegation of authority to international institutions risks
supplanting national governments.361 National sovereigns, it is argued,
are losing control, which in turn imperils federalism’s existing political
safeguards. If institutions like the NAFTA tribunals threatened
“[f]undamental exercises of self-government” before Congress was pressured into intervening,362 those who would preserve federalism may legitimately be concerned as to how matters might otherwise have looked.
B. Federalism as an Underenforced Norm
The judiciary has been slow to respond to the risks delegations pose
to federalism. As previously noted, the nondelegation doctrine nominally operates to prevent delegation of congressional power to the states,
while at the same time preserving state authority by cabining the exercise
of national power. Nonetheless, the strongest link between nondelegation and federalism is that neither is fully enforced by the Supreme
Court.363 To be sure, the Rehnquist Court’s enthusiasm for federalism is
was at risk where a state might punish a defendant for out-of-state conduct—that is, where
punitive damages might infringe on another state’s prerogatives, 538 U.S. at 421–22—but
this, too, is an attribute of federalism.
360. See Swaine, Treaty Power, supra note 224, at 443–44 (evaluating sufficiency of
political safeguards in treatymaking for protecting state interests). For samples of the
broader disagreement, compare Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 219 (2000) (describing political
safeguards claims, and adding emphasis on political parties), with Lynn A. Baker, Putting
the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 951 (2001)
(disputing sufficiency of political safeguards), and Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1459
(2001) (same).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 10–14.
362. Michelle Sager, One Voice or Many? Federalism and International Trade 94
(2002) [hereinafter Sager, One Voice] (quoting The Impact of NAFTA on the Public
Sector: Hearing Before the Legis. and Nat’l Sec. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 103d Cong. 142 (1994) (statement of Max B. Sawicky, Economic Policy
Institute)). Sager’s book is the best succinct account of the political struggles between the
states and the federal government regarding NAFTA. See id. ch. 4.
363. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 75–76 (2001) (describing “federalism’s historic link to
other aspects of our expatriate constitution—e.g., economic substantive due process,
legislative nondelegation—which were banished for their collusion”).
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patent,364 and it has reneged on indications that the Justices would step
out of policing federalism altogether.365 But the Court has remained reluctant to enforce additional limitations based on reserved areas of exclusive state authority, if Congress is otherwise acting within its Article I competence.366 In part because of concerns regarding judicial
competence,367 the Court has taken the view that national political
processes are the principal safeguard against such incursions368—albeit a
364. See generally John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation’s Power: The Supreme
Court Sides with the States (2002) (suggesting revolution in federalism jurisprudence).
While some queried whether the Court’s “hostile” view of federal authority might change
after September 11, see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National
Authority?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 14, the answer appears to
have been in the negative. Linda Greenhouse, For a Supreme Court Graybeard, States’
Rights Can Do No Wrong, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5
(concluding, in appraising Chief Justice Rehnquist’s contributions, that “the federalism
revolution he ignited was solidly underway and is likely to define his place in Supreme
Court history”).
365. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which itself overruled
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)); compare Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 903
(construing the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia as a “brave declaration that it had
sworn off federalism for good”), with John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 1311–12 (1997) (arguing that, if Garcia is considered to have
announced that “it no longer would examine the constitutionality of federal legislation
that threatened to violate the sovereignty of the states,” it is no longer good law).
366. See Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 Tex. L. Rev.
1551, 1572 n.122 (2003) (making this distinction). To be sure, the Supreme Court has
revived the rhetoric of “dual sovereignty,” which was originally associated with the notion
that the states retain “‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’” Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, supra note 340, at 245 (James
Madison)). But while the Court increasingly treats state sovereign immunity and other
attributes of state dignity as “inviolable” in character, it explicitly regards the states’
retention of government authority as only “residuary”—what is left, that is, after the
enforcement of limits on Congress’s authority under Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Dual federalism, in the classic sense of connoting an exclusive field of
regulation for the states, see Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights
135 (1936) (describing dual federalism as “the theory of two mutually exclusive,
reciprocally limiting fields of power, the governmental occupants of which confront each
other as equals”), has not been revived, and may be beyond reviving, see Edward S. Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950) (describing alteration of
constitutional structure); Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1629, 1638–45 (2000) (describing how recent Supreme Court cases sketched
Commerce Clause limits and restricted means for congressional action, without protecting
against use of other federal powers); Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It
Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke L.J. 1513, 1638–39 (2002) (explaining why the Rehnquist Court’s
case law has not, and cannot, revive dual federalism).
367. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548 (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify
principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers
over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”).
368. See id. at 552 (“State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.”).

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 88

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

19-OCT-04

11:01

1579

safeguard protected by the narrowing constructions recently given the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the bar on “commandeering” states, and the limits to waivers of state sovereign
immunity.369
The gap between the nominal scope of federalism doctrine and its
judicial enforcement has caused the resort to familiar alternatives, including canons favoring construing statutes so as to avoid infringements on
state sovereignty.370 Irrespective of whether these canons close the underenforcement gap in the domestic setting, they have had little effect in
foreign affairs, where they confront contrary presumptions favoring national authority.371 There, the conventional wisdom is that states have
even less, if any, reserved authority, given that the national government’s
treaty power is complemented by a bar on state agreements with foreign
powers.372 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Insurance
Ass’n v. Garamendi, while disclaiming any general resolution of preemption in foreign affairs, indicated that anything more than an incidental
effect on national policy may warrant preemption, and suggested that
whether a state acts in an area of traditional competence is at best a preliminary, rather than a conclusive, inquiry.373
As with the nondelegation doctrine, it is difficult to determine
whether the federalism doctrine’s underenforcement in foreign affairs
reflects its renunciation on the merits or, alternatively, a judicial reluctance to intervene. The most plausible answer is that both the merits and
justiciability are involved, and will continue to be. The Supreme Court’s
recent refusal to revive any dormant foreign affairs preemption power
suggests that it is not yet willing to renounce any accommodation of the
states in international affairs;374 indeed, given claims that international
institutions undermine state prerogatives regarding formerly domestic affairs, doing so would seemingly be both unmanageable and fraught with
369. See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 17, at 1604 n.281 (suggesting
that federalism may be underenforced, notwithstanding recent decisions protecting state
sovereignty).
370. See Shapiro, supra note 325, at 71–75 (briefly surveying field); Einer Elhauge,
Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2251–52 (2002)
(attributing aggressive avoidance of constructions infringing on federalism values to the
Supreme Court’s inability “to develop intelligible rules to provide content to the Tenth
Amendment”).
371. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 S. Ct. Rev.
175, 195–201 (describing tension between presumptions); see also Edward T. Swaine, The
Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 337, 347–51 (2001)
(commenting on Goldsmith).
372. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 221, at 1129 n.1 (citing
commentary). I have elsewhere argued that these provisions can be mediated, but it is at
Congress’s discretion. See generally Swaine, Treaty Power, supra note 224.
373. 539 U.S. 396, 418–20 (2003); id. at 424–25 (emphasizing nontraditional, and
thus weak, state interest for purposes of assessing conflict with federal policy).
374. See supra note 241 (describing resolution of Zschernig v. Miller claim in
Garamendi).
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hazard.375 The result, then, is that colorable concerns about federalism,
supported by case law, nonetheless find little succor in the courts.
C. The Continuing Salience of Federalism
I have assumed to this point that any harm international delegations
cause to federalism is worth preventing, notwithstanding any judicial reluctance to intervene. But what if that assumption is misplaced? Just as
Posner and Vermeule attempt the evisceration of the nondelegation doctrine on its merits, others contend that federalism isn’t worth protecting
in the first place.376 Unlike Posner and Vermeule, these critics do not
specifically address the subject of international delegations. Still, if federalism is a distraction, as critics report, it should have little bearing on the
constitutionality of those delegations.
The central insight, winningly articulated by Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, is that many of the claimed virtues of federalism—particularly public participation, the virtues of jurisdictional competition, and
the “laboratories of democracy”—are better attributed to decentralization. Unfettered federalism, which allows states autonomy in certain policy areas, tends to produce chaotic variation that would have to be prized
for its own sake. Only centrally managed decentralization, they submit,
offers a genuine chance to realize the virtues falsely associated with
federalism.377
375. Cf. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 221, at 1236–42 (evaluating
claims that merger of domestic and foreign affairs has changed constitutional restrictions
on state diplomacy).
376. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 909 (endorsing Garcia holding not on
grounds “that the states are capable of protecting themselves,” but rather on grounds “that
there is no normative principle involved that is worthy of protection”).
377. As they explain,
[M]any standard arguments advanced for federalism are clearly nothing more
than policy arguments for decentralization. These are the claims that some
nationally-defined policy is best achieved by permitting regional variation. The
point is not simply that federalism is unnecessary for implementing such policies,
that it represents an unnecessary use of constitutional artillery. Rather,
federalism is absolutely antithetical to these policies because it allows the wrong
kinds of variation. Implementing a national policy through a decentralized system
means that the permitted variations will be those that contribute to achieving the
designated policy. In contrast, federalism allows the states to vary as they choose,
pursuing their own policies instead of the national one. This can be justified only
by arguments favoring a variety of policies, not by arguments favoring the
implementation of a single policy by a variety of methods.
Id. at 914; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 483, 498 (1991) (stressing that “[w]e must not confuse federalism . . . with
decentralization”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 390, 408–14 (explaining that central
governments can capture the advantages of decentralization).
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Nonetheless, the fact that decentralization is not constitutional—and
therefore might not be pursued—gives pause.378 Professors Rubin and
Feeley allow that “[c]oncern about the concentration of power was one of
the guiding forces in the design of our entire political system,”379 and a
key solution was the vertical division of authority: In Madison’s words,
dividing responsibility between “two distinct governments,” together with
the separation of powers, means that “[t]he different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”380 To the Framers, the initial diffusion of authority, and the result378. Others have raised a slightly different criticism, namely, that today’s federalism is
the only kind of decentralization we have. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
Minn. L. Rev. 317, 381–83 (1997); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2217–28 (1998) [hereinafter
Jackson, Federalism] (noting importance of recognizing that “decentralization . . . is a
function of, and bound up with, federalism”). Rubin and Feeley agree, insofar as they
would not abolish the states, see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 908–09 (noting that
because relying on other subdivisions “would be costly and disruptive . . . it is probably best
to use the existing states as our primary means of decentralization”), and would be content
with some aspects of contemporary federalism as it is enforced by the courts, see id. at 909
(suggesting that Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), be honored, so that “[t]he Supreme Court should never invoke federalism as a
reason for invalidating a federal statute or as a principle for interpreting it”).
379. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 927; see also id. (describing diffusion as one
“important argument[ ] that genuinely support[s] the basic principles of federalism”).
The most credible concern, in their view, involves the aggregation of administrative
power—“control over appointed officials, public resources, and regulatory rules”—as
distinct from political power over “votes, offices, and public opinion.” Id. at 931. They
more readily dismiss, on the other hand, the need to disperse physical (military) power
and the importance of ensuring separate political identities. Id. at 928–31. Were these
values less readily disregarded, they might offer additional reasons to value constitutional
federalism in its present form, though I share Rubin and Feeley’s skepticism. The formal
political identity of the states, as distinct from their practical authority, does not genuinely
seem at stake. Id. at 929–30. As to physical power, one might disagree as to the potential
utility of the states. Compare id. at 928–29 & n.86 (arguing that state-level deterrence is no
longer tenable, citing the federal government’s nuclear superiority), with Amar, supra
note 377, at 501–03 (1991) (discussing how federalism can help “address the worst-case
scenario, in which a tyrannical government . . . attempts to rule by brute military force”).
But it seems incontestable that the dispersion of authority through analogous international
mechanisms is the more effective check. See infra text accompanying notes 402–412
(discussing U.N. Security Council).
380. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 340, at 323 (James Madison); see also The
Federalist No. 28, supra note 340, at 180–81 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that
federalism would thwart attempts at tyranny, since “[p]ower being almost always the rival
of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general
government,” and either may be made effective in accordance with the popular will).
These arguments have been emphasized by the Supreme Court. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (observing that “‘federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power’” (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
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ing benefits associated with decentralization, could be secured only by
constitutionally guaranteeing an independent checking role for the
states.381
The critical proposition here—that the national government would
fail, if left to its own devices, to capture what federalism guarantees—is
difficult to evaluate empirically, in no small part because the content of
federalism’s guarantees is open to dispute.382 But it seems doubtful that
the national government has the right incentives to decentralize when it
should.383 Central governments may be reluctant to share desirable auin any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”).
381. See, e.g., Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism 91–92 (1991)
(criticizing supposition that decentralized but unitary government would benevolently
respect local authority, and citing Publius’s concern regarding self-aggrandizing and
oligarchical tendencies of a central government); Amar, supra note 377, at 498–99
(explaining Publius’s vision that “healthy competition between federal and local officials
can help protect citizens against government tyranny,” and that “[t]he key to this dynamic
is that each government must retain a certain degree of institutional autonomy—a
measure of structural independence—from the other”); see also Calvin Massey, Federalism
and the Rehnquist Court, 53 Hastings L.J. 431, 443–44 (2002) (summarizing role for
federalism in thwarting dangerous concentrations of power).
382. Frank Cross has asserted, for example, that the national government presently
decentralizes “far beyond any level required by constitutional federalism.” Cross, supra
note 24, at 46. The evidence of decentralization in fact appears mixed, and the future
uncertain. See generally Timothy Conlan, From New Federalism to Devolution: TwentyFive Years of Intergovernmental Reform (1998) (tracing evolution of federalism and
reform of American federal system); David B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism 171,
322–28 (2d ed. 2000) (noting mixed evidence regarding devolution of authority). More to
the point, the assertion depends upon an assumption that the Constitution requires little
decentralization, which remains to be established; were that assumption widely shared,
moreover, the rate of such “voluntary” decentralization might slow considerably. See
Jackson, Federalism, supra note 378, at 2217 (explaining that, since “present realities are
conditioned by the existence of the states, and by a belief, shared by many, that [they] are
constitutionally secured[,] . . . abandoning constitutional federalism has potentially high
costs” (citation omitted)).
383. Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn call this the problem of credible
decentralization. Jenna Bednar et al., A Political Theory of Federalism, in Constitutional
Culture and Democratic Rule 223, 224 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001) (“[A]ll must
believe that the regional governments will not try to take advantage of one another and
that the center will not try to usurp power form the regions . . . an ideal that has proved
elusive at times in each of the [case studies].”); see William Riker, Federalism: Origin,
Operation, Significance 7–8 (1964) (describing tendency of central power in centralized
federal systems to exert increasing pull and to “overawe” constituent units); Daniel J.
Elazar, The United States and the European Union: Models for Their Epochs, in The
Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the
European Union 41 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (stating that, absent a
system that checks the central powers, “there would be no function that would not be
seized by the larger, stronger government in the course of time”); see also Shapiro, supra
note 325, at 137–39 (describing centripetal and centrifugal forces affecting distribution of
political authority); Cary Coglianese & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Securing Subsidiarity: The
Institutional Design of Federalism in the United States and Europe, in The Federal Vision:
Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, supra,
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thority with the states (particularly if they are regarded as rivals for political allegiance)384 and overzealous in shuffling off relatively unrewarding
tasks for the states to handle.385 Rent-seeking interest groups, too, will
distort the central government’s incentives for efficient decentralization.386 All things considered, it seems reasonable to suppose that decentralization is not entirely self-enforcing.387
at 277, 281 (describing federal and state incentives to renege on constitutional bargain);
Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1347, 1349–50 (1997) (same).
In addition to lacking sufficient incentives, it is likely that the central government
would lack sufficient information to coordinate effective decentralization. Ronald
McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems: The Role of Political and
Financial Constraints, in The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted? 3, 10–11 (John
A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) (discussing information problems facing
central governments that attempt to determine ideal provision of local services). And even
if such information could be obtained, doing so may be costly, improving the relative
efficiency of truer federalism. States, for their part, may act collusively, either among
themselves or with the cooperation of the national government. Id. at 29–30. On some
subjects, such as interstate commerce, the risks are sufficient that near-exclusive authority
is given to the national government. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution,
supra note 284, at 536–42 (suggesting that “[n]ational representatives are more likely to
rise above parochial interests than local representatives”).
384. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 363, at 138 n.282 (“Unless states are
endowed with ‘trumps’ that guarantee them some measure of sovereignty . . . federal
politicians will be able to undermine their potential political opponents in the states by
withdrawing meaningful functions from state governments.”); cf. Amar, supra note 377, at
503–05 (explaining how state governments have played a role within federalism “similar to
that of the institutional press” by “monitoring the conduct of officials in power, and
coordinating opposition to central policies deemed undesirable”).
385. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 180–81 (1995) (describing
tendency of national politicians to leave intractable political problems to state and local
officials).
386. There is an enormous literature on this subject. For a brief explanation of the
dynamics, see McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 383, at 26–28 (outlining elements
underlying centralization tensions between central and lower-tiered governments).
387. In a valuable forthcoming article, Daryl Levinson challenges the widespread
supposition that the national government and its officials (and, for that matter, the states
and their officials) are inclined to pursue power. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004–2005)
(manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). His argument is theoretical, rather
than empirical, in character, and he does not consider evidence of governmental growth—
or, for that matter, garner evidence concerning the success of the electorate in checking
over-ambitious governments, on which his argument depends. Empirics aside, the
argument has other limits that bear brief mention. First, Professor Levinson emphasizes
the Framers’ perception that the people were the ultimate check on governmental
ambition, but systematically underplays (while noting) the extent to which they also
thought that institutional checks on the national government were an essential and
indispensable part of the Constitution. Id. (manuscript at 3–5). Second, Levinson’s
argument corrects any notion that governments have unmitigated appetites, but that is a
straw man; the threshold question, instead, is whether governments will be inclined to
amass and exercise power in a disinterested manner. He appears to concede that they
would not, acknowledging that governments will be inclined to expand their jurisdictions.
Id. (manuscript at 15). Few would maintain that those governments will exercise that
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It remains unfortunately difficult to assess the harm caused by federalism’s underenforcement, let alone the damage attributable to international delegations. But Rubin and Feeley’s analysis is also provocative in
its view of how federalism may be achieved. It is not invariably the case,
as they observe, that increasing federal power decreases state power, as
though there were a fixed sum of power with zero-sum tradeoffs.388 Even
assuming a tradeoff, the addition of federal intervention to areas previously governed only by states “generally means that two governmental hierarchies will be involved in a particular area of governance instead of
one,” and “[a]ll the advantages associated with power dispersion can flow
from this intervention.”389
There are flaws, certainly, with imagining that adding a national alternative “to the previously comprehensive power of the state”390 gets us
the same kind of diffusion that might be achieved through protecting
and promoting federalism.391 One concerns relative vulnerability: The
national government’s authority may be constitutionally exclusive and judicially protected—even when it has not acted, courtesy of the dormant
Commerce Clause—while the states can rarely say the same. In potentially overlapping areas, moreover, the national government can act
preemptively,392 or strong-arm the states via conditional preemption or
the Spending Clause, while the states have no such recourse.393 Adding
national authority, for these reasons, detracts from state authority in a
way that adding state authority to national authority does not.
Nevertheless, the exercise of imagining top-down diffusion offers several insights potentially relevant to the constitutionality of international
jurisdiction to its fullest extent, and it seems enough that governments reliably accrue
authority for its occasional excessive exercise—and, indeed, using that authority seems
essential to claiming and preserving jurisdiction.
388. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 931–32; cf. Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note
12, at 849–50 (making similar point, premised on analysis of U.S. federalism, in relation to
expanding delegations of decisionmaking authority to international institutions).
389. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 933–34 (adding that “[t]he second decisionmaker can introduce new standards, subject old ones to debate, increase popular
awareness, decrease arbitrary power, restrain corruption and thereby expand liberty—the
liberty of individuals from excessive or inappropriate government control”).
390. Id. at 932.
391. I address differences not related to diffusion, such as the difference in the scope
of national or international action, in the course of evaluating the impact of international
delegations. See infra Part IV.A.3–4.
392. This is the “decided advantage” emphasized in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
460 (1991) (“As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution,
Congress may impose its will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally
regulated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system.”). Rubin and
Feeley acknowledge this, but differ as to how significant it is. Rubin & Feeley, supra note
24, at 933. With respect to foreign affairs, at least, the combined effect of constitutional
and statutory preemption may be quite severe. See supra text accompanying notes 238,
241, 248–249, 373–374.
393. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (observing,
famously, that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy”).
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delegations. First, debates about federalism, including its goal of diffusion, are at the core debates about normative values, rather than arid
assessments of constitutional text or case law.394 Second, in assessing
whether federalism promotes those values, it is important—though not
necessarily conclusive—to consider whether it is the only means of obtaining them, or the best means. Third, taking federalism’s values seriously also requires paying attention to when federalism may betray them.
The central example, cited by Rubin and Feeley and others, is that interposing sovereign states above localities may allow the latter to be victimized, reducing any genuine achievement of decentralization.395 It remains to consider in Part IV whether the same consequences flow from
establishing institutions above the national government.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE

FOR

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

To recap: International delegations, an increasingly significant component of America’s international relations, look as though they conflict
with constitutional principles of nondelegation and federalism—and yet,
incongruously, they are permitted to flourish. This incongruity might be
judicially remedied, but misgivings about judicial competence make that
unlikely and probably unwise. The incongruity might also be based on a
misperception—perhaps nondelegation, or federalism, rests on a conceptually untenable premise—but those arguments, too, are not entirely
persuasive.
This persistent incongruity is at least partly resolved by the immanent
logic of federalism. For the reasons explained below, the most compelling advantage that federalism has over decentralization—the diffusion of
authority—actually cuts in favor of international delegations, turning the
lack of unilateral U.S. control into a small virtue. After teasing out the
394. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 928 (concluding that “the language of the
Tenth Amendment is too opaque” to require the dispersion of power among the states;
“[r]ecognizing this, no Supreme Court decision has ever rested on its language, and even
federalism’s most enthusiastic proponents, such as Justice O’Connor, cast their arguments
for federalism in functional, or policy terms”).
395. See, e.g., id. at 909 (summarizing that “federalism does not diffuse power in our
system, but may actually act as an impediment to its diffusion”); id. at 919–20 (noting that
“federalism only protects the autonomy of states, not the autonomy or variability of local
governments”—and, indeed, prohibits national interference with state direction of local
governments—with the result that “federalism does not secure the kind of governmental
variability that would provide any realistic choice for citizens; its principal effect in this area
is to create a legal barrier against the imposition of such variability as a matter of national
policy”). For other leading analyses, see David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New
Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377 (2001) (arguing that increased centralized power does not
necessarily impede, and in fact can aid, localized decisionmaking); Richard Briffault,
“What About the ‘ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism,
47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303 (1994) (discussing value of formal, constitutional aspects of
federalism, as distinguished from normative discourse about federalism and values); Cross,
supra note 24, at 34–51 (citing theoretical and empirical bases for preferring national
governance over federalism as a means for advancing localism).
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implications of this claim, including important objections, this Part considers some qualifications.
A. International Delegations and Diffusion
Commentators sometimes describe international institutions as federal in character because they reserve substantial authority to their national members.396 But with respect to any particular nation, particularly
those with federal systems, that characterization invites objection. The
object of delegating authority to international institutions is, after all, to
coordinate policies that formerly were autonomous. By the same token,
such institutions tend to make uniform subnational policies that may previously have been diverse in character. The marginal effect of international delegations, in this view, is to harmonize, not decentralize.
At the same time, Part III suggested how international delegations
can have compensatory effects that favor federalism’s values. If we are
concerned about “legislative usurpations”—that “[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all
power into its impetuous vortex”397—having Congress divest itself of
power in favor of international institutions is a sort of self-inoculation.
Rubin and Feeley’s conceit of federal intervention—with top-down diffusion, engineered by the addition of a national layer rather than the guarantee of a subnational layer—reinforces the point. The premise held in
common by Madison, Hamilton, and the modern Supreme Court is that
governments should serve to check one another, and that the national
government’s check on the states was part and parcel of federalism.398 If
the more governments, the merrier, then the addition of a third, international level may secure many of the same ends as dispersal to the states.
Indeed, if we attend to concerns at the Founding that national and state
governments might be “mutual rivals and enemies, but . . . uncontrolled
by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each
other,” international authority might be regarded as fulfilling by another
means the original constitutional vision.399
1. International Delegations as a Constraint on U.S. Authority. — An initial question, certainly, is whether international institutions can play a
role analogous to that played by the states in domestic affairs. Even as396. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review and Global Federalism, 54 Admin.
L. Rev. 491, 492 (2002) (noting a “move toward ‘global federalism,’” and cautioning as to
its domestic consequences); John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State
and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 903, 903
(1996) (asserting that “in the West, the regime of nation states has, by degrees, been
replaced by . . . ‘international federalism’”); see also infra note 523 (citing authorities
considering federalism as a design objective).
397. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 340, at 309 (James Madison).
398. See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
399. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 340, at 294 (James Madison). Madison’s
original “common superior,” I hasten to add, was the people. For comment on applying
Madison’s view to international delegations, see infra text accompanying notes 478–479.
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suming that international law often checks national governments,400 the
critical inquiry is whether delegated authority may genuinely constrain
governments otherwise capable of aggrandizing authority—including the
contemporary United States, a “hyperpower” of virtually unrivaled preeminence.401 The United States appears to have considerable discretion to
chart its own course, and its recent conduct—particularly the more recent invasion of Iraq—is read by some as suggesting little heed for decisions by international institutions.402
Even the example of Iraq, in my view, tends to cut in precisely the
opposite direction. Assuming, plausibly, that the invasion of Iraq was not
legally authorized by the Security Council,403 U.S. conduct nonetheless
followed the pattern of prior conflicts in respecting the Security Council’s
Chapter VII authority.404 The United States sought and obtained an additional resolution (albeit one of ambiguous import), repeatedly sought
Security Council approval for the enforcement of existing resolutions,
400. See supra note 196 (quoting Louis Henkin’s famous pronouncement about nearuniversal compliance). See generally Henkin, How Nations Behave, supra note 196, at
42–44, 88–93 (discussing how international law affects national governments).
401. Depictions of the United States as a hegemon are commonplace. While some
would welcome that development, see, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America 1 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The United States possesses unprecedented—and
unequaled—strength and influence in the world.”); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of
America’s Empire 2 (2004) (describing U.S. empire favorably), others regard it as
threatening international institutions—and requiring their reinforcement, see, e.g., Henry
J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 27, 81 (2003) (“The
emergence of the United States or any other state as global hegemon represents a generic
threat to international legal authority, because the corruption of that authority through
hegemonic demands is a virtual certainty.”); Craig R. Whitney, NATO at 50: With Nations
at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1999, at A7 (citing French appraisals of
U.S. power and French policy “that multilateral institutions, from the International
Monetary Fund to the United Nations, should be strengthened to offset American
influence”). For a range of views on the consequences of U.S. power for international law,
see United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Michael Byers &
Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
402. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, Foreign
Aff., May/June 2003, at 16 [hereinafter Glennon, Security Council].
403. Whether Security Council Resolution 1441 authorized military intervention or
gainsaid it is clearly relevant to this discussion, but I do not purport to resolve that
question. Compare, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 Geo.
L.J. 173, 177 (2004) [hereinafter, Murphy, Assessing] (concluding that the United States
lacked Security Council authorization, and that the Security Council’s involvement
diminished the legality of U.S. actions), with John Yoo, International Law and the War in
Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 563–71 (2003) (arguing that the Security Council had
authorized the use of force).
404. The pattern of prior conflicts also cautions against attributing excessive
influence to the Iraq case. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Misreading the Record, Foreign
Aff., July/Aug. 2003, at 202, 203 (contending that “in the first Gulf War, Bosnia, East
Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and, after the fact, Kosovo,” powerful member states “used
the Security Council to frame their common response”).
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conspicuously avoided forcing any adverse vote within the Council, and
justified its operation in part as an implementation of extant resolutions.405 Obviously, the Security Council did not employ its delegated
authority to stop U.S. intervention, but its public failure to embrace the
U.S. approach increased the costs of intervention.406 Moreover, the U.S.
strategy demonstrated that the political and legal legitimacy of Council
approval was worth considerable effort and substantial delay, lending
credence to its capacity as a legal arbiter;407 the Council, for its part, did
not capitulate to enormous pressure by the United States,408 and its effort
created the (unfulfilled) possibility of an eleventh-hour solution.409 Unless the Security Council’s resistance leads to its abandonment by those
capable of acting unilaterally,410 the episode bears out, rather than belies,
405. See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
338, 338–39 (Mar. 17, 2003) (emphasizing efforts within the Security Council, and
commitment to the UN); Colin L. Powell, A Strategy of Partnerships, Foreign Aff., Jan./
Feb. 2004, at 22, 25 (same); see also Bob Woodward, Bush at War 333 (2002) (quoting
remark by Secretary of State Colin Powell to President Bush that “[i]t’s nice to say we can
do it unilaterally, except you can’t”); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack 224–26, 296–97,
343–45, 357–60, 368–69 (2004) [hereinafter Woodward, Plan of Attack] (describing U.S.
efforts to obtain Security Council authorization, notwithstanding resistance within the
Bush Administration); Murphy, Assessing, supra note 403, at 237–39 (emphasizing
prominence of legal authorization within U.S. political strategy). The preexisting
legislative authorization, as it happened, even took the form of an assimilative statute. See
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002) (authorizing President to employ armed forces as
necessary and appropriate to defend national security “and enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”).
406. See Murphy, Assessing, supra note 403, at 232–33 (concluding that, in part due
to its failed attempts to obtain Security Council authorization, “the United States ultimately
generated a widespread public perception that the action was illegitimate”).
407. Ian Hurd, Responses, Too Legit to Quit, Foreign Aff., July/Aug. 2003, at 204, 205
(noting that Resolution 1441 negotiations demonstrated that “Washington clearly would
have preferred to act with council approval rather than without it”); Murphy, Assessing,
supra note 403, at 234 (judging that Security Council’s recent unwillingness to bend to
United States on issue of Iraq may have increased the Council’s global reputation and
legitimacy).
408. See Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law, supra note 85, at 882 (noting, as
counterpoint to examples of U.S. hegemony, that “[t]hose who suggest that the most
effective counterweight to U.S. unilateralism is the Security Council can point to the winter
of 2003, when the Council bravely (if ineffectually) refused to acquiesce in the U.S.
invasion of Iraq despite forceful, highly public U.S. patron-client pressures”). As one
commentator added, Security Council “disapproval was not enough to stop the American
operation, but that isn’t the point. It raised the costs of unilateralism, and this is the most
that the council can do when the great powers clash.” Hurd, supra note 407, at 205.
409. It was conceivable, after all, that the passage of time might have enabled Iraqi
compliance with the inspection regime, a conclusive rebuttal of U.S. and British securityrelated assertions, or some other solution. For example, prominent Egyptians forwarded
in February 2003 a proposal to grant Saddam Hussein exile, though its ambiguous
reception by President Bush effectively rejected it. Woodward, Plan of Attack, supra note
405, at 314.
410. For concerns along these lines, see Glennon, Security Council, supra note 402,
passim; see also Murphy, Assessing, supra note 403, at 235 (observing that adoption of
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the Council’s potential for checking national authority—to a degree substantially greater than anything the U.S. states might have accomplished.411 The influence of international institutions in post-war Iraq
potentially reinforces the lesson.412
If war and peace issues are the acid test for international institutions,
proof that delegating authority to international institutions checks national governments is much easier to find in other quarters. International trade institutions are a particularly rich source of examples. The
TRIPS regime governing protection for patented pharmaceuticals has
twice been modified despite resistance by the U.S. national government.413 Moreover, WTO dispute settlement mechanisms have on several recent occasions interpreted trade agreements adversely to the
United States, and created sufficient financial pressure to force changes
in U.S. law.414 The most dramatic such defeat concerns U.S. tax law relimits to Security Council authorizations of force “might discourage the United States from
seeking any Security Council authorization, since the U.S. Executive Branch historically
has been unwilling to ‘tie its hands’ in advance regarding the length of a deployment,
either as a matter of international or U.S. law”).
411. See supra note 379 (discussing value of federalism in dispersing physical
(military) power).
412. See supra text accompanying notes 6–8 (discussing U.S. cession of authority over
reconstruction of Iraq to international agencies).
413. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96 (describing controversy over Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS). While the U.S. concessions were grudging, the final deal did
provide for some U.S.-requested limitations on the ability of developing nations to
purchase drugs. Moreover, U.S. agreement seems to have been prompted in part by a
desire to achieve progress on other trade talks. See Elizabeth Becker, Poor Nations Can
Purchase Cheap Drugs Under Accord, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 2003, at A14. The possibility of
extrinsic motivations such as these provides a useful caution against deeming any
particular negotiating result a victory or a loss for national sovereignty.
414. For example, the United States recently dropped its steel imports safeguards
after the WTO Appellate Body upheld an adverse panel decision that threatened to result
in the imposition of billions of dollars in punitive tariffs. United States—Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (Report of the Appellate Body),
WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocu
ments/t/WT/DS/259ABR.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see Eliza Patterson,
WTO Rules Against US Safeguard Measures on Steel, ASIL Insights, Nov. 2003, Dec. 2003
addendum, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh120.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (concluding that subsequent repeal of steel tariffs “is evidence of the
effectiveness of the WTO in enforcing its rules and limiting protectionism”). For
background, see generally Kevin K. Ho, Comment, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002
Bush Steel Tariffs, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 825 (2003). The United States claimed, however,
that its decision simply reflected the vicissitudes of the U.S. steel industry, rather than any
effort to comply with the WTO. See Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative,
Remarks at White House Press Briefing (Dec. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-11.html) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Criticisms of the WTO frequently emphasize this function of constraining the
national government. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 Mich. L. Rev.
1944, 1944–45 (1997) (stressing that, while the national government may defy or override
WTO obligations as a matter of domestic law, “as a practical matter the WTO’s preference
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garding foreign sales corporations (FSCs), in which Congress appears to
be bowing before punitive tariffs415—notwithstanding portrayals of this
dispute as the classic “wrong case,” a challenge to an impregnable national measure that risks destruction of the fragile dispute settlement system.416 WTO proceedings have also pressured the United States to temper some of its favored unilateral tools, such as interim measures417 and
extraterritorial sanctions relying on the WTO’s “national security
exception.”418
In other areas, prophylactic steps taken by the United States suggest
the potential for international constraint. The U.S. executive branch has
for international standards and the certainty of sanctions for violations will inevitably
induce governmental decisionmakers to prefer compliance with international standards.
The resulting practical devolution of decisionmaking authority to international institutions
is the essence of the loss of national sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)).
415. See United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities) (Report of the Appellate Body),
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 447, 489 (upholding WTO panel decision
that FSCs—used by U.S. companies to shield overseas profit from taxes—provide illegal
subsidy and violate trade rules). The U.S. government has dragged its heels in complying.
Scott Miller, EU Trade Sanctions Have Dual Edge, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 2004, at A3. But the
gradual imposition of tariffs seems likely eventually to be successful, subject to the
vicissitudes of legislative procedure. Edward Alden, House Backs Bill to Avert Trade
Sanctions from EU, Fin. Times, June 18, 2004, at 9 (describing passage of FSC-abolishing
bills in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the President’s
endorsement of the House bill); see Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints,
44 Va. J. Int’l L. 545, 601–02 (2004) (describing FSC controversy as evidencing “how
increased delegation raises the likelihood of hard cases” for national sovereigns).
416. Compare Hudec, supra note 56, at 212–13, 218–19 (describing “wrong case”
thesis), with A Taxing Challenge for Congress, Fin. Times, Mar. 2, 2004, at 18 (noting
potential for a backlash against the WTO, given that the United States “fiercely guards its
fiscal sovereignty,” but observing that this has not yet transpired).
417. WTO Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
¶¶ 7.2–7.126, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 19, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/152R.DOC (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see Seung
Wha Chang, Taming Unilateralism Under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished
Job in the WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 Law &
Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1151, 1224 (2000) (explaining that while the WTO panel upheld the U.S.
position, “the EC achieved a major goal in this panel proceeding by acquiring a U.S.
commitment not to exercise the USTR’s discretionary power contrary to U.S. obligations”
under the WTO).
418. The battle on extraterritoriality was joined over the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021–6091 (2000). Reacting to U.S. threats that it would impose punitive sanctions on
foreign firms if they continued to do business in Cuba, America’s leading trade partners
retaliated by threatening to initiate WTO proceedings—resulting in agreements by those
partners to cooperate in discouraging the illegal use of expropriated property, but
accompanied by formal waivers by the United States of private sanctions under Title III of
Helms-Burton and effective waiver of government-imposed sanctions under Title IV.
Michael Mastanduno, Extraterritorial Sanctions: Managing “Hyper-Unilateralism” in U.S.
Foreign Policy, in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 4, at 295, 303–11; see
Associated Press, U.S. to Levy Cuba Sanctions on Jamaica Firm, Wall St. J., May 25, 2004, at
A14 (noting that Title IV has been invoked only rarely, and only against nations that lack
strategic importance—and not against those threatening WTO action).
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expressed the view that the enforcement of customary international law
via the ATS risks serious complications for its diplomatic relations with
foreign countries.419 Even the U.S. decision to “unsign” the Rome
Treaty, which was widely regarded as evidencing its disregard for international law, reflects an appreciation for the potential constraint of international legal processes—and the permissible means for disengagement.420
U.S. efforts to achieve still further distance have also been frustrated by
the Security Council’s refusal to extend the immunity of U.S. troops from
ICC jurisdiction—thus illustrating the constraints imposed even by those
institutions in which the United States has disproportionate influence.421
There are many more instances in which international institutions
have checked exercises of authority by the U.S. national government, and
the fervent objections to the power implied by international delegations
suggest that their critics agree.422 One puzzle is why the United States
might accept this state of affairs, as opposed to one in which it exhibits
greater dominance.423 The structure of some organizations has been historically determined, and may resist change,424 but it is also possible to
419. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 40–46, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 159 L. Ed. 2d 718 (2004) (No. 03-339) (citing example of South Africa).
420. See Swaine, Unsigning, supra note 119, at 2061–63 (contrasting formal propriety
of U.S. unsigning with international criticisms thereof). Statements of U.S. officials
highlighted the perceived risks that ICC prosecutions and treaty amendments posed for
U.S. interests. See, e.g., Marc Grossman, American Foreign Policy and the International
Criminal Court, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 6,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
421. The U.S. failure to secure an extension followed a plea from the SecretaryGeneral to maintain the “primacy of law” and “common purpose.” Warren Hoge, U.S.
Drops Plan to Exempt G.I.’s from U.N. Court, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2004, at A1. It may
remain possible, however, for the United States to obtain immunity through missionspecific extensions of immunity, as in the resolution establishing a multinational force in
Liberia. S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497
(2003).
422. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 12, 14–15.
423. For these purposes, I assume the most difficult case—that is, one in which (a)
the United States might act independently, and (b) merely symmetrical benefits of
international delegations (e.g., the prospect that the United States may prevail in equal
measure against other WTO members) are insufficient, because hegemons may strike less
balanced bargains. Sometimes, it should also be noted, delegations may simply be
mistakes. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by Nafta Tribunals Stirs Worries,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (quoting Abner Mikva, a former judge and congressman
and sometime NAFTA arbitrator, as representing that “[i]f Congress had known that there
was anything like this in NAFTA . . . they would never have voted for it”); id. at 20 (quoting
representation by Senator John Kerry that “not a single word was uttered” on Chapter 11 in
congressional debates over NAFTA).
424. The most obvious example is the UN Security Council, on which none of the
original Permanent Members have lost their seats, despite changes in stature relative to the
other members. Other institutions, like those controlling the establishment of customary
international law, may also be slow to bend their ground rules to a hegemon’s influence—
even if they yield to a hegemon in particular instances. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine,
Rational Custom, 52 Duke L.J. 559, 608–12 (2002) (discussing advent of continental shelf
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theorize how a hegemon’s contemporaneous interests may be served by
consigning itself (with others) to the constraints imposed by international
institutions. One hypothesis is that a leading nation may agree to restrain
the indiscriminacy and severity of its actions and sacrifice some of the
returns it might gain through the unconstrained use of its authority in
order to spare resources it would otherwise spend coercing lesser nations
and to obtain insurance against its future decline.425 Vesting institutions
with delegated authority may be part of the leader’s concession, part of
an attempt to insinuate (constrained) dominance into the institutional
scheme, or part of a mutual attempt to permit institutional adaptation
and ensure greater lock-in for both the leading and lesser nations.426
These and comparable theories offer plausible accounts for the more unlikely delegations (like those to the UN and the WTO) that appear to
have most compromised U.S. sovereignty.427
The question remains whether an international level of governance,
considered for its own sake, ultimately suffers from the same limitations
as adding (and growing) the national level of governance did in the
United States.428 As part of the balancing of underenforced values, it is
then necessary to consider whether there are other federalism-related
costs to international delegations, and whether emphasizing the federalist virtues of international delegations ignores the delegation side of the
ledger.
regime through the Truman Proclamation of 1945). But cf. Goldsmith & Posner, A
Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 130, at 1123–24 (arguing that
coercively determined norms cannot genuinely be described as customary international
law); id. at 1149, 1160, 1162, 1167 (citing examples of coerced behavior).
425. See G. John Ikenberry, Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy, in
Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 4, at 121, 127–36 [hereinafter
Ikenberry, Multilaterialism]; id. at 127 et seq. (finding evidence supporting this hypothesis
in U.S. postwar practices); see also G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic
Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars 4–6 (2001) (finding evidence of
similar, self-imposed restraints for other powers following major wars in the modern era).
426. Professor Ikenberry’s model does not lend itself to the diagnosis of these
interests, but he does note the leading state’s interest in trying to lock in other states “while
trying to minimize limitations on its own policy autonomy and discretionary power,” even
as it must make commitments to purchase the cooperation of other states. Ikenberry,
Multilateralism, supra note 425, at 125.
427. Other hypotheses have been offered to explain how international institutions
may enhance, rather than retard, sovereignty—raising the question whether international
delegations do a better job of enhancing than constraining the tendency of the federal
government to aggrandize power. See, e.g., Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 12, at
857–62 (describing how interdependence has changed meaning of sovereignty and how
participation in institutions is required to realize this new sovereignty); id. at 863–69
(describing how international institutions might ward off private rent seekers and enhance
bureaucratic power).
428. I address another significant concern, the lack of democratic control over
international institutions, in connection with delegation-related objections. See infra
notes 474–482 and accompanying text.
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2. International Delegations and Relative Gains to Diffusion. — If adding
a national layer to state governance works less well at diffusing power
than would securing constitutional federalism, international delegations
fall somewhere in the middle. The legal force of international delegations, as previously discussed, is typically less severe than ordinary federal
legislation; treaties and congressional-executive agreements are often
deemed non-self-executing,429 and the rules and decisions issued by international institutions are for the most part treated likewise. Customary
international law, at least, is widely regarded as binding federal law, but
its preemptive application—and the limits thereto—are almost entirely
hypothetical.430
What, if anything, ensures that this will continue to be the case?
What prevents the national government from conferring preemptive authority on international organizations, or enacting a statute that clarifies
and extends the effect of customary international law? Those wary of depending upon the political safeguards of federalism may be equally wary
of the national government’s largesse with respect to international delegations.431 In domestic negotiations concerning the implementation of
the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, for example, states were concerned that
no matter how accommodating federal legislation might prove, it was still
preemptive in character, and prone to aggressive interpretation by subsequent administrations.432 Nor have states relaxed entirely in the years
since.433
429. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 198–204 (describing and
criticizing this practice); see also id. at 180–84 (describing and criticizing practice of
entering reservations to ensure non-self-execution); supra text accompanying note 250
(noting dispute regarding presumption for or against self-execution).
430. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52
Duke L.J. 485, 552–53 & n.315 (2002) (citing, as an exceptional case potentially involving
preemption of state law, Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 704
(N.Y. 1969)); Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations
Federalism, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 282, 293–94 (2002) (asserting that “despite claims by
many scholars that customary international law has the status of preemptive federal law,
there are essentially no decisions in U.S. history actually using customary international law
to preempt state law”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary
International Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 365, 497 (2002) (reporting that “[t]o my knowledge,
the preemptive force of customary international law has never been applied to supplant an
otherwise valid state law rule. Nor is it likely to be in the future” (footnote omitted)).
431. See supra notes 326, 360 and accompanying text (noting literature concerning
political safeguards of federalism).
432. See Sager, One Voice, supra note 362, at 110–11.
433. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., Resolution: In Support of State Sovereignty
and Regulatory Authority (adopted Mar. 19–22, 2002), at http://www.naag.org/naag/
resolutions/res-spr02-regauth.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that
NAFTA Chapter 11 could undermine authority of state and local governments and could
privilege foreign investors at the expense of U.S. citizens); Letter from National
Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, the United Conference of
Mayors, and the National League of Cities, to Ambassador Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade
Representative (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/scecon/
Trade_Principalsltr92303.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (calling for, inter
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The treatment the states were afforded in those episodes, in which
they wound up enjoying dispensations above and beyond those enjoyed
by the national government,434 can hardly be guaranteed. But at the
same time, there are deep-seated differences between the preemptive biases of domestic legislation and the acts conferring authority on international institutions. Most important, the obligations that may be developed under international authority presumptively apply against the
national government as well, which may make it hesitate before giving
them automatic legal effect. Even where the international institution’s
scope of authority is more likely to implicate state sovereignty under the
U.S. system, the national government’s long-term interests apparently include maintaining the flexibility afforded by a dualist system.
This symmetry of interests is not, of course, unalterable. International law’s bias toward making the national government alone responsible for international delicts might, in theory, be offset were the national
government to legislate so as to give international rules and decisions preemptive effect as against state law only—diminishing any prior symmetry
of interests.435 But the weight of practice is surely to the contrary. The
U.S. persistence in seeking federalism-based RUDs above and beyond
those required by the Constitution,436 and its protracted defense of state
interests arising from violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,437 indulged the states even where national and state interests
alia, improved consultation with national authorities, adoption of presumption against
preemption, and respect for state and local law).
434. See Sager, One Voice, supra note 362, at 106–07; see also supra note 330 and
accompanying text (noting relevant provisions of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round).
435. It seems unlikely that the discrimination would be accommodated on the
international plane, given the resistance of other nations and international institutions to
assuming claims against the states. For discussion, see Swaine, Treaty Power, supra note
224, at 450–57.
436. See id. at 441–47.
437. The Convention grants foreign detainees the right to consult with consular
officials. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, ¶ 1(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292. Several cases
before the International Court of Justice have concerned violations by U.S. states of their
obligation under the Convention. See Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶¶ 42–46 (March 31, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); LaGrand Case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 516 (June 27); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Order,
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 10 (Mar. 3); Concerning
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Order, Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 253–55 (Apr. 9). In those proceedings,
the United States invoked federalism as a reason to limit any remedy for the states’ breach.
See, e.g., Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America (LaGrand Case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.)) ¶¶ 121–126 (Mar. 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (alluding to
constitutional restrictions on U.S. federal authority); Counter-Memorial Submitted by the
United States of America (Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.))
185, 193, 214–15 (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Supreme Court, and other federal courts, have
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nominally diverged. While the states’ traditional roles may protect them
more effectively in domestic matters,438 the visceral U.S. distrust of international institutions—exemplified still more clearly in non-self-execution
RUDs, which benefit the national government and the state alike439—at
least arguably diminishes the gap.440
Of more immediate relevance to international delegations, the legislation implementing NAFTA and the Uruguay Round suggests that the
pull of symmetry—in which the national government protects the states
as it would itself—is strong. Each statute contains a section barring any
treaty provision “inconsistent with any law of the United States” from having legal effect.441 The symmetrical reservation of U.S. sovereignty is coualso resisted U.S. obligations, which have thus far arisen solely with respect to state
prosecutions. See F.R.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999) (per curiam)
(asserting, in declining original jurisdiction, that “a foreign government’s ability here to
assert a claim against a State is without evident support in the Vienna Convention and in
probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles”); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371, 377 (1998) (per curiam) (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment might bar suit by
Paraguay to set aside criminal conviction and sentence); Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270,
280 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that precedent dictated that petitioner’s claim was
procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative, that Vienna Convention did not confer an
individually enforceable right); Swaine, Treaty Power, supra note 224, at 435 n.131 (citing
additional case law).
The effect of insulating state criminal processes from federal intervention, however,
may have the indirect effect of necessitating intervention by state authorities—since, given
the lack of any available relief through federal habeas corpus proceedings, state
postconviction processes may be the only recourse. See Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04442, slip op. at 7 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., specially concurring)
(noting that “Avena directs the United States to review and reconsider Torres’ conviction
and sentence in light of the consequences of the treaty violation”). But see id., slip op. at 3
(Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (concluding that Torres’s claim was barred by res judicata and
waiver, and that “[t]he Avena decision cannot revive a stale claim”).
438. See supra text accompanying note 373 (discussing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396 (2003)).
439. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 65, at 407–09, 419–22, 447–49
(describing, and defending, practice). The national government may take the additional
step, in the further legislation occasioned by some non-self-execution RUDs, of
simultaneously precluding inferences of preemptive or later-in-time effect. See infra text
accompanying note 441 (noting provisions in Uruguay Round Agreements Act and
NAFTA).
440. U.S. attitudes toward international institutions vary across time and by
institution; they also may not be markedly more hostile to the principle of international
institutions than those of citizens in other developed states. See Luck, supra note 4, at
34–40. But it is fair to assume that Americans are more likely to be vigilant in insisting on
safeguards as against international institutions, including for state and local governments,
than they are with respect to incursions by the national government. See, e.g., Rubenfeld,
supra note 14, at 27–29 (depicting inconsistency between constitutionalism as understood
by Americans and its international variants, which embody “universal principles that derive
their authority from sources outside natural democratic processes”); Peter J. Spiro, The
New Sovereigntists, Foreign Aff., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9, 9 (describing keen antiinternationalist tendencies in American thought).
441. NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (2000); Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1). While the reference to U.S. law may be
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pled with a bar on private enforcement against either the United States
or the states.442 The statutes do acknowledge the ability of the United
States to challenge state law for its inconsistency with the agreement (and
not vice versa), and presume the ability of the United States to legislate so
as to preempt inconsistent state law (again, not vice versa). But the accompanying Statement of Administrative Action notes that such steps
were never taken under the GATT443—and each piece of implementing
legislation is accompanied by safeguards designed to accommodate the
states at the international and at the national levels.444
Anecdotal evidence aside, the problem remains that international
delegations are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed. If the managerial decentralization advocated by Rubin and Feeley is vulnerable to the
criticism that it lasts only so long as it suits the national government,
don’t international delegations persist for only so long as the United
States desires them? Whatever the frailties of the Tenth Amendment,
one may at least depend upon the continuing existence of the states,445
whereas U.S. international commitments are hardly so certain. The lastin-time rule, indeed, suggests a bias against attributing any constitutional
character to international commitments.446
ambiguous, the legislative history of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act makes clear that
the language was intended to encompass both federal and state law, and reflected concern
about the lawmaking potential of the WTO in particular. The Uruguay Round
Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative Action, attached to H.R. Rep. No. 103-826,
pt. 1, at 656 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4050.
442. See NAFTA Implementation Act § 3312(c); Uruguay Round Agreements Act
§ 3512(c).
443. H.R. Rep. No. 103-361, pt. 1, at 142 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2863,
2872 (quoting representation by Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, that
“[a]lthough ultimately the federal government . . . retains the authority to overrule
inconsistent state law through legislation or civil suit, use of this authority has not been
necessary in the nearly half-century history of the GATT or the five years that the CFTA has
been in effect”); accord Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong.
(1994); The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative Action,
attached to H.R. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 656 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4053 (stating that federal government retains authority to overrule inconsistent state law,
but noting that this authority had never been necessary during history of GATT).
444. These include consultation prior to and during the implementation of the
agreement, involvement in the development of U.S. positions in the dispute resolution
process, etc. See supra notes 16, 330 and accompanying text.
445. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (protecting states from loss of territory absent
their consent); id. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to each state a republican form of
government).
446. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (“‘[A]n Act of
Congress . . . is on full parity with a treaty, and . . . when a statute which is subsequent in
time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty
null.’” (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (Black, J.))); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“[T]he last expression of the sovereign will must
control.”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“[I]f there be any conflict
between the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter must
control.”); Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
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The last-in-time rule does not, however, affect a nation’s obligations
on the international plane,447 where obligations are surprisingly sticky—
if not precisely constitutional in tenure. As previously discussed, the nature of international institutions exercising delegated authority—the difficulty in constraining their behavior, the difficulty in escaping their jurisdiction, and the continued (relative) benefits of membership—makes
exit difficult.448 As compared to the domestic context, Congress not only
cedes authority, but also finds it relatively hard to reassume, and thereby
assumes durable obligations binding the national government. This characteristic, which distinguishes international delegations from the baseline
of ordinary legislation, may also redeem them as a constitutional
safeguard.
3. International Delegations and the Other Virtues of Federalism. — Diffusion is not the only plausible justification for domestic federalism. Another justification involves citizen choice: the prospect that federal systems better accommodate a heterogeneous society by permitting citizens
to locate and influence polities more closely aligned with their preferences.449 The claimed benefits of citizen choice dovetail with the idea
that federalism may help promote affective or political communities,
which may then in turn help constitute individual identity.450
Neither value would be satisfied by diffusion on a top-down, national
basis. It is not as though exclusive federal authority simply substitutes for
state authority;451 if the legislation is nationwide in its application, it displaces state authority, in all its variety, all at once.452 The number of laws
bearing on a particular resident, at a given point in time, may not vary as
between the scenarios,453 but the number of different laws that they
States § 115(1)(a) (1987) (providing for superseding effect of later statutes); id. § 115(2)
(providing for superseding effect of later treaties); supra notes 184–188 (citing authorities
suggesting that vulnerability to last-in-time doctrine diminishes significance of
internationally delegated authority).
447. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115(1)(b)
(“That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is
superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international
obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.”).
448. See supra text accompanying notes 184–185, 285–297.
449. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 918–20 (critically reviewing claim).
450. Id. at 936–51 (critically reviewing claim). I address the related concerns about
the democratic costs of international delegations further below. See infra text
accompanying notes 474–482.
451. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 934 (describing how, where the federal
government has taken complete control of an area, “federal intervention neither increased
nor decreased the dispersion of power”).
452. The equity concerns motivating national uniformity may be persuasive or not,
but there is little doubt that they motivate national intervention. See McKinnon &
Nechyba, supra note 383, at 6, 9–10, 54–55 (arguing that “an equality of outcomes
standard of equity in the provision of a particular service,” such as public education, “leads
to centralization of that service”).
453. That is, between the scenario in which the states are constitutionally guaranteed
a role in order to diffuse power held by the national government, and the scenario in
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might potentially access and influence does. Rubin and Feeley reply, of
course, that the national government can accommodate differences
through decentralization. They also suggest that citizen choice and community building take place, typically, at a level well below the state, that
both are driven more by political culture than by legal forces, and that in
the United States each increasingly pales in comparison to the development of a national, more homogenous culture.454
Whatever the merits of this rebuttal for domestic, top-down diffusion, it is inadequate for the problems posed by international delegations.
Federalism vindicated through international delegations appears inconsistent with both national and subnational mechanisms for securing citizen choice and community building. If citizen affinity resides, in any
case, no higher than the national level, the transnational homogeneity
created by international institutions is unsatisfactory.455
At least two offsetting considerations warrant mention. First, international institutions may help correct imperfections in U.S. federalism.
Constitutional federalism preserves state sovereignty not only to protect
the states and their institutions against national intervention, but also to
preserve competition among states and to prevent undesired interference
by some states with others.456 State barriers to trade with disproportionate impact on other states, for example, warrant congressional intervention, or constitutional preclusion, in a fashion perfectly consistent with
respect for federalism. The exaggerated political clout of small states
within the national government, moreover, may block acts that might be
taken on behalf of other states.457 International intervention against
such state barriers, or against national barriers affecting local interests,
thus may be of value in curing political impediments to national
action.458
which the national government gradually intervenes in areas previously regulated
exclusively by the states.
454. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 940–50.
455. It is possible, presumably, for international institutions to decentralize, and there
is occasional recognition within organizations of principles like subsidiarity or devolution.
See, e.g., OECD, Managing Across Levels of Government 13 (1997), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/14/1902308.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(examining concept of governance relative to public management changes and reforms in
intergovernmental relations in OECD member states). Perhaps the most tangible
realization has been special and differential accommodation for developing countries.
Joint Group on Trade and Competition, OECD, The Role of “Special and Differential
Treatment” at the Trade, Competition and Development Interface 20–21 (Dec. 4, 2001),
OECD Doc. COM/TC/DAFFE/CLP(2001)21/Final, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/49137/2072318.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
456. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 325, at 76–77; see also Bednar et al., supra note
383, at 224–25, 228–29.
457. See supra note 316.
458. The steel safeguards found illegal by the WTO, for example, benefited some U.S.
companies (steel producers) at the expense of others (those consuming steel), giving rise
to conflicting regional interests even within the United States. The original decision to
impose tariffs seems to have been predicated on the importance of securing political
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International institutions occasionally address constitutional interstices as well. For example, as previously noted, the review by GATT panels
of state alcohol taxes and regulations struck at the heart of state authority
under the Twenty-first Amendment.459 Whether or not that state authority constitutes an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause remains
unclear, but some precedent suggests that states have retained exceptional authority to significantly impair interstate trade.460 In such an
event, international intervention—heedless, in effect, of an ad hoc state
prerogative—may be the only mechanism for securing a prerogative for
the greater good.
Second, international delegations present the question of whether
there can be new kinds of communities, beyond both localities and nation-states. At present, there is no global political community as such,
and no means of guaranteeing the liberal preconditions for a polity;461
any stronger, but nonpolitical, bond appears untenable simply as a matter
of scale.462 While there are those who insist on the potential for collecsupport in steelmaking states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; over time,
political advisors came to weigh more heavily the interests representing steel users, and to
consider the prospect that retaliatory tariffs imposed by the European Union could fall on
equally significant states. See Paul Blustein & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Loses Appeal on
Steel Tariffs, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 2003, at A1. A subsequent panel decision finding that
U.S. cotton subsidies were unlawful may prove to have a similarly sharp regional impact,
Paul Blustein, U.S. Farmers Get a Lesson In Global Trade, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2004, at A1,
and prove a blow to politically dominant lobbies within the United States—to the benefit
of other interests that may prefer free trade. See The Cotton Club, Wall St. J., Apr. 28,
2004, at A16; Scott Miller, WTO Cotton Ruling May Help Subsidy Opponents, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 28, 2004, at A15. While these benefits may seem like happenstance, the
antidiscrimination function performed by international trade institutions serves as an
excellent examplar. See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra
note 284, at 542–48 (describing democracy-reinforcing effects of WTO).
459. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
460. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on several of the cases raising
this issue. Compare Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524–28 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
state law permitting direct shipment sales by in-state wineries, but restricting imports from
out-of-state wineries, violated the dormant Commerce Clause), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Granholm v. Heald, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962 (2004), cert. granted in part sub nom. Mich.
Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass’n v. Heald, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962 (2004), Dickerson v. Bailey, 336
F.3d 388, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2003) (same), and Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 514–17 (4th
Cir. 2003) (same), with Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231–39 (2nd Cir. 2004)
(upholding similar state law against dormant Commerce Clause challenge), cert. granted,
158 L. Ed. 2d 962 (2004), and Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853–54 (7th
Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001). See generally Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (describing precedent as confirming that Twenty-first Amendment
“primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause”).
461. See supra text accompanying note 303.
462. Rubin and Feeley, distinguishing between political and affective communities,
describe the latter as involving a personal, emotional connection among people, “often
[established] through ongoing, day-to-day relationships.” Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24,
at 938–39. The notion of affective communities is sometimes sketched more broadly, see,
e.g., Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism 187–92 (1968) (defining an affective
community as “the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture”), but as Rubin and Feeley
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tive global decisionmaking,463 or the possibility that some other kind of
collectivity may arise,464 these arguments seem too utopian to be considered in any contemporary analysis.
At the same time, establishing a constitutional rule limiting U.S. engagements would be unduly severe. Democratic community building has
gradually moved from small city-states to nations, and the notion of
global communities is not self-evidently more outlandish than the modern nation-state may have once seemed.465 If U.S. ambivalence about international institutions were ossified as a constitutional bar, it would risk
estranging U.S. citizens from the rest of the world, limiting both the nature of their own community and the possibility that a shared community
might arise. Any constitutional barrier to international delegations
would also interfere with the potential competition for affinity among the
international community, the federal government, and the states.466 Finally, a constitutional bar would reduce the prospect for heterogeneity in
the linkages between local communities and international institutions; at
present, the dialogic relationship emerging from U.S. relationships with
international institutions may help establish a new model for imitation by
other nations struggling to effectively integrate themselves.467 Enforcing
a broad proscription on international engagements, accordingly, would
be substantially inconsistent with the broader thesis of federalism.
observe, usually in the context of personal relationships, Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at
937 n.124. Given those preconditions, they naturally conclude that “all, or virtually all,
American states are far too large to function as affective communities”—presumably
casting doubt on the feasibility of global affective communities. Id. at 940.
463. See, e.g., Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 Stan. J. Int’l L. 191 (2000)
(proposing grassroots organization of popularly elected international citizens’ assembly).
464. See, e.g., Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World 192–93 (2002) (discussing
prospect that international institutions will contribute to heterogenous world community);
Pippa Norris, Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens, in Governance in a
Globalizing World 155, 173–75 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000) (citing
evidence indicating resistance to cosmopolitanism, but also long-term movement of public
opinion “in a more internationalist direction”). See generally Symposium, What is the
International Community?, Foreign Pol’y, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 28 (presenting nine authors’
views on existence, membership, and purposes of international community).
465. See Roland Axtmann, Liberal Democracy into the Twenty-First Century 117–18
(1996).
466. Cf. Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s
Forgotten Marketplace, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 329, 338–44 (2003) (describing constitutional
framework for such competition between national government and states).
467. Cf. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (2001)
(discussing constitutional implications of adoption of international treaties and norms by
U.S. state and local governments). The potential for an international dialogue is
abundantly clear. See John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes, Questions and Comparisons, in
Implementing the Uruguay Round 457, 457–59 (John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds.,
1997).
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4. The Tension Between Federalism and Nondelegation. — A final, critical
consideration is whether this redemption of international delegations in
federalism terms has simply forgotten about the nondelegation problem.
Nondelegation doctrine has as its object, after all, preventing Congress
from giving away power. If we take federalism to be concerned with the
prospect that Congress will seize power, and if we applaud its choice to do
the opposite by giving away power to international institutions, then perhaps we are simply denying that delegation is of primary concern.468
One answer is that it is simplistic to speak of losses of congressional
power in this sense. Part of Posner and Vermeule’s claim, recall, was that
delegating is not necessarily inconsistent with congressional control over
its agents (or with the ability of voters and interest groups, in turn, to
exercise control over Congress).469 Even if that claim has less force with
regard to international delegations, for reasons already belabored,470 the
fact remains that the impetus for delegation derives from need and expediency—as with any delegation, we may suppose, Congress delegates because it cannot manage all tasks by itself, or because its members wish to
take advantage of an agent’s talents.471 Even where Congress delegates in
order to off-load perceived responsibility, it presumably has a reason,
even if it is still feasible to hold it accountable for its choices.472
Delegations, in this view, are primarily about the changed use of congressional power, with fewer negative implications for the underlying values of nondelegation than might be supposed. With regard to welfare
effects, it is hard to say whether international delegations are generally
detrimental, and impossible to show that they are invariably so. International delegations may be positive not only due to overall capacity restraints on Congress, or because of the diminished sway of interest
groups, but also because of the gains from international cooperation that
could not be achieved unilaterally.473
The antidemocratic effects, however, are more troubling. International delegations give power to officials and institutions that “are not
accountable, directly or indirectly, exclusively to the American electo-

468. See The Federalist No. 48, supra note 340, at 309 (James Madison)
(acknowledging“danger from legislative usurpations”); Freedman, supra note 298, at 309
(noting that “the Framers may not have regarded the prospect of voluntary legislative
divestments of power as particularly worrisome”); Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra
note 23, at 1733–34 (“The Framers’ principal concern was with legislative
aggrandizement—the legislative seizure of powers belonging to other institutions—rather
than with legislative grants of statutory authority to executive agents.”).
469. See supra notes 267–272, 299–300 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 273–296, 303–314 and accompanying text.
471. See Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 23, at 1744.
472. See id. at 1746–47.
473. See supra text accompanying note 297.
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rate,”474 and indeed may not be accountable to much of anyone at all.475
The comparison as against any harm to governance by American states is
even starker: International institutions have less proximity to the people
than does the national government, let alone state or local
governments.476
The implications of this comparison for the case against international delegations may be profound. International institutions serve the
end of diffusion because they establish another level of government—
with its own entitlement to make law—to check the objectives of the national and state governments. But the Framers’ case for the checking
function performed by national and state governments on one another
depended on their common fidelity to the American people. As Madison
observed in The Federalist No. 46,
[T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found,
resides in the people alone, and . . . it will not depend merely on
the comparative ambition or address of the different governments whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge
its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no
less than decency, requires that the event in every case should
be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their
common constituents.477
Madison implied that even if a government less tied to a common
constituency might check the ambitions of other governments, it should
not be embraced for extrinsic, democratic reasons.478 If so, the check
474. Golove, supra note 15, at 1699–1700 (describing objection posed by some
scholars); see also supra text accompanying note 312. Professor Golove is dubious,
however, that this rises to a constitutional offense. Golove, supra note 15, at 1699–1701;
accord John Gerard Ruggie, American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global
Governance 26 (Kennedy School of Government Working Paper, RWP04-006, Feb. 2004)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
475. See supra notes 303–309 and accompanying text.
476. This ignores, for simplicity’s sake, arguably antidemocratic characteristics of
federalism, as in the power of small states in national assemblies. See supra note 316. But
see Robert A. Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in Nomos XXV: Liberal
Democracy 95, 107 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983) (concluding that
federal systems are in principle as capable of democratic representation as unitary, or
nonfederal, systems).
477. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 340, at 294 (James Madison). The reliance on
the people as the common denominator is also evident in The Federalist Nos. 28 and 51,
see supra text accompanying note 380 (quoting texts), and has been noted by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–60 (1991).
478. Samuel Beer appears to take the view that Madison’s allegiance to the people
and to divided government were not only functionally consistent, but entirely
interdependent—that is, that under the federal scheme the “outcome ‘in every case’ . . . will
‘depend on the sentiments and sanction’” of the constituents common to the states and
the national government. Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of
American Federalism 298 (1993) (quoting Madison, but adding emphasis); id. at 295–301.
If that is the argument, it seems patently wrong, even were it a correct interpretation of
Madison, since the residents of one state might universally favor the state’s policy goal but
still lose to the national constituency favoring another policy goal.
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that international institutions may afford is decidedly inferior, if not
intolerable.479
There are also good reasons, however, to regard the democracy argument against international delegation as less than decisive. Accountability for international delegations will differ materially from that for ordinary legislative exercises because exclusive and immediate control is
compromised by the need to share authority with other nations. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that decisions to delegate authority
to international institutions are completely lacking in accountability.
Congress may, after all, be held responsible for authority it has distributed even in excess of its continuing power over the agent; in consequence, it is not inconsistent to imagine the national government giving
up power—i.e., putting final authority in the hands of others—without
rendering it unaccountable for the original decision to set up the irrevocable power. The measured view, I believe, is that delegations to international institutions are not the democratic equivalent of ordinary legislation or even international agreements, but nor is it as though the
international institutions in question have been vested with authority by a
monarch. National democratic processes are, in an important regard,
tied to the decisions made by international delegates, even if the strength
of that connection leaves something to be desired.
Moreover, putting aside the prospects for democratic governance in
international matters,480 the adverse impact on democratic values is ameliorated by the character of the decisions entrusted to international institutions. The expectations of exclusive electoral accountability are upended if we presume that the problems involved indeed affect others
outside the United States.481 As Susan Marks observed, replying to the
479. One might also invoke, as is sometimes done, the Founders’ aversion toward
foreign entanglements. See, e.g., Ryan A. Candee, Book Annotation, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. &
Pol. 893, 893 (2001) (reviewing Delegating State Powers: The Effect of Treaty Regimes on
Democracy and Sovereignty, supra note 283) (citing view held by some scholars that the
constitutional structure disfavors such entanglements). The policy against foreign
entanglements, originating in Washington’s second term and encapsulated in his farewell
address, emphasized that choosing sides in European affairs might expose the United
States to reprisals. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Washington’s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy
of Independence, 39 Am. Hist. Rev. 250, 262–64 (1934); George Washington, Farewell
Address (Sept. 19, 1796), available at http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/farewell/transcript.
html (last visited Aug. 31, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Involvement in international institutions, however, not only seems distinct from these
“foreign” entanglements, but may even be regarded as consistent with that concern—
insofar as the institutions adopt less partisan stances, enforce norms like
nondiscrimination, and temper inconsistent unilateral and multilateral conduct. But see,
e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 52–54 (establishing separate principles respecting use of force
under regional arrangements); John H. Jackson, The World Trading System 165–67,
169–73 (2d ed. 1997) (describing awkward accommodation of bilateral and regional
trading arrangements under the WTO).
480. See supra text accompanying notes 303–314.
481. Golove, supra note 15, at 1700 n.8.
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claimed virtues of international lawmaking and enforcement by national
leaders “who are accountable to the people,”
[D]emocratic legitimacy depends on accountability to those affected by such activities. In this context, those affected will necessarily include citizens of other countries, among them countries very probably not represented in the relevant
[transgovernmental] network. . . . When options in one country
are shaped . . . by decisions in other countries, national democracy—no matter how widespread and how deep-rooted—cannot
suffice.482
The point, to be clear, is not that national democracies are being obviated, or that any international community exists that should supplant
their decisions483—or even, for that matter, that incremental harm to national democratic values should be overlooked. The more limited argument, instead, is that while delegating legislative authority to international institutions may result in less democratic decisionmaking than
would decisions about domestic matters by national (or state) institutions,
decisions about international matters are a different kettle of fish. The
international context matters, in other words, not only in evaluating the
salience of the nondelegation principle, and the potential for harm to its
underlying values, but also in alleviating what might otherwise be
debilitating objections.
B. Qualifications
The foregoing discussion reemphasizes that not all international
delegations are created equal. Among other things, the complexity of
the international mechanism involved, its transparency, the nature of the
interests affected, and its scope of authority will bear upon the risks of
interest group monitoring, citizen monitoring, and capture484—all of
which suggest the hazard of any generalized constitutional proscription.
482. Susan Marks, Democracy and International Governance, in The Legitimacy of
International Organizations, supra note 61, at 47, 58; accord David Held, The
Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of
Globalization, in Democracy’s Edges, supra note 298, at 84, 103–06 [hereinafter Held,
Transformation] (arguing that decisionmaking centers beyond national territories are
appropriate when those significantly affected constitute a transnational grouping).
483. Professor Held, while decidedly optimistic about the potential for
cosmopolitanism, is explicit about this. See Held, Transformation, supra note 482, at 103.
484. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J.
Int’l L. 381, 385 (2000) (arguing that international institutions with plenary authority to
sustain multilateral agreements are subject to special-interest group capture, as these
institutions are distant from affected polities); McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade
Constitution, supra note 284, at 515 (arguing that WTO would give leverage to
protectionist special-interest groups if empowered to substantively regulate); Stephan,
supra note 12, at 699–701 (suggesting that special-interest groups can lobby international
lawmakers at lower cost, though with higher monitoring costs for the public, than they can
domestic lawmakers).
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Even so, the federalism rationale sketched above supports several intuitions about appropriate limits to international delegations.
1. Monopolizing Delegations. — International organizations scholarship has chronicled two related phenomena: the proliferation of international organizations, on the one hand, and the growing competences of
previously specialized organizations, on the other. The introduction of
new, postcolonial nations into international affairs, together with the expanded scope of problems deemed amenable to international solution,
has led to a slow but steady growth in the number of international organizations.485 While the number of “traditional” international organizations
remained constant or dropped, the aggregate number of international
organizations—including, for example, those created under the aegis of
the UN, without a separate undertaking by its members—increased significantly.486 The spread of international organizations, and in particular
their self-replication, diminishes the influence of traditionally powerful
nations,487 and so may concern those occupied with the loss of U.S.
sovereignty.488
A second, parallel trend has been toward the internal proliferation of
functions, resulting in the development of conglomerate organizations.
The phenomenon of “mission creep” is as common to international organizations as it is to other bureaucracies.489 Perhaps the most significant
example is the WTO, which has seen its mandate expand with each successive round of negotiations.490 The WTO’s principals seem to follow
485. See Jan Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in The
Legitimacy of International Organizations, supra note 61, at 221, 223 (citing “birth and
death” statistics for agencies within the UN, and claiming that they may be generalized to
bureaucratic growth outside the UN as well); Stein, supra note 12, at 489 & n.2 (stating
that most intergovernmental organizations created between 1982 and 1992 were founded
by other intergovernmental organizations rather than by governments).
486. David Held, Democracy and The Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance 108 (1995); Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the
Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992, 50 Int’l Org. 593,
598–600 (1996). For an updating of this analysis, and summary of causal explanations, see
Niels Blokker, Proliferation of International Organizations: An Exploratory Introduction,
in Proliferation of International Organizations: Legal Issues 1, 2–14 (Niels M. Blokker &
Henry G. Schermers eds., 2001) [hereinafter Proliferation].
487. See Shanks et al., supra note 486, at 600 (noting that powerful member states
exert less influence over “emanations” from international organizations than in traditional
methods of international lawmaking).
488. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty:
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 282–83 (1995) (describing
resistance by developed nations to new, specialized agencies, which are perceived to regard
developing nations as their principal clients).
489. See, e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, Foreign Aff., Sept./
Oct. 2001, at 22 (arguing that World Bank’s mission has grown unmanageably complex as
it has assumed challenges beyond its operational capabilities).
490. For a summary of insights into the causes and limits, see José E. Alvarez, The
WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 146 (2002) [hereinafter Alvarez, The WTO as
Linkage Machine].
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what John Jackson termed the “bicycle theory”—“unless there is forward
movement, the bicycle will fall over”491—and the WTO is under continual pressure to expand its mandate further to “non-trade” issues.492 This
is not, needless to say, free of controversy; academics debate the wisdom
of linkage, and widespread objections to expanding the WTO’s mandate
destroyed negotiations in Seattle and threatened to derail the WTO
entirely.493
Defining these rival phenomena is hard—for example, developing
new departments within an organization may be regarded as proliferation
or conglomeracy494—as is generalizing about the merits of one or the
other. As a general proposition, though, the diffusion defense of international delegations favors proliferation and disfavors conglomeracy, to the
extent they are alternatives. Adding more international organizations
maps roughly onto the preference of federalism for diversifying governance.495 Indeed, to the extent that organizations multiply without establishing any hierarchy among them,496 they more closely approximate the
benefits of decentralization without the impediment of adding
“trumps.”497 The downsides, of course, are coordination problems and
491. John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and
Jurisprudence 24 (1998).
492. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Foreword to Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO,
96 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 3 (2002) (“Pressures to link will continue to arise both from business
interests eager to expand economic liberalization to new sectors such as investment and
from prominent members of ‘international civil society.’”).
493. See generally Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 1
(2002) (addressing reasons that WTO members may want to link WTO to issues ostensibly
unrelated to trade).
494. For one of many discussions of whether the UN should be regarded as a
coherent organization, and whether coordination within it is feasible, see Nigel D. White,
The World Court, the WHO, and the UN System, in Proliferation, supra note 486, at 85,
85–109.
495. It is also roughly consistent with calls for deliberative, fragmented governance.
See, e.g., Perez, supra note 55, at 47 (extolling “fragmented view of the political
experience” that “fits nicely with the decentralized nature of contemporary global law,
which knows no ‘universal center’”). See generally Marco Verweij & Timothy E. Josling,
Special Issue: Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organization, 16 Governance 1
(2003).
496. This is indeed the case as a general matter. International agreements are not
supposed to be construed or administered in such a way as to cause conflict with other
international obligations. But assuming a potential conflict, there are very few supremacy
principles governing relations among international organizations once one goes beyond
the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 103 (providing that “[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail”). The trading system, for example, depends upon conflictreducing norms like the most favored nation principle, but has not been so successful at
establishing a clear priority among multilateral, regional, and bilateral instruments. See
supra note 479.
497. See generally Gillette, supra note 383 (examining effects of decentralized
“trumps” over centralized government authority).
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the risk of imposing conflicting obligations on member nations—though
even that arguably tempers the bite of any international law emanating
from the relevant institutions, and so enhances national and subnational
discretion to choose among the relevant obligations.498
Conglomeracy, on the other hand, poses more tangible concerns.
With respect to the U.S. system, Professors Rubin and Feeley expressed
skepticism that “the aggregation of federal power across a broad range of
governmental areas represents a dangerous concentration of power, even
if its effect, in individual areas, is to disperse power among multiple authorities.”499 But adding breadth to international institutions may be too
much of a good thing. Sunken investments in a particular institution,
linked benefits, and path dependence generally make it more difficult for
a nation to exit an expanding institution than to decline to join a new
one.500 This is valuable, for reasons already stated, insofar as it makes the
commitment to international institutions more closely resemble a constitutional commitment to diffusion.501 It is counterproductive, on the
other hand, to the extent that it accentuates the democracy deficit in the
present governance of international institutions,502 or eclipses the ability
to make constitutional changes that might reconcile the interests of supranational and subnational governments.503
498. See Blokker, supra note 486, at 14–16 (noting coordination issue and view of
commentators that proliferation might imperil authority of existing principles and
generation of new ones). At the extreme, though, the only result is chaos. See Chayes &
Chayes, supra note 488, at 283 (citing estimate that 180 different environmental bodies
demanded active involvement by Swedish government).
499. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 24, at 934.
500. See, e.g., Alvarez, The WTO as a Linkage Machine, supra note 490, at 148 (“The
WTO encouraged path dependencies through sunk costs, learning and coordination
effects, and adaptive expectations.”); Martin & Simmons, supra note 284, at 459
(suggesting that “states are least likely to be willing to withdraw from an institution in the
face of unanticipated consequences when they are dealing with issues that exhibit
increasing returns to scale, which, in turn, create conditions of path dependence”); see
also text accompanying notes 184–185 (noting gulf between theoretical and practical ease
of withdrawing from the WTO).
501. This may be a partial explanation for why national governments tend to resist
conglomeracy. See Henry G. Schermers, Final Remarks, in Proliferation, supra note 486,
at 549, 549 (“One large, strong hierarchically structured organization might be more
effective but, apparently, governments do not want that kind of threat to their sovereign
powers.”).
502. See, e.g., id. at 551 (expressing concern that “[o]ne large international
organization, hierarchically supervising and co-ordinating all activities of other
organizations may become so powerful that a sophisticated system of democratic legitimacy
would be required”).
503. The experience in the European Union to date has been relatively heartening.
Many have been concerned that the EU, like other supranational institutions, might
effectively transfer control over domestic affairs to institutions more susceptible of national
control. See, e.g., Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial
Restructuring and Political Change (1998); Naomi Roht-Arraiza, The Committee on the
Regions and the Role of Regional Governments in the European Union, 20 Hastings Int’l
& Comp. L. Rev. 413, 421–23 (1997); see also Vivien A. Schmidt, European “Federalism”
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If we truly value the federalist strengths of international delegations,
regional institutions may be the most appealing. First, because their
management and legal principles more likely correlate with regional
rather than universal norms, they will be more proximate to any regional
community that may exist. Second, insofar as federalism is concerned
with providing safeguards against the national government, regional institutions better permit exit by those governed. For example, a corporation
dissatisfied with residing in the United States, Canada, or Mexico—or, for
that matter, with residing in the European Union—has some alternatives,
though its trade in those regions will undoubtedly continue to be
fettered.504
To be sure, regionalism is not an unmitigated good. Redistributive
policies, for example, may be available only under conditions constraining flight.505 Proximity may also be a two-edged sword: Lower
levels in multilevel governance—the states in the U.S. federal system, the
cities in the state system, and perhaps regions in the international system—are sometimes said to act more repressively toward still more local
levels.506 Finally, the long-term repercussions are unknown. The conventional criticism is that regional institutions interfere with developing multilateral efforts that are better suited to the task,507 while others contend
that regionalism is only a way station on the path to more global coordiand its Encroachments on National Institutions, 29 Publius 19 (1999). Others have
suggested that such institutions instead reinvigorate European federalism, and diminish
the stranglehold of national governments. See Udo Bullmann, The Politics of the Third
Level, in The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in
Europe? 3 (Charlie Jeffery ed., 1997); Jackie Jones, The Committee of the Regions,
Subsidiarity and a Warning, 22 Eur. L. Rev. 312, 314 (1997); John Newhouse, Europe’s
Rising Regionalism, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 67. The development of the principle
of subsidiarity under the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties and the parallel growth in the
authority of the Committee of the Regions, as amplified in the draft constitution presently
under discussion, suggest mounting evidence for the latter view. See Conference of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, arts. I-11, I-32, III-386–III-388, CIG 87/04 (Aug. 6, 2004),
available at http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087.en04.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing principle of subsidiary and basic functioning of
Committee of the Regions); cf. id. art. I-60 (providing, for the first time, explicit
authorization for voluntary withdrawal by member states from the European Union).
504. See Kenneth Norrie, Is Federalism the Future? An Economic Perspective, in
Rethinking Federalism, supra note 327, at 135, 146–50.
505. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1548–51
(1994) (discussing Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 66–92 (1981)).
506. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (explaining that federalism may
hinder local power).
507. See Bernard K. Gordon, A High-Risk Trade Policy, Foreign Aff., July/Aug. 2003,
at 105; see also John Odell & Barry Eichengreen, The United States, the ITO, and the
WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership, in The WTO as an
International Organization 181, 206 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998) (concluding that the
United States will have limited alternatives to the WTO for the near future, and that “[a]s
the web of U.S. trade relations spreads increasingly wide, regionalism will probably become
progressively less attractive as an alternative to multilateral negotiation”).
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nation.508 If the latter judgment is accurate, such that any disadvantages
to regionalism tend to be transient, it may provide an intermediate
course for reconciling localism, internationalism, and U.S. federalism.
2. Reverse Delegations. — Besides the U.S. Constitution, the constitutions of international institutions themselves may indicate whether
nondelegation and federalism values are in tension. One important
question concerns whether, and how, the principle of delegata potestas non
potest delegari (“a delegated authority cannot be again delegated”) is
heeded. While the authority of international organizations to delegate
power to subsidiary organs is widely presumed,509 the propriety of assuming the power to delegate outside the organization may be more controversial. More particularly, what may be called reverse delegations—in
which institutions vested with delegated authority pass that authority back
to their principals—are, in one view, presumptively acceptable if done so
as to respect sovereign equality and territorial integrity.510 Others would
require more specific authorization, and various other safeguards extrapolated from the delegata non potest maxim.511
The fact of the matter, in any case, is that some organizations do
engage in reverse delegation, and the most significant example exceeds
any territorial limit. The Security Council has repeatedly delegated its
authority over international peace and security to member states and regional organizations.512 Assuming that this practice is (or has become)
consistent with the UN Charter and general principles of international
law, it remains suspect as a matter of delegation values: The specter that
an international institution may be delegated authority, then redelegate
that authority in a manner that converts a national principal into the institution’s agent, raises serious accountability issues, particularly given the
potential limitations on curtailing the delegation under international
law.513
508. G.C.A. Junne, International Organizations in a Period of Globalization: New
(Problems of) Legitimacy, in The Legitimacy of International Organizations, supra note
61, at 189, 214.
509. Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective
Security: The Delegation by the U.N. Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers 16–18,
119 (1999); Schermers & Blokker, supra note 42, § 224.
510. Schermers & Blokker, supra note 42, § 229 (“As a rule, international
organizations may be considered to be entitled to delegate tasks to all member states, each
being obliged to perform them within their own territory.”); see also id. (“Delegation of
tasks of the organization to one or more specific member states will generally not be
permitted unless there are particular reasons, such as geographic position, which justify
such delegation.”).
511. See Sarooshi, supra note 509, at 18–49 (laying out general limitations on Security
Council’s powers of delegation); id. at 142–66 (laying out specific limitations on Security
Council’s delegations of power to member states).
512. Id. at 167–246 (citing, among other examples, conflicts in North Korea, Iraq,
Somalia, and Bosnia).
513. See supra note 181 (discussing reverse veto); see also Effect of Awards of
Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 56–63 (July 13)

R

R
R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-6\COL603.txt

1610

unknown

Seq: 119

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

19-OCT-04

11:01

[Vol. 104:1492

The Security Council’s practices may be unavoidable, absent any
standing international military, but similar problems may be identified in
other settings. For example, because the Clean Diamond Trade Act’s dependence on the WTO or the Security Council was perceived to present
an unconstitutional international delegation, the President interpreted
the Act as permitting the plenary evaluation of relevant international
measures.514 The obvious difficulty with that solution, though, is that it
converts a relatively esoteric assimilation problem into a garden-variety
nondelegation offense. In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court
distinguished between prior cases, in which “Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the
occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, [leaving] only
the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President,”
and the Line Item Veto Act, which would unconstitutionally permit the
President to cancel legislation based on an independent exercise of policy discretion.515 That reasoning appears to apply squarely to presidential assertions of standardless discretion to determine the domestic status
of international acts.
The problem of reverse delegations also has immediate relevance to
the compatibility of delegations with federalism. Federalism controversies involving NAFTA and the Uruguay Round were resolved by providing
that neither the international agreement, the implementing legislation,
nor even the decisions applying the agreement would automatically preempt state laws. That authority, instead, would rest initially in the hands
of the federal government, which could elect whether to initiate litigation
to effectively overrule the state law.516
This is generally considered to have been a triumph for cooperative
federalism,517 and is certainly critical in evaluating whether international
(upholding authority of General Assembly to constrain itself to be bound by the decisions
of its delegate exercising a delegated power, such as the power to render judgments
binding on the Assembly).
514. See supra note 100 (citing Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act,
39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 491 (Apr. 25, 2003) (“If section 15 imposed a mandatory duty
on the President to certify to the Congress whether either of the two specified events has
occurred and whether either remains in effect, a serious question would exist as to whether
section 15 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to international bodies.”)).
515. 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998) (distinguishing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)).
516. E.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102, 108
Stat. 4809, 4815–19 (2003) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)) (barring anyone other
than the United States, including private parties, from challenging U.S. or state action or
inaction based on its consistency with the statute, as well as providing a process by which
the United States is to consult with the states and provide notice to Congress before taking
legal action against a state or local government for noncompliance with the statute); see
Sager, One Voice, supra note 362, at 104–11 (quoting statements of administrative action
and legislative history).
517. See, e.g., Tangeman, supra note 16, at 258 (“NAFTA’s implementation of a
cooperative mechanism for state participation in federal decisions concerning
international trade activities should alleviate the fears that NAFTA violates state sovereignty
and restore that balance.”).
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delegations interfere with local autonomy and accountability. As a matter
of delegation, though, it treads a fine line. The executive branch ordinarily possesses the authority to refuse enforcement of the law in otherwise
meritorious cases when, in its judgment, doing so would have serious constitutional consequences.518 It is less common, however, for a statutory
scheme to contemplate what amounts to the executive veto, after the fact,
of the legal defense to a damages judgment—one running against the
United States. If this amounts to a redelegation to the executive branch,
it may at least be said that the benefits of diffusion are not being captured, and the accountability problems associated with delegations loom
relatively large.519
CONCLUSION
One of the greater ironies of globalization is how it has revived interest in local governance. The conventional wisdom is that the United
States abandoned federalism in our foreign affairs “even before it began
to be a wasting force in U.S. life generally.”520 One might fairly suppose
that “Our Federalism”521—an idea with dated and parochial connotations even within the United States—has still less current appeal internationally, and would either fade quietly or survive only as an idée fixe within
certain American circles.522
Yet those designing and evaluating international institutions often
allude to federalism as a leading template.523 Institutions are considered
518. See supra note 200 (noting that U.S. President may refuse to enforce statutes
that are considered unconstitutional).
519. Representative Kucinich made a similar argument in proposing an amendment
to the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1999, 144 Cong. Rec. 18981, 18981 (1998) (“Congress gave too
much power to the administration by permitting it to preempt the laws of local and State
governments on the grounds that they are inconsistent with international trade and
investment agreements. That is the function of Congress.”).
520. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 15, at 149; see supra note 366 and
accompanying text (noting obsolescence of dual federalism).
521. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
522. Michael Greve summarized the skeptical perspective, without entirely endorsing
it, in this way:
Federalism is about borders, and borders are disappearing in an age of enormous
economic, social, and geographic mobility. Trillions of dollars jump political
boundaries at the push of a button. . . . Millions of Americans spend half their
waking hours in cyberspace, a global forum where the prerogatives of the
Mississippi state government rarely become an issue. In short, federalism looks
fusty—the province of latent racists, pedantic social scientists, and opportunistic
political campaign consultants who understand the power behind the rebel flag.
Michael Greve, AEI Federalist Outlook, The AEI Federalism Project (July 2000), at http://
www.federalismproject.org/outlook (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
523. Daniel Elazar, for example, maintained that federalism was replacing liberal
internationalism. See Daniel J. Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Post
Modern Revival of Confederal Arrangements 15 (1998); Daniel J. Elazar, The State System
+ Globalization (Economic Plus Human Rights) = Federalism (State Federations Plus
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well-tailored when they address collective action problems and externalities of the type giving rise to the U.S. national government, while affording national autonomy as much respect as that owed U.S. states under the
domestic constitution.524 The reason, in principle, is not merely that international centralization is politically unattainable,525 but also that jurisdictional competition under federalism will yield appropriate regulation.526 Some perceive, indeed, that globalization will increasingly favor
a division of authority between international and subnational governments, with the real losers being national sovereigns.527
Regional Confederations), 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 555, 556–57 (1999); Raustiala, Rethinking,
supra note 12, at 845 (explaining that “[b]oth federalism and the creation of international
institutions suggest that power is best allocated across several levels of governance, rather
than aggregated at a single level,” while noting dissimilarities); see also Leslie Friedman
Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative
Context 4–5 (2001) (citing international organizations as progressive development from
sovereignty splintered by federal systems); cf. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch, reprinted in Kant’s Political Writings 93, 102 (Hans Reiss ed., 1970)
(urging that “[t]he Right of Nations Shall be based on a Federation of Free States”).
Perhaps the most important example is the European Union, which many perceive to be
making purposeful strides toward federalism (while zealously avoiding any official embrace
of that aim). Gerard Baker, Against United Europe, Wkly. Standard, Sept. 22, 2003, at 23;
Gerard Baker, How the EU Could Bulk Up, Bus. Wk., June 30, 2003, at 64. But cf. Perez,
supra note 55, at 42 (casting skeptical eye on “radical vision” of global federalism, and
holding up European Union as an example of its ills).
524. See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 284, at
542–44.
525. International federalism is invoked most frequently in disciplines where the
notions of centralizing authority and surrendering national autonomy are plainly
infeasible—such as antitrust, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism:
Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1781 (2000), and environmental law, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1283
(1997)—as is generally the case in international matters. Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to
the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, 14 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. & Yale J. on Reg. 177 (1996); see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International
Community, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1331, 1341 (1997) (addressing centralization in international
environmental regulation).
526. See Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 World
Trade Rev. 7, 18 (2002) (citing possibility for designing vertical competition between
international and national governments for “optimal public decisionmaking”). The
potential for such competition, and whether there are offsetting risks, clearly depends
upon the issue area. Cf. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics
of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo.
L.J. 201 (1997) (arguing for context-sensitive evaluation of prospects for competition, and
suggesting that burden lies with those invoking competition’s benefits).
527. See, e.g., Richard Simeon & Katherine Swinton, Introduction: Rethinking
Federalism in a Changing World, in Rethinking Federalism, supra note 327, at 3, 9
(“[G]lobalization is a greater threat to central governments than to state and provincial
governments, and, hence, that authority in the present era is being stretched like a
concertina, with influence flowing both upwards to public and private supranational
institutions and downwards to smaller units.”); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998
Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional
Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 109 (1999) (noting that sovereignty appears to be flowing
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The increasing clamor to the effect that globalization and domestic
federalism principles may be rivalrous, then, is somewhat ironic—if poetic justice, given the headaches that state governments posed for reaching, and abiding by, international agreements.528 But it also appears misconceived, or hasty at best. The delegation of authority to international
institutions certainly challenges the traditional prerogatives of states and
localities, as it does those of national governments, and the costs it exacts
are far less self-imposed. Given the loss of authority that accompanied
U.S. political and economic integration, it is unsurprising that states
would feel threatened, especially given the lack of any international analog to the U.S. Senate.
But if we look beyond the adverse effects international institutions
may have on the existing agents of U.S. federalism, the prospects are less
bleak. Taking international delegations seriously reveals a constitutional
character that serves, however inadvertently, many of the same ends as
have the U.S. states. On this view, delegations of lawmaking authority to
international institutions may promote the values underlying domestic
federalism, vindicating rather than cannibalizing their normative warrant—and doing so when the legitimacy of those institutions is at a critical juncture.529
This perspective also speaks to a puzzle of continuing significance to
legal scholarship: Why are some norms, like nondelegation and federalism, underenforced? The conventional story involves their amenability to
judicial enforcement; the conventional reaction to the resulting gaps between constitutional doctrine and practice is to redress them, either by
reviving enforcement or interring the doctrine. As this Article suggests, it
may be more appropriate to examine the values underenforced doctrines
seek to promote. Sometimes those values have reached their natural limits, or they encounter tensions endogenous to the doctrine itself—as
when it is recognized that Congress must delegate in order to ensure effective administration, or that a national government must intervene in
otherwise local domains in order to provide a collective good.
In the instant case, however, discovering legitimate bases for worrying about international delegations also provides a ground for resolving
an extrinsic constitutional objection—federalism—and reveals a potential reason actually to embrace those delegations. Here, at least, under“upward, to supranational government institutions” and “downward, to subnational
governments”).
528. I addressed each of these headaches in previous work. Swaine, Treaty Power,
supra note 224, passim (considering whether constitutional federalism obstructs exercise of
national treaty power); Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 221, passim (addressing
whether state foreign relations activities are precluded by national treaty power).
529. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 526, at 9–14 (describing erosion of rational,
bureaucratic foundation for the WTO); id. at 19 (describing compelling need for
enhancing public acceptance of WTO, and observing that “it is essential that ‘space’ be
reserved for separate domestic political processes . . . just as the US Constitution reserves
important elements of authority to the states”).
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enforcement respects the tradeoffs among our constitutional commitments, and resists readings of the Constitution that mistake the part for
the whole.530 International delegations may yet suffer constitutional infirmities, including on nondelegation and federalism grounds, but the
prudent course is to carefully assess their costs and benefits, not to dismiss them—and to acknowledge that international institutions may advance not only international governance, but the constitutional vision of
national governance as well.
530. Contrast, for example, Senator Helms’s speech before the UN, in which he
asserted an unavoidable link between delegated authority and the Constitution:
[W]hen the United States joins a treaty organization, it holds no legal authority
over us. We abide by our treaty obligations because they are the domestic law of
our land, and because our elected leaders have judged that the agreement serves
our national interest. But no treaty or law can ever supercede the one document
that all Americans hold sacred: The U.S. Constitution.
U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Address Before the
UN Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000), in 1 Sean D. Murphy, United States Practice in
International Law 5 (2002).

